Time wasted on roads instead of bridges

Olga Pakosh: In light of what is happening today, how can we talk about building bridges?

Krzysztof Czyżewski: We first need to realize how few of them we have actually built.

Why?

We were given time—time we largely failed to use. Today comes the test of what we did with it, and it turns out it could have been much more. Too few bridges were built—between Poles and Ukrainians, but also many others. Because all these bridges are interconnected. Fear of the other very easily turns into scapegoating—of the foreigner, someone of another nationality, culture, or skin color. And this shows that we could have done far more, especially from the bottom up, at the grassroots, organically. We lacked investment in local government, in education—from primary school through every level—in cultural and community-building activities. Had we put more effort into these, we would be in a completely different place today.

That’s why the work of rooting is so important—in a place, in oneself, in our identity. When the full-scale war in Ukraine broke out, refugee children came to Krasnogruda. One of the first projects we did with them was an animated film.

The children called it Pokój (“Room/Peace”), because they discovered that in Polish the word has two meanings: “absence of war” and “my space to live.” It was precisely this space they had lost—their room, their home—and that’s what they longed for. They also understood that the one who starts a war is the one who has no room of their own.

People deprived of rootedness and a sense of community are more easily swayed by ideologies that lead to hatred and violence. That’s why we need time to rebuild this rootedness, which our region still lacks because of its history of wars and regimes. We simply wasted the time we were given.

We invested in roads—because that’s easy, because every politician wants to boast about them. But investments in schools, cultural centers, civic organizations—in people—were never a priority.
And yet those are precisely the investments that could give us the strength to stand against hatred and war.

The Comfortable Role of the Victim

What is hatred?
No one is born with hatred. It always has a source, usually in the early stages of life. Something must have happened in our environment—in the family, at school, in the community. Something that made us susceptible to this illness called hatred.

To confront it, we must go back to its beginnings. To the moment when a child or young person found themselves in a situation where no one defended them, protected them, or taught them how to cope with harm. It’s the environment that shapes a person, and if it is not built on peace, it creates space for hatred. Hatred often grows out of emptiness, resentment, and a sense of loss. A person who experiences pain at the hands of others, lacking the tools to understand it, builds a defense mechanism: they start believing that hatred will make them stronger.

Imagine a young Czesław Miłosz. He dreams of Western Europe, of Paris—and during a trip with friends, he reaches a bridge on the Swiss–French border. There he sees a sign: “No entry for Slavs, Gypsies, Jews.” Such a blow can trigger two reactions. One is to respond in kind: return home and put up a sign against the French or the Germans.
But one can also react differently: do everything not to answer hostility with hostility. Yet to choose this path, one needs support—spiritual, moral, found in an authority or a community.

We encounter such “signs” even today—in a metaphorical sense—living in multicultural societies. We often, and unwittingly, hurt others with words or gestures. These are moments when we can take Miłosz’s path: to dedicate our life and work to opposing the philosophy of exclusion. But choosing this path means loneliness. As in the case of Miłosz, who in interwar Vilnius—governed by nationalists—was told that history did not belong to him.

The “signpost philosophy” always builds a fortress. It assumes one must close off, build walls, and cast outsiders in a bad light. It’s the feeling that strength comes from isolation.
I have met people who build such fortresses. Today this is very visible in Ukraine. My Ukrainian friends wrote to me after February 24th: “I hate. That’s my state of mind.” I understand this. In the face of aggression, one builds defensive embankments, protects family and community. Perhaps a soldier needs hatred as a weapon—it gives determination and strength.

But the crucial question is about the boundary. Between the person who can treat hatred like a shield, then set it aside after the fight and return to normal life—and the person who becomes its captive. If you can put it down, hatred remains a temporary weapon. If you cannot, the illness takes control. Then hatred doesn’t end with the war—it begins to destroy life, relationships, one’s entire world.

How can we defend ourselves against hatred in today’s world?

Sometimes a person must build a fortress, but a fortress is not a natural environment for life. When a new generation arrives—our children—they will feel curiosity and the need to go out into the open world. Because a fortress, if accepted as a permanent home, becomes a prison—and everyone wants to escape from prison.

So the question is: if I build a bridge to the other side, risking my own shore and the possibility that an enemy may use it—am I acting against life?

Would it be better to stay on my side and live more safely, more comfortably? This is how supporters of extreme, xenophobic ideologies think: that it’s best to be only among one’s own. Except that in human nature such a scenario never proves life-giving. Sooner or later it leads to illness—xenophobia or hatred.

That’s why courage is always necessary. To resist hatred, we must cultivate inner strength to overcome our emotions. And yet we have a tendency to justify our hostility easily: we pick at resentments, repeat that someone wronged us. It feels comfortable to wear the skin of the victim, because then we are always ostensibly on the “good side.” But staying in the role of the victim also leads nowhere. It breeds weakness and fear—fear of opening up, of encountering the other.

What does this mean in practice? If I, as a Pole, am afraid to admit that in Jedwabne, during the Holocaust, a crime was committed against Jewish neighbors and I prefer to conceal this truth—where is my patriotism then? Where is my courage?

