A swift peace, American-style. Will Trump outplay Putin?

Her second term as President of the European Commission has been marked by growing attempts to challenge her authority. In July, Ursula von der Leyen narrowly survived a vote of no confidence.
During the current plenary session of the European Parliament (October 6–9), the issue of trust in her leadership will once again be put to a vote.
Support from centrists and moderate forces should grant the Commission President a temporary sense of stability — but will that support last?

The Best person for the job‍

Maryna Stepanenko: Since 2014, no President of the European Commission has faced a vote of no confidence, yet Ursula von der Leyen has found herself in this situation for the second time. What is the source of this political crisis?

Roland Freudenstein: Within the European Commission, critical voices toward its President are becoming more frequent — not only from political extremists but also from some centrists. However, everyone understands that, in reality, there is no alternative. That’s why the upcoming vote of no confidence is unlikely to succeed.

Some call Ursula von der Leyen “Europe’s strong voice in the world” and a consistent advocate for Ukraine’s interests across the continent. Others claim she lacks the persistence needed to see major initiatives through to the end. What would you identify as von der Leyen’s main strengths and weaknesses as a politician?

I would say her greatest strength lies in the power of her convictions and her incredible work ethic.

She is often described as a workaholic. She even turned her room on the 13th floor of the Commission’s headquarters in Brussels into a makeshift office.

Naturally, not everyone appreciates that. Some people dislike strong Commission Presidents; others simply dislike strong women. She has also faced criticism for not devoting enough attention to certain projects — though, in most cases, the circumstances worked against her.

The best example is the European Green Deal — an effort to balance Europe’s economic competitiveness with the fight against climate change. For years, the pendulum of public sentiment swung toward saving the planet, but that moment has passed. Now, von der Leyen is unable to deliver on all the “green course” initiatives she once championed at the start of her second term.

Although the summer’s vote of no confidence was unsuccessful, it exposed deep divisions within the European Parliament. How do you assess von der Leyen’s ability to maintain the support of various political groups during her second term?

— The very fact that her most ardent critics come from the far left and the far right is what ensures her survival. The left doesn’t want to vote with the right — and vice versa. Moreover, there truly is a sense, even among her critics, that no one else could do this job better than she does.

If we look at their own criteria — especially in areas such as social legislation, environmental policy, and respect for member states — I simply cannot imagine anyone else capable of fulfilling this role.

Her critics know this too, particularly those in the political center who may be dissatisfied with her style or certain decisions. In the end, even they admit it.

Is Ursula von der Leyen able to adjust her policies to satisfy both centrist and right-wing parties while maintaining the unity of the EU?

No, that’s impossible — you can’t please everyone. It’s the same in national politics: no head of government can satisfy all voters. That’s why von der Leyen must rely on a coalition of centrist forces.

Yet even within that coalition, maintaining consensus is extremely difficult — it requires constant compromise. And this is precisely where her strength and her work discipline play a positive role. To make compromises, you must be strong and guided by strong convictions. At the same time, you have to work relentlessly and cooperate with a vast number of decision-makers.

I am deeply convinced that Ursula von der Leyen is currently the best person for this job.

The Political Show of the Far Right

The influence of right-wing parties in the European Parliament is growing. How do you assess their impact on the EU’s political direction? Could they change the balance of power within the European People’s Party (EPP)?

Under the leadership of Manfred Weber, the European People’s Party has at times adopted positions aligned with the far right, allowing it to build a majority that extends beyond the classic centrist coalition of the EPP, liberals, social democrats, and greens. For instance, on certain provisions of the Green Deal, the EPP diverged from von der Leyen and pushed the Commission toward more right-leaning, pro-agricultural stances.

However, on strategic issues — European defense, support for Ukraine, and global trade agreements — its stance remains fully aligned with the EPP’s. The real problems tend to come from the left, particularly the socialists and the greens. One example was von der Leyen’s strong reaction to the situation in Israel and Gaza, which many EU members — including socialists and greens — saw as hasty and one-sided in favor of Israel.

So while the EPP has influenced von der Leyen’s program to some extent, on key strategic matters it remains close to her views.

Given the far-right parties’ support for the vote of no confidence against von der Leyen, could their goal be not just to change the leadership but to influence the overall direction of the EU?

Yes, that’s exactly what they’re trying to do. They aim for tactical victories by gathering as many votes as possible for a no-confidence motion against Ursula von der Leyen. They’re unlikely to win such votes, but their goal is to send a political message.

If you look at Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric, it becomes clear that Brussels is his enemy — and no one personifies Brussels more than Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission.
Of course, there are other influential figures — the Presidents of the Parliament and the Council, and High Representative Kaja Kallas — but von der Leyen is the most powerful of them all.

That’s why she has become a symbol of the EU institutions, which, according to Orbán, have grown too powerful and have led Europe in the wrong direction. Together with the Patriots for Europe (PFE) and other far-right groups, he wants to attack her publicly — and, through her, attack the very idea of the European Union.

They want to turn it into a grand political show.

Hungary, under Orbán’s leadership, has repeatedly blocked EU initiatives — especially those related to sanctions against Russia. How do you assess Orbán’s actions and their impact on von der Leyen’s position?

Viktor Orbán has effectively sided with Putin — he’ll never admit it, but that’s the truth. He believes the future belongs to dictators, wants to maintain close relations with them, and ultimately aspires to become one himself. He might even lose the next election, but that remains his worldview.

He rejects everything the EU stands for: shared sovereignty, strong Brussels institutions, and majority voting in the Council. He has also been a vocal opponent of Ukraine’s EU membership. However, in the coming weeks, the Council may attempt to bypass Hungary’s veto on sanctions against Russia.

At this point, not only Brussels institutions but also most EU member states have had enough of Orbán and are looking for ways to work around Hungary — and, in some cases, Slovakia as well.

That’s a major shift. Previously, member states disliked Orbán but rarely confronted him directly. Now, countries like Poland, the Baltic states, the Nordics, and even Germany sometimes do so openly. Orbán feels cornered. He continues to portray Brussels as the villain and the member states as the “good guys,” but in reality, most governments now openly oppose him. His fallback strategy is to delegitimize them by labeling them “elites” or “globalists” who no longer represent their nations. But since those governments were democratically elected, Orbán’s position is increasingly difficult.

Von der Leyen has publicly supported ending the EU’s unanimity rule in certain policy areas. Can this move be seen as radical or risky for her political career?

No, because she’s not the driving force behind this process. And she’s being very wise not to be — it would only reinforce the stereotype of her as a power-hungry Eurocrat bent on limiting member states’ rights. Let’s not forget that several member states themselves remain hesitant about majority voting in crucial areas.

It would be much better if another influential figure in Brussels — in this case, European Council President António Costa — took the lead, with member states’ backing. That way, the issue would appear political, not personal. Honestly, I don’t think the debate over majority voting will harm her career.

Disinformation and Russia’s Natural Enemy

How do you assess the role of disinformation in EU politics, particularly in campaigns targeting von der Leyen?

Its influence is significant. Russia is doing everything it can to increase tensions in European politics — both within member states and inside the Brussels bubble. The negative image of Ursula von der Leyen is part of that effort to fuel conflict. And of course, Russian disinformation and propaganda target her directly because of her strong and consistent stance on Ukraine. She is, quite simply, their natural enemy.

Russia is always trying to heighten political tensions and internal divisions within the European Union.

At the same time, I notice that people expressing Eurosceptic views or criticizing von der Leyen or Ukraine aren’t always doing so because the Kremlin is paying them. Sometimes, they genuinely believe what they say. That’s why I would be cautious about labeling every form of criticism as Russian disinformation or assuming that someone is on Putin’s payroll.

We need to counter such criticism with political arguments — not just by pointing fingers.