There is no courage in falsifying history. Courage is born when I can look into the eyes of those who were victims, when I do the work on myself. It is difficult, critical work of memory.
If we want to build bridges with others, let’s start with ourselves. Let us ask: are there not painful places in our own history that we should work through—acknowledge, beat our breast, return the truth to others, or at least try to listen? Paradoxically, this does not weaken us—it makes us stronger.

Pop Culture Pure

How would you explain the shift from the immense openness toward Ukrainians in February 2022 to the current state, where some say that help was unappreciated or that newcomers “give nothing in return”? Is it fatigue, lack of courage, or something deeper in human nature?

What’s missing is something else. What’s very dangerous is what politicians often try to convince us of: that our attitude toward Ukrainians must be conditioned by interest. In my view, the spontaneous, magnificent reaction of people was simply a human reaction. No one asked then what we would get out of it. It was as Pope Francis said in Lampedusa about the Church: it should be like a field hospital.

It doesn’t matter what your faith, nationality, or skin color is—you simply serve a person in need. This is an absolute human duty. Without asking about interest, advantage, or profit.

If we step down from that level—and today many try to frame help for Ukrainians in terms of budgets, gains, or losses—we reduce the field hospital to a marketplace.

And that’s exactly what we see in the world. It used to be unthinkable that states would give weapons only in exchange for raw materials. Today this approach is part of the political mainstream. It’s a moral collapse.

Of course, rationality, logic, and common sense are needed—especially in politics and strategic decisions.

At the same time, we must act on a human level. Because we are Christians, Poles, Ukrainians, people. There are no narrow categories here. It’s not about nationality or religion, but about a human being in need.

The first wave of refugees from Ukraine made this very clear. I remember Viktoria Amelina [a Ukrainian writer who died in hospital on July 1, 2023, from injuries sustained during a Russian attack on Kramatorsk—ed.] in Krasnogruda telling me that at the border she felt treated better than refugees from other countries. She was privileged simply because she was Ukrainian. That shows the limit of our wonderful Polish–Ukrainian period of solidarity—right next to the Belarusian border, the symbol of non-solidarity.

When such selection creeps into our responses, we see a symptom of illness: our assistance and attitudes are no longer fully true or natural. It’s not about judging people—we’re all in the same boat; we all have oversights and limitations. But it’s also part of a great moral decline, a degradation we’re witnessing worldwide. It shows how much fear, anxiety, and uncertainty we harbor, and how little of the peace that children talk about. And how easily populist politics can lead us astray.

Why does hatred take root in us so easily? Is it politics, ideology, indoctrination (imposing certain ideas and beliefs on a person — Ed.)?

Or perhaps pop culture? And culture? How is it possible that in a democratic society we separated pop culture from culture—that pop culture is meant to reach people who “won’t understand” culture because it’s too difficult, not for them?

If we accept that conversations about values, morality, and understanding the other are intended only for those in that “other” culture and not for everyone, the tragedy begins.

The tragedy is that in a democracy we don’t trust people. We don’t believe they can make difficult decisions themselves, hold values, and take responsibility for them.

We persist in the belief that we must speak to people in a simplified way, otherwise they “won’t understand.” Politicians and the media often take this path. They create a “pop-cultural mush,” and we pay the price. We’ve created pop-cultural politics, pop-cultural politicians, and politics characterized by leveling down. It’s the result of our underestimating culture and failing to understand that conscience—our spiritual culture—is an obligation for everyone, without exception.

Szewczenko or Miłosz are for everyone, and with everyone we can talk about values, demand reflection, action, and responsibility. It’s like the wisdom of the Gospels—they are not reserved for the chosen. We have lost faith that this has anything to do with everyday life. Even people who consider themselves Christians often craft their own “life-gospel,” at odds with the true Gospel, while politicians offer a discourse full of xenophobia and hatred.

Here lies a serious neglect, for which we are now paying the price. A vast arrogance and paternalism that we have allowed to speak. As a result, we’ve lost many citizens—people who felt utterly marginalized not only in terms of material well-being but also in terms of trust and co-responsibility for the world’s affairs. Pushed aside and often stigmatized as xenophobes.

I never use such labels for anyone. Because when you call someone a chauvinist or a xenophobe, you put them against a wall. You strip them of the ability to move—and thus the chance to change. Culture should provide space and time for us to change, learn, and mature. That’s what our culture often lacks: patience for process, the understanding that change takes time.

The history we come from, and the new tragic circumstances, place demands on us that often exceed our strength. Sometimes we are too weak to bear them. But does that mean we are immediately bad—and forever? Perhaps we can still be partners—for conversation, for cooperation, for living together—even if we handle our emotions differently.

We are very good at cornering people. “You are this—period.” Meanwhile, we should learn to understand ourselves and others, to transcend our own limitations, to practice the art of dialogue—because only then is true transformation possible.

You speak of empathy, which was so visible at the beginning. But haven’t you noticed that today the word “neighbors” has practically disappeared from the media when we speak about Ukrainians?

“Neighborhood” is a good word, isn’t it? A neighbor is already part of our life. And if we drive them out, a feeling arises… that there is no threat, and no need for effort or even sacrifice, because a neighbor demands more from me.