There is a widespread sense of frustration — a belief that things are going in the wrong direction, that wealth is distributed unfairly, that Europe isn’t generating enough economic growth, that too much is spent on defense and too little on social issues, and so on. These feelings are real. Russia seeks to exploit them to intensify political tensions. However, the right way to respond to this criticism is through political action — not merely by accusing people of taking money from Moscow.

Is the European Union responding actively enough to the threat of disinformation from third countries? What more should be done to strengthen the EU’s information security?

Neither national governments nor the EU itself should directly hire people to fight disinformation. Instead, they should fund projects that strengthen and empower civil society — for example, investigative journalists who expose networks of Russian influence.

Of course, governments should use their intelligence services to detect influence operations. But the primary response of a free society to authoritarian threats — whether in the information sphere, social media, or the economy — must come from civil society itself. This means foundations, political parties, think tanks, associations, universities, and the media.

Ukraine itself has achieved remarkable success in countering Russian disinformation since the early years following the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas in 2014. It was Ukrainian civil society that responded — and far more quickly than the government. The same should happen within the European Union. Governments should fund and support civil society, but the real work must be done by the citizens themselves.

Ukraine’s Integration with the EU: Just the Beginning

In her State of the Union address, Ursula von der Leyen emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s integration with the European Union. How do you assess the role of the President of the European Commission in this process?

She sets concrete goals and defines the direction for Ukraine’s path toward EU membership. And this is not merely her personal initiative — it is the initiative of the entire European Commission. She is implementing the will of the member states within the EU Council, yet there are still many aspects she manages independently.

The EU’s assistance to Ukraine — particularly the EU-financed military support — is one of Ursula von der Leyen’s major personal achievements, as she has invested enormous energy into it. The same goes for Ukraine’s accession process. However, the final decisions will be made by the member states, not by the Commission or von der Leyen personally.

Could Ukraine become an EU member by 2030?

That is the plan. I wouldn’t say it’s impossible, but the EU has had surprisingly mixed experiences with setting a fixed date before successfully closing all negotiation chapters and fully implementing the necessary legislation in the candidate country.

Ukraine still has work to do — not so much in adopting legislation, which is largely ready, but in enforcing it, especially in strengthening the rule of law and the fight against corruption. This year has brought certain setbacks, which have certainly not helped accelerate Ukraine’s accession process. But Ukraine has the potential to meet these challenges.

<frame>"More knowledge, less fear" is the slogan of our new publication series. Safety is based on facts, verified information, and solid arguments. The more we know, the better we will be prepared for the future. <frame>

Is Poland ready for a crisis? In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, the war in Ukraine, and rising tensions across Europe, education and societal organisation are crucial. By welcoming over a million Ukrainian refugees, Poland has not only gained new residents but also unique knowledge and experience from people who have learned civil protection under the harshest conditions—under bombs and rocket fire. This is capital that must not be wasted. 

The new law on civil protection and civil defence, in force since January 1, is a concrete response to real threats. At the same time, it offers an opportunity for deeper integration, allowing Poles and Ukrainians living in Poland to prepare together for crises. 

Poland has learned from the tragic events of recent years. The new law emphasises three key areas: modernising and constructing shelters and hiding places, improving alarm and notification systems, and launching widespread civic education to ensure every citizen has basic knowledge of how to act during a crisis. The context of the war in Ukraine makes this even more urgent.

Many Ukrainians living in Poland have priceless experience in civil protection - whether as survivors, organisers, or leaders of evacuation and shelter operations.

This is an opportunity Poland must not miss. When war strikes, no system is ever fully ready. What matters then is how effectively we can use what we already have.

What can serve as a shelter? A practical approach to civil protection begins with this question. Knowledge—that is our first "shelter"!

According to the new law, every basement, underground garage, or tunnel can serve as a hiding place. It’s worth taking a moment to look around and ask yourself, "What would I do in case of danger?" 

It’s better to know in advance than to scramble during chaos. 

Here, the experience of Ukrainians in Poland becomes invaluable. Those who have survived bomb alerts can share practical knowledge with Poles, including how to organise life in shelters, secure water and food supplies, address the psychological aspects of survival, and utilise mobile alert apps that have become critical tools in Ukraine. This is not theory. These are real-life experiences from people who face the consequences of war every single day.
Their testimony is more valuable than any textbook could be. 

Education in this field is the key to safety. Poland must harness the knowledge of Ukrainians and launch a wide educational campaign as soon as possible. 
According to the new law, local governments and fire services will play a central role in civil protection. However, in practice, the system will only function effectively if hundreds of thousands of people are involved. 

Ukrainians who have faced real threats can become instructors, educators, and leaders of this change. NGOS are already playing a significant role in organising training for both Ukrainians and Poles. 

This will benefit everyone. Polish municipalities urgently need practitioners who understand the realities of crises.

Every citizen on the front lines.

The new law places local governments in charge of implementing the civil protection system, meaning the battle for the effectiveness of this law will be fought where Poles and Ukrainians live nearby. It is essential to acknowledge that women played a vital role in Ukraine’s civil protection efforts, from rescue workers and volunteers to leaders of humanitarian organisations. They ensured survival amid chaos. 

In Poland, too, women can become the driving force behind such changes, joining local governments, NGOS, and educational teams. 

Is Poland ready for a crisis and civil protection?

Poland is better prepared today than it was a few years ago. The new law represents a significant step forward, but infrastructure alone will not be sufficient.

What will truly matter is the genuine engagement of citizens in education and crisis response, the effective application of Ukrainian experience, and practical cooperation among local governments, NGOS, and the central government.

Today, Poland is in a better situation than a few years ago. The new law is an important step, but one infrastructure is not enough. The real involvement of citizens in training and the elimination of the consequences of emergencies, the wise use of Ukrainians' experience and effective cooperation between local governments, organizations and the government will be crucial.

This isn’t a Hollywood disaster movie scenario. It’s reality—a reality we must understand and prepare for.  In the 21st century, security isn’t just about armies; it’s about conscious, organised societies. And building them starts with education—education based on facts, not fearmongering. 

Security is our shared responsibility.

It’s not just the domain of the state. It’s not something the government can "provide" like a service.  It’s something we build and give to each other.  Of course, institutions, regulations, alarm systems, and shelters are vital. But what truly determines survival during a crisis is people—their relationships, willingness to help, ability to act under stress, and the awareness that, in challenging moments, we are not alone. 
Every one of us is part of the security system—from the teacher who teaches first aid, to the neighbour who knows the nearest shelter location, to the volunteer who helps newly arrived refugees adjust to a new reality. 

The strength of a nation lies in the strength of its society—and society is strong when its members know they can count on one another. 

In the past, those who realised that the best defence wasn’t walls or bunkers, but well-prepared, united people, were the ones who prevailed.  In Ukraine, social mobilisation saved thousands of lives.  In Poland, we have a chance to learn from this experience before a crisis forces us to.

While NATO leaders reaffirm their commitment to supporting Ukraine, and the EU once again demonstrates the fragility of its unity under pressure from Budapest, Russia not only refuses to halt its aggression but is intensifying its actions - both on the battlefield and in the information war. The summit in The Hague did not result in a breakthrough: promises without guarantees, talk of «peace through strength», hints at dialogue with Putin - all amid the increasingly evident decline in American ambition. Simultaneously, Hungary is blocking new sanctions, and the Kremlin is launching sophisticated cyber operations, pretending the world has already accepted its presence.

On how the West’s strategy has changed, what risks stem from illusions about Russia, what the new wave of disinformation means, and why Europe must take the lead in deterring aggression, Sestry spoke with Keir Giles - a leading British expert on security and Russia, and Senior Consulting Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House.

Trump, NATO and Russia: an alliance on the brink of compromise and challenges

Maryna Stepanenko: «Peace through strength» was declared the main theme of the talks between Trump and Zelensky. After the meeting, the head of the White House hinted at dialogue with Putin and possible Patriot missile deliveries, but no firm commitments were made. In this context, how, in your opinion, could the formula «peace through strength» be applied to Russia, and how ready is the US to take on a real role in exerting pressure?