A neighbor is someone you can rightly offer hospitality to, someone you can share with, someone you coexist with and share responsibility for something with. Simply by existing, a neighbor touches deeply rooted values in us—and puts them to the test.

If we succumb to confrontational, hateful ideology, we push out words like “neighborhood,” “kinship,” “the common good.”

I won’t even dwell on the fact that politicians try to convince us that it’s in our interest to cut ourselves off from Ukraine—which is absurd, because Ukraine provides us with security. If we were rational and sober about what is truly good for us, we should do everything to make our neighborhood as deep and as close as possible.

Meanwhile, we allow ourselves to be ruled by what is irrational or aimed at short-term effects (which amounts to the same). We let weakness work within us and perceive threats where they do not truly exist.

I would also like to address Ukrainians—to understand that sometimes it’s not worth attaching too much importance to these momentary crises—just as in the life of an individual, so in a collective body we sometimes succumb to weakness, and politicians draw out the worst in us. We should not believe that this is a permanent state, nor should we immediately put Poles against the wall, assuming that “this is how they are now.”

Of course, we should set standards for ourselves—now I’m speaking about Poles in the context of the situation in Ukraine. But at the same time, it is worth giving ourselves a chance to change: to be more understanding, more empathetic, to trust that change is possible. I also don’t attach excessive importance to momentary gusts in social media—those winds change very quickly.

I would rather focus on long-term, grassroots, organic building—creating things that won’t bear fruit today but will do so in a few years. Because trust has extraordinary power. If I, Ms. Olga, believe that even if you (purely hypothetically) feel prejudice, resentment, or hatred toward me, it won’t be forever—and I don’t close myself off to our mutual presence—and if I believe our relationship can change—then you will not remain indifferent to that. You will sense in me not an enemy, but a person open to change. That is precisely what releases positive energy between us.

Sometimes it demands more of us than we could realistically expect—greater generosity than daily life calls for. And that’s what builds a person, gives extraordinary strength. For me, beauty lies in the Ukrainian word peremoha. When I travel the world, I always urge people to learn it not in translation (“victory”) but in its Ukrainian meaning.

Peremohty, mohty—it means the ability to act beyond one’s own capacities. Even if we have limitations, traumas, weaknesses, there is such a thing as peremohty: to be able to do more than we can. And that is true victory.

To achieve this, we must extend ourselves a credit of trust, create good energies that allow us to do more than we believe possible. Two years ago our borders opened, solidarity emerged, and suddenly we were able to show a better face—better than before, in the context of the Belarusian border. Even those who previously stood for radical confrontation and closing the border to refugees could not silence their own consciences in the face of need—children in the Białowieża Forest who needed a simple glass of water. You can’t calm your conscience that way. Ideological arguments aren’t enough.

And suddenly Ukrainians appeared, toward whom we could be entirely different. It was a moment when we became better than ourselves, though such moments never last long. Our wisdom should lie in knowing how to appeal to what is best in us, building on that, and not giving up the work of maturing into those values.

There Are More People of Good Will

After the president vetoed the law on assistance for Ukrainian mothers and as a wave of hatred grew, one of my colleagues asked: what should I do now? Where should I go? I chose to stay in Poland, and I don’t know what I should feel or how to live, if I’m even afraid to speak Ukrainian with my child on the street.

For a moment I thought that it’s increasingly difficult today to advise your colleague where she might go to be better off. There are fewer and fewer such places in the world. Of course, that is no excuse for what’s happening in our country. But it is one of those painful lessons we receive from the modern world. I return to the idea that we are part of communicating vessels. What happens here is interdependent with other places in the world, and we often struggle to cope with that.

Let’s have no illusions: we live in an era of moral decline, a degradation of humanism.

Of course, I would like people like the one you describe to remain in Poland—because we need them. I don’t mean this in terms of budget revenue, though that’s obvious. That’s not the logic I’m using. These people are needed so that we can grow into the maturity demanded of us by the situation in the world—and so that we have a chance to change our own attitudes. Your colleague, experiencing intolerance in Poland yet still engaging in building good neighborliness, has a chance to be part of a process of change—one that won’t happen overnight and will surely bring her suffering, but in the long run it carries hope.

Because in this process there is strength and potential—we change the world where we are, not by endlessly fleeing elsewhere.

My philosophy largely rests on changing the world from within. There is a growing temptation to flee from various environments, institutions, religions, or countries because something seems unbearable or contrary to our beliefs. But that’s escape. Then we become perpetual nomads.

The answer is to stay, to find a room, to take root, and to work—with an understanding of all the conditions that come with it. Such rootedness is not the same as returning to a lost place (though may such returns be possible). It is staying within a new situation and learning it mutually—this gives a chance for growth.

A second reflection is that there are more of us than we think: us, people of good will. We live in a world that often minimizes our presence because it amplifies drama, conflict, pain, and injustice. The voice of harm reaches the media; it is harder to express good and positive emotions. This is also my work: to help people give voice to the good emotions that, I believe, dwell in everyone—even in those who hate deeply. In everyone there is a spark of a need to do something good. The problem is often how to do it, how to give it form.

We lack holidays, language, and culture for this—and politics even more so—because we live in a world where harm, pain, and hatred are easy to express. Sometimes it’s about a wise perspective: perhaps there are more of us than it seems; perhaps the politician who has won and seems monstrous does not, in fact, have all our votes.

Where is that other half of Poland? It exists—and there are ways to reach it. It’s difficult, but it gives hope.

I’ve lived in Poland for 10 years, and I’ve heard from various people that humans are inherently good—which I never heard in Ukraine. Two Poles also told me that even if people do something bad, they later regret it.

What I’m talking about is close to what I earlier called the spark of good in every person—something hard to bring out. I speak of it because it was passed on to me by people who went through real hell. Starting with Miłosz, who survived two world wars; with Holocaust survivors; with Bosnian Muslims whose relatives lie buried in Srebrenica. They could have said that the world is evil, that our actions are meaningless in the face of the destructive forces of dictatorial regimes, that building bridges is weak against military and ideological violence. And yet it was precisely they who taught me not to lose faith in the good—in that small light present in every person, regardless of which “side” they are on.

They taught me that it’s worth working to help others and ourselves—to free the good within us, to find words and time so that our conscience can be spoken, not stifled. And despite the “sober skeptics,” whose voice I respect, and despite having witnessed the core of darkness revealed by wars, I stand with my teachers, who allowed themselves neither nihilism nor agreement that good in this world is doomed to defeat.

Because if they weren’t right, would we be able to have this conversation at all, Ms. Olga?

On August 25, the President of Poland announced a veto of the government bill that was meant to regulate protection and support for families fleeing the war. This decision, and the language that accompanied it – promises to make aid for children conditional on their parent’s employment, prolonging the path to citizenship, reigniting historical disputes – is not a matter of mood, but of cold political calculation.

It strikes at Ukrainian refugee women, at their children, at the elderly and the sick; it also strikes at our schools, doctors, and local governments. Instead of certainty, it brings fear; instead of calm, it threatens family separations, secondary migration, and the erosion of trust in the Polish state.

Imagine that you are the ones at war defending your homeland – and a neighboring country treats your wives, mothers, and daughters as hostages of politics.

After the President’s decision, thousands of homes across Poland were filled with shock, bitterness, and a sense of betrayal. Mothers who fled with children and sick parents from cities and villages turned to rubble now ask themselves: where are we supposed to flee next? Women who chose Poland out of love and trust now feel that this love has not been reciprocated.

A child is not a lifeless entry in a statute, and the aid granted to that child cannot be used as leverage against their mother. Solidarity is not seasonal, it is not a trend. If it is true in March, it must also be true in August. Memory is not a cudgel. A state that, instead of healing the wounds of history, reaches for easy symbols does not build community. A state cannot be a street theater. A serious state chooses responsibility, not political spectacle: procedures, clear communication, protection of the most vulnerable.

We, Polish women – mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, and grandmothers – say it plainly: no one has the right to impose conditions, in our name, on women fleeing war. We will not accept the pain and suffering of people in need of our support being turned into fuel for political disputes. We will not allow the destruction of the trust on which community stands. This is a matter of national interest and of our common conscience. It is bridges – not walls – that turn neighbors into allies, and it is predictable and just law, together with the language of respect, that strengthens Poland’s security more than populist shouting from the podium.

Europe – and therefore we as well – has committed to continuity of protection for civilians fleeing aggression. It is our duty to keep that word. This means one thing: to confirm publicly, clearly, and without ambiguity that the families who trusted Poland will not wake up tomorrow in a legal vacuum; that no child will be punished because their parent does not have employment; that the language of power will not divide people into “ours” and “others.” For a child and their single mother, the law must be a shield, not a tool of coercion into loyalty and obedience. Politics must be service, not spectacle.

We call on you, who make the law and represent the Republic, to restore certainty of protection and to reject words that stigmatize instead of protect. Let the law serve people, not political games. Let Poland remain a home where a mother does not have to ask: “Where to now?” – because the answer will always be: “Stay in a country that keeps its word.”

This is not a dispute over legal technicalities. It is a question of the face of the Republic. Will it be a state of the word that is kept – or a state of words thrown to the wind? Will we stand on the side of mothers and children – or on the side of fear?

Signed:
Polish women – mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, grandmothers.

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As of today, the letter has been endorsed by over two thousand women from across Poland — among them three former First Ladies of the Republic of Poland, Nobel Prize laureate Olga Tokarczuk, and internationally acclaimed filmmaker Agnieszka Holland. Their voices stand alongside those of hundreds of other women — mothers, daughters, sisters, grandmothers — who have chosen to sign as a gesture of solidarity and moral responsibility.

The full list of signatories is available at the link below:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/135yP6XadgyRJmECLyIaxQTHcOyjOVy9Y4mgFP9klzIM/edit?tab=t.0

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‍Melania Krych: What is this Zryw [eng. Surge]  all about?

Julia Wojciechowska: We’re the generation that, at the time of the government transition in 2015, was still in our teens. Our coming of age was marked by constant political debate — at home, at school, on the streets. And it was a debate that neither included us nor spoke to us. But times have changed.