Keir Giles: We have always known that the only way to ensure European security is to provide Ukraine with the maximum possible support. So now we are dealing with the consequences of the policy of several successive US administrations that decided a different approach was needed. They are profoundly mistaken, and this causes enormous damage not only to European security and, of course, to Ukraine itself, but also to global security.

It is precisely such restraint and refusal to confront aggression that has led to the outbreak of global conflicts around the world

We are witnessing escalating situations, increasing casualties, and more wars breaking out - all because of this new American idea that confronting the aggressor is more dangerous than allowing the victim to be destroyed

The meeting between US and Ukrainian leaders once again raised the question: what model of support for Kyiv does Washington envisage? Are we speaking about a strategic partnership or rather about controlled containment of the war without long-term commitments?

There is a serious question as to whether a genuine strategic partnership with Donald Trump is even possible. After all, the United States sought partnership with Russia - and even that does not work particularly well, despite Trump being willing to do whatever it takes to give Russia everything it wants. Any country, any traditional friend, ally or partner of the United States must remember that the relationships upon which America’s former prosperity and security were built no longer have any real meaning for Trump. We are in an entirely new global environment.

This means that countries that take European security seriously, and therefore also the security and future of Ukraine, must step up to fill the gap left by the United States. This applies primarily to Europe’s neighbours, but also to liberal democracies around the world that have a shared interest in ending aggression.

Recently, there were rumours in Brussels that Russia might be removed from the list of NATO’s main threats, leaving only international terrorism. This seems strange considering that it is Russia that continues the war in Europe and destabilises the situation globally, from Africa to the Middle East. In the final communiqué, Russia was recognised as a long-term threat to the entire Alliance. However, do you generally observe an attempt by the West to «normalise» the aggressor?

The United States has long pretended that Russia is not a problem, and we should not rule out the possibility that NATO, in its desperate efforts to retain the US in the alliance, may go along with this rhetoric.

We have already seen signs that NATO is prepared to take extraordinary measures to placate Trump: take, for example, the letter written to him by Secretary General Mark Rutte, deliberately composed in «Trump’s language». It must have been extremely difficult to imitate the verbal expressions of a five-year-old child in order to accomplish this.

Therefore, we cannot confidently predict how far NATO might go to ensure continued US participation in the Alliance. But European countries must harbour no illusions about whether Russia has ceased to be a threat, regardless of the efforts of the current US administration to convince itself otherwise.

The resilience of regimes and the fragility of decisions: what will determine the duration of the war

Despite sanctions, battlefield losses and growing isolation, Putin’s regime is holding firm - at least on the surface. Given your expertise, what is the source of this system’s resilience today, and what could destabilise it from within?

There is little chance that the Russian regime will be brought down from within, as it appears to be a regime with which the overwhelming majority of the Russian population is entirely satisfied.

Ultimately, it is a self-sufficient system in which those who have gained wealth and power within it have no interest in its destruction. Therefore, there is currently no reason to believe that Russia will deviate from its aggressive course, despite the long-term damage and the catastrophic consequences for the country’s economy and its population.

Assuming the end of the war is neither imminent nor hopelessly distant, what factors, in your view, might break the current deadlock? You have outlined internal collapse as unlikely, but could it be external pressure or something else we have yet to articulate?

The answer to this question has always been and will remain the same: European countries must provide Ukraine with maximum physical and financial support to help it defeat Russia, by any means available. Not necessarily on the front lines, but also through other forms of support.

European countries are slowly realising that their future is closely linked to the future of Ukraine, and that they can no longer rely on the United States as the primary sponsor of these efforts. But Europe will need to do much more for Ukraine to continue holding the front line and repelling the aggressor.

Russia and Belarus have announced the «Zapad-2025» exercises. In the past, such manoeuvres have served as a prelude to aggression. Is there currently a risk of this scenario being repeated, and is the West capable of responding adequately amid political fragmentation?