Agnieszka Gryz: Do you know the playbook for apathy? When the key political events unfold right under your nose, shaping your tomorrow, and yet you can neither cast a vote nor even raise your voice. Zryw didn’t begin the day we registered the Foundation — it began, piece by piece, within each of us, years ago.

JW: And yes, now we run a Foundation. We’re not selling a cat in a bag: we are political, but we are not partisan. We want to build the next generation of state leaders. We’ve just finished recruitment for our first zryw, a four-day public leadership retreat in the Tatra mountains.  

Why public servants? Don’t we have enough of those?

JW: The bench is short and not very attractive. We have experts, and we have politicians. The experts have spent the last eight years climbing corporate ladders or building Euro-careers in Brussels; they have families to support. And suddenly they’re supposed to destabilize their lives to take a ministry job for a quarter of the salary?
Meanwhile, there are plenty of young people who can and want to step in but no one is inviting them. And what’s more, when they knock on the door themselves, no one cares to open it.

AG: Right now, the most reliable “pipeline” into public service is through party youth wings. Those are often comprised of people who, from a very young age, have been focused solely on securing a particular seat. And once they’re in it, they don’t want to leave. What would their alternative be? And while not all youth wings are the same, the young people we’ve met often had neither vision nor their own ideas, only the party line that raised them.

That’s not the kind of public service we want Zryw to represent. Our diagnosis isn’t about a lack of knowledge or experience. What’s missing are people willing to make decisions and take responsibility for them; to risk and bear the consequences. State leaders, not mouthpieces of the party. I still remember being deeply struck by the words of Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, then a minister. Asked about the stability of his profession, he replied that his coat always hung on the back of his chair: “I am a public servant and a politician, and I must always be ready… at any moment. If I have to leave, I take my coat and I go.” We want to fear neither stepping in nor out.

Who applied to the first Zryw? Who did you select?

AG: The range was incredible. From doctors and engineers to political science students and civil servants. We received applications from 149 towns across all 16 Polish regions, plus 12 cities abroad. The final group is eclectic in the best way: a trainee fighter jet pilot, a former health expert abroad, aspiring local government leader.

JW: But only 35% of applications came from women. However, among those invited for interviews, women made up half,  because the candidates who did apply, were incredibly strong. That’s a slightly higher ratio than the proportion of women in our parliament. It shows that the imbalance of opportunities starts much earlier.

This won’t fix itself, but our group speaks for itself: neither Zryw nor Poland has a shortage of capable, ambitious women.

Right, I’ll tell you an anecdote. We recently received a lengthy comment on a blog post ["Our Favorite Elections: Who's Joining the September Zryw?" - Ed.], in which we mentioned the deficit of female applicants. Someone criticized us for “making up inequality,” since recruitment was open to everyone, they argued. “Anyone could click the link.” They claimed that bringing up such stats could discourage young men from public service because nowadays, any and all gender differences are painted as discrimination.

And how did you take that comment?

AG: Honestly, I was glad! Someone took the time to write out their thoughts. Polemic is a valuable legacy of Polish public life, and it’s an honor to partake in and to foster it. Of course, I disagreed with the arguments themselves, because discrimination and systemic inequality are not the same thing.

JW: In a nutshell, discrimination means unequal treatment or neglect. It would apply if one group had been treated preferentially. Then you could say the others were discriminated against. But we had no preferences. What we did consider were the ground realities of Poland’s education system and cultural patterns that shape what people feel is possible for them. And in Poland, that burden falls especially on young women, who are often brought up according to a different set of values. As girls, we’re taught to be polite, to obey. Boys will be boys: they get a pass to mess around, to take risks. And that carries over into adult life, including our careers.

AG: Equality doesn’t always mean equal opportunity. Leveling the playing field requires special attention to the needs shaped by years of conforming to social and cultural norms. And often, forms of exclusion that aren’t necessarily written into law but affect people’s lives nonetheless. Going forward, we pledge to ensure that women not only get access, but also an actual encouragement to apply.

JW: Many of us in Zryw studied abroad, which makes the contrast all the more striking. I was in England, where class divides are the bigger issue. But after returning to Poland, I’ve spoken with countless young women who face a powerful mental barrier—they doubt their own abilities and potential. And yet, so often, they have far greater knowledge and social awareness than many of the men I meet who are already part of the state apparatus.

As a Foundation, we can’t overlook this—when we see inequality, we take it into account.

How did Zryw come about?

AG: It all started with sleeping on mattresses. The year was 2023, a parliamentary election year — time to rise to the challenge. A dozen or so of us came together to build a campaign for Parliament from scratch. We barely knew each other. For several months, our candidate’s apartment turned into a kind of “transfer station”: it began with five people, by the end, there were fifteen, and many more passed through along the way. That group of fifteen became the core on which we built Zryw. Because we discovered something important — not only could we survive living on top of each other in one small flat, but we could actually make things happen together.

JW: It all started through word of mouth. In ’23 we were acting on our own initiative, and the news spread: to friends, and then to friends of friends. Take me and Aga, for example. We only knew each other from afar, and only virtually. Back during Covid, we happened to organize student conferences at the same time. Every now and then, we’d catch a glimpse of each other on Zoom or on social media. Then the parliamentary election came.

AG: That’s right. I asked if I could join the campaign; I texted Julia on Instagram, I had seen her repost something relating to our candidate. The timing was right, the whole thing was only getting started. After the successful election campaign, we wanted to harness that energy and channel it toward something. We realized there was no point in waiting for a window of opportunity, and we had to open it ourselves. That’s why we created Zryw: to capture that national surge of energy, give it shape, and direct it where it’s needed most.

So, where is it needed most?

JW: Over the past two years, we’ve seen how much absurdity and inertia you run into when working in ministries. Take salaries, for example—some of them, quite frankly, make it impossible to live in the capital. 3,200 zł net? That’s an extreme case, but a real one. And many people in Zryw know this firsthand. They came back from abroad, wanting to work for the state, and were willing to accept those conditions because they had a vision. Some managed to endure, while others left—whether due to financial strain or a lack of room to grow.

AG: We believe that a qualitative generational shift in Poland’s public service is possible from within. For systemic change to take hold, you need to sow it in many places at once—because, in the end, the state needs capable people in both offices and the legislative process. But it’s also about showing that there are people worth making that change for.

We don’t want to open a showroom where all you can do is admire a luxury car from the outside. Zryw should be a garage, a place where you can actually get under the hood of your own car. We’ll give you the workshop, the tools, and access to great mechanics. And then it’s time to hit the road—with our support and community alongside you.

Who do you work with?

JW: Last year, we were the only organization from Poland accepted into the accelerator run by the Apolitical Foundation, which supports what they call political entrepreneurs. And despite the name, it’s not about businesspeople, but rather about those who create new models of civic and political engagement.

We’re also supported by, among others, the EFC Foundation, founded in memory of Roman Czernecki — a social innovator and educator. At Zryw, we believe that democracy requires not only institutions, but above all people: competent, empathetic and ready to act. In this sense, our mission and projects align deeply with EFC’s vision of building a strong democratic community.

AG: Among our allies is also the Mentors4Starters Foundation. From them, we’re learning how to build meaningful mentor–mentee relationships that truly benefit both sides. Maria Belka and Zofia Kłudka bring a wealth of practical knowledge and an equal willingness to share it with us.

How do you imagine the future of Zryw?

JW: Our mission is to find capable, driven people, encourage them either to stay in Poland or to come back, and equip them with the tools and knowledge they need to be effective in public service.

AG: While our zrywy [eng. surges]—the lowercase ones, meaning our short multi-day gatherings—are largely aimed at students who study in Poland and see their future here, we also see ourselves as a kind of “repatriation hub.” When you go abroad for your studies, you find countless networks and support systems that help you adapt to a new place. We believe Poland needs a similar network, but for those considering a return.

JW: Exactly. A Pole abroad is rarely alone. But a Pole returning after studies is a different story. For a long time, such a decision carried the stigma of disappointment or even failure. Nonsense! Poland is beautiful, innovative, and above all, it’s home. This is where we feel purpose, and this is where we see our future. And we want the privilege we had—finding each other in 2023, and being able to start working together—to be available to many more people. Because in the end, you need both something and someone to come back to. The flight home is just one plane ticket, but the decision to board it isn’t so simple. We want to show, in very concrete terms, that the return is worth it, and that it opens up incredible opportunities.

Kaja Puto: History shows that war is an opportunity for the emancipation of women. During the Second World War, European women began to work in industries previously dominated by men, such as railways and the military sector. Are we witnessing something similar in Ukraine today?

Liliya Faskhutdinova: Undoubtedly. Sectors where men previously dominated are now lacking workforce, and more and more women are being employed in them. This is due to the fact that many men are fighting on the frontlines, and thousands have already died there. Some have also refused to work because they are hiding from mobilisation.

You can increasingly see women behind the wheel of a bus or truck, in a mine or on a construction site. However, I would not call this emancipation. Women in Ukraine have been economically active since Soviet times, as employment was mandatory then. After the collapse of the USSR, wages became too low to survive on one income. Therefore, I see it differently: the war has made society more open to women taking on more diverse roles in the labour market.

It also works the other way around, because some men have taken up jobs in sectors dominated by women, such as education. This protects them from conscription, as teachers are considered critically important to the state and are not subject to mobilisation. Perhaps this is not the noblest motivation, but likely some of these teachers will remain in the profession after the war. This could have a positive impact on the gender balance among staff in Ukrainian schools.

And what about politics? Women play a huge role in the Ukrainian volunteer community, which supports the army and state institutions. This community enjoys public trust, which may translate into political success after the war. Are new female leaders already emerging?

Undoubtedly, after the war, new faces will appear in politics, and among them will be volunteers. However, I am not certain that they will be primarily women. Society is aware of the enormous contribution they make to volunteering - helping to raise funds for military equipment, medical supplies and so on. A certain image of the female volunteer has been entrenched in the collective imagination: an older woman weaving camouflage nets for soldiers. However, she usually remains unnamed. In my view, the most recognisable volunteers are men. They are the ones most often awarded and interviewed, and whose faces are known.