People always become anxious ahead of the «Zapad» exercises - this has been the case long before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and even before the annexation of Crimea. And yes, it always creates an opportunity to do something unrelated to the training itself.

But at this stage, when there is already an intense conflict ongoing, should we consider «Zapad» as just another element of battlefield deception, part of a broader deception within the ongoing war, rather than the start of a new one?

Of course, Western intelligence services will be closely monitoring who is doing what and where in the context of the Russian-Belarusian exercises - even in this new reality, where a significant part of Russia’s ground forces is already deeply engaged in Ukraine and has limited capacity for operations in other regions.

«The invisible front»: how Russia is waging war against the West in the information space

Mr Giles, you yourself became the target of a new, sophisticated phishing attack by Russian hackers - disguised as an employee of the US State Department. The attackers used Gmail’s «delegate access» function to gain hidden access to your inbox, bypassing two-factor authentication. This operation likely required weeks of effort. In this context, how has Russia’s tactic in the information war changed over the past year? And what does this say about the new level of threat?

I am confident the entire operation took far longer - several weeks just for the execution, so the planning stage must have begun much earlier.

On the one hand, this new technique, this new approach to gaining access to people’s email, indicates that Russia is being forced to develop more refined methods because its previous, more primitive attempts have failed. For many years, there have been numerous attempts to hack my email, some laughably primitive, others highly complex and sophisticated.

But on the other hand, this new method highlights that we are all vulnerable

The way the suspected Russian attackers exploited a built-in Gmail feature available in every user’s account to create, essentially, a «side door» that bypasses all our usual security measures (two-factor authentication, mobile codes, confirmation requests) shows that no one is truly safe.

Until companies such as Google, Microsoft and others fix this loophole, it is inevitable that this technique will be used much more broadly, not only against targets like me.

This summer, Europe witnessed a wave of fake messages sent on behalf of Western governments, social media manipulations, and interference in election campaigns in individual EU member states. How exactly is Russia trying to influence public opinion in Europe today, and which narratives is it primarily promoting?

Some of Russia’s narratives are entirely consistent over time, while others are tied to specific political events. It is important to remember that the campaigns conducted by Russia are ongoing and are not limited to dates on the democratic calendar.

Russia is constantly working to undermine the forces that unite Europe: solidarity among European states, societal cohesion, trust in institutions and, above all, support for Ukraine in resisting Russian aggression

These campaigns are permanent. In addition, there are targeted, time-sensitive efforts aimed at influencing the outcomes of specific democratic processes in specific countries at specific times.

Sanctions fatigue: Is the West’s pressure on the Kremlin still effective?

In addition to the NATO summit, another event important for Ukraine took place - the European Council summit. There, both a new sanctions package against the Russian Federation and support for Ukraine’s negotiation process with the EU were discussed - both initiatives were blocked by Hungary. Sanctions - also by Slovakia. To what extent do such actions undermine trust in EU unity, and what self-defence mechanisms against internal sabotage does the EU need?

This is yet another illustration of how consensus-based organisations - NATO and the EU - are vulnerable to the lowest common denominator. If there is a saboteur or a disruptor within, it can effectively paralyse the entire organisation, especially in the case of the EU, which is primarily a trade organisation rather than a structure designed to address geopolitical conflicts.

In many ways, the very structure of Europe’s supranational institutions does not meet the challenges they currently face

Nevertheless, it is impressive how far they have come in maintaining unity and a shared understanding of the importance of supporting Ukraine. I hope and believe that it will once again be possible to find a workaround to move forward, even without the cooperation of countries such as Hungary, Slovakia or others.

‍What does it signify that the United States currently does not intend to increase sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation from its side?

Well, the message from the United States has been very clear. At present, they are partners with Russia and are seeking to impose on Ukraine the terms of capitulation dictated by Moscow. This is the reality with which Ukraine and Europe must now contend.

And it is precisely the adaptation to this reality, and the speed with which it occurs, that will determine the future security of the entire continent.

Cover photo: Office of the President of Ukraine

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

‍

‍

‍

‍

‍

‍