Recently, I asked my acquaintances whether they could name any female volunteers. Almost no one could. But everyone knows Serhiy Prytula or Vasyl Baidak. War or no war - it is harder for women to be recognised. Nevertheless, the trend of female activism in Ukrainian politics is on the rise. In the 2000s, women accounted for less than 10 per cent of parliamentarians, now it is over 20 per cent. This may be helped by the quotas introduced in 2019 in electoral lists. We have not had the opportunity to verify this, as no elections have taken place since the Russian invasion, except for local government elections.

Quotas were introduced to bring Ukrainian legislation closer to EU standards in the field of women's rights. Is this argument still convincing for Ukrainian society?

Yes. Ukrainians generally have an idealistic view of the West and want to be part of it. This makes it easier to promote progressive values. Tolerance towards LGBTQI+ people is growing - for many Ukrainians, it seems, precisely because they want to be Europeans. They do not want to resemble Russians, who persecute homosexuals and at the same time decriminalise domestic violence.

We have discussed positive trends that give hope for progress in the field of Ukrainian women's rights. Unfortunately, war also brings dangers in this area.

What do you mean?

There is a risk that when men return from war, they will be so revered that women will be expected to forgive them everything, to show gratitude, to bear them children, even more so than before. In the traditional image, a woman is a protectress, a caring goddess, a martyr who patiently endures all the hardships of family life.

In my parents’ generation, many women supported their husbands even if they abused alcohol. They called their decisions care and responsibility

In Poland, this is the «matka Polka», who «carries her cross». Fortunately, this model is receding into the past.

In Ukraine, it had also begun to fade. But then the war came, and everything became more complicated. Men returning from war find it difficult to reintegrate into reality. They have seen death and cruelty, many suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, some are prone to violence.

To this are added broken bonds. Long months on the frontline mean that you often feel a stronger connection with your comrades in the trenches than with your family. After returning, this can ruin your relationship with your wife. Mistrust and jealousy arise, suspicions such as: «You cheated while I was gone». I know cases where men at the start of the war wanted their women to go abroad, but now treat them as traitors.

It is hard for me to talk about this. I am infinitely grateful to all the soldiers who are defending my country. If they behave inappropriately as a result of their experiences - I know it is not their fault. My heart breaks when I think about what they have endured.

This is the fault of Russia, which invaded your country.

Yes, it is the fault of the aggressor. But we, Ukraine, cannot allow their suffering to cause additional suffering for women and children. We all suffer, men and women, and many of us will have psychological problems for the rest of our lives.

The war will also leave its mark on future generations. The task of the Ukrainian state, as well as Ukrainian society, is to mitigate these terrible consequences

Are you not afraid that such a campaign may be perceived negatively? Already during the war, Ukrzaliznytsia introduced women-only compartments on night trains. This provoked the outrage of many men: «We are risking our lives for you, and you make us out to be predators?»

Of course, it will be met with resistance. Not only from men, but also from women, especially those whose husbands are fighting or have already returned from the front. Many problems in the army are already very difficult to talk about - gratitude to soldiers makes them taboo topics. However, if we truly want to be a European rule-of-law state, we must learn to find solutions for these uncomfortable problems.

What problems do you mean?

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For example, sexual harassment in the army. I am not saying this is a widespread issue, but such cases do occur, and they must be condemned. When, at the beginning of the Russian invasion, a victim of such violence publicly shared her experience, some people responded very critically. They accused her of discrediting the Ukrainian armed forces and implied that women join the army to find a boyfriend. Fortunately, after three years of full-scale war, it has become somewhat easier to talk about problems. We no longer censor ourselves as we did at the beginning.

How can the state help veterans?

Helping veterans is one part - they need psychological support, as well as comprehensive programmes to facilitate their reintegration into civilian life. For some, it would be good to receive a grant to start their own business (such programmes already exist), while others need help with employment. We must not allow war veterans to sit idle at home. This also applies to those who became disabled on the frontlines.

However, support is also needed for families. When a soldier returns from war, they bear a huge burden. They do not know what to expect or how to respond. Moreover, I believe a campaign should be directed specifically at women along the lines of: «You have the right to leave, even if your husband is a hero». Nothing justifies living with an abuser.

Nevertheless, the position of Ukrainian servicewomen has generally improved since 2014...

Yes, absolutely. Previously, they could hardly hold combat positions. They fought on the frontlines, but were officially, for example, cooks. Today, such cases are exceptions. Ukrainian servicewomen are appreciated on a symbolic level too - Defender of Ukraine Day, celebrated on 1 October, has been renamed Defender and Defendress of Ukraine Day. The Ministry of Defence acknowledges the contribution of servicewomen to the country’s defence, and stories like «beautiful women make our service more pleasant» are, fortunately, heard less and less in the media. However, it is still difficult for women in the army to be promoted to leadership positions.

A serious problem also concerns homosexual relationships among servicewomen. They are not recognised by the Ukrainian state. When your partner is wounded or taken prisoner, you will not be informed. When she dies, you cannot see her body.

When a biological mother dies, her partner has no rights to the child. This also applies to male military personnel, except that more children are raised in lesbian partnerships

Alright, but ultimately it is men in the army who face greater discrimination - unlike women, they are forcibly conscripted. Thus, they are deprived of their right to life and health, the fundamental human right...

I often hear this narrative from foreigners. It annoys me just as much as when our defenders are told that «killing people is wrong». Of course, it is wrong, but what are we supposed to do? For those who are not confronted daily with a threat to life, it is easy to theorise and criticise our decisions, and harder to offer alternatives. Surrender to Russia? Send everyone to the frontlines? Draw lots to decide which parent ends up in the army? How will we protect children and the elderly then? Who will work to keep the economy going?

Women, unlike men, were legally allowed to leave Ukraine.

This, in turn, is a huge challenge for the Ukrainian sisterhood. Tension has arisen between the women who left and those who stayed. Some of us blame each other: «You abandoned your country in its time of need, you ran away, you betrayed us». Or: «You stayed, you are ruining your children’s lives».

This is very sad to me. I believe everyone has the right to make the decision they think is best for their family. It is a tragic choice, because every decision is wrong in some way. This tension harms Ukraine because some refugee women may not want to return home because of it. I know women who left, and their families stopped speaking to them.

And will they be accepted back?

I think that when the war ends, this tension will subside, and people will begin to live new lives. But for many refugee women, this will be a reason not to return to Ukraine.

Are you not afraid that the negative impact of the war on the rights of Ukrainian women will outweigh the positive?

I do not know. I am an optimist, I hope the positive will prevail. But I assess the chances as fifty-fifty.

How has the war changed you as a feminist?

Before the full-scale war began, I would have said that above all, I am a woman. Nothing was more important to me in terms of my identity. Today I say that I am Ukrainian. War unites nationality more than anything else. If you do not know war, you will never understand it.

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<frame>Liliya «Lila» Faskhutdinova is a feminist and human rights activist with ten years of experience in civil society, anti-discrimination programmes and gender equality advocacy. She received a bachelor's degree in philology from the Sorbonne and a master's degree in human rights from the University of Padua. She has worked with Syrian refugees in Turkey, internally displaced persons in Ukraine, people living with HIV, LGBTQI+ individuals and women. She currently lives in Lviv, where she is working on a women’s empowerment project at an international humanitarian organisation.<frame>

Her second term as President of the European Commission has been marked by growing attempts to challenge her authority. In July, Ursula von der Leyen narrowly survived a vote of no confidence.
During the current plenary session of the European Parliament (October 6–9), the issue of trust in her leadership will once again be put to a vote.
Support from centrists and moderate forces should grant the Commission President a temporary sense of stability — but will that support last?

The Best person for the job‍

Maryna Stepanenko: Since 2014, no President of the European Commission has faced a vote of no confidence, yet Ursula von der Leyen has found herself in this situation for the second time. What is the source of this political crisis?

Roland Freudenstein: Within the European Commission, critical voices toward its President are becoming more frequent — not only from political extremists but also from some centrists. However, everyone understands that, in reality, there is no alternative. That’s why the upcoming vote of no confidence is unlikely to succeed.

Some call Ursula von der Leyen “Europe’s strong voice in the world” and a consistent advocate for Ukraine’s interests across the continent. Others claim she lacks the persistence needed to see major initiatives through to the end. What would you identify as von der Leyen’s main strengths and weaknesses as a politician?

I would say her greatest strength lies in the power of her convictions and her incredible work ethic.

She is often described as a workaholic. She even turned her room on the 13th floor of the Commission’s headquarters in Brussels into a makeshift office.

Naturally, not everyone appreciates that. Some people dislike strong Commission Presidents; others simply dislike strong women. She has also faced criticism for not devoting enough attention to certain projects — though, in most cases, the circumstances worked against her.

The best example is the European Green Deal — an effort to balance Europe’s economic competitiveness with the fight against climate change. For years, the pendulum of public sentiment swung toward saving the planet, but that moment has passed. Now, von der Leyen is unable to deliver on all the “green course” initiatives she once championed at the start of her second term.

Although the summer’s vote of no confidence was unsuccessful, it exposed deep divisions within the European Parliament. How do you assess von der Leyen’s ability to maintain the support of various political groups during her second term?

— The very fact that her most ardent critics come from the far left and the far right is what ensures her survival. The left doesn’t want to vote with the right — and vice versa. Moreover, there truly is a sense, even among her critics, that no one else could do this job better than she does.

If we look at their own criteria — especially in areas such as social legislation, environmental policy, and respect for member states — I simply cannot imagine anyone else capable of fulfilling this role.

Her critics know this too, particularly those in the political center who may be dissatisfied with her style or certain decisions. In the end, even they admit it.

Is Ursula von der Leyen able to adjust her policies to satisfy both centrist and right-wing parties while maintaining the unity of the EU?

No, that’s impossible — you can’t please everyone. It’s the same in national politics: no head of government can satisfy all voters. That’s why von der Leyen must rely on a coalition of centrist forces.

Yet even within that coalition, maintaining consensus is extremely difficult — it requires constant compromise. And this is precisely where her strength and her work discipline play a positive role. To make compromises, you must be strong and guided by strong convictions. At the same time, you have to work relentlessly and cooperate with a vast number of decision-makers.

I am deeply convinced that Ursula von der Leyen is currently the best person for this job.

The Political Show of the Far Right

The influence of right-wing parties in the European Parliament is growing. How do you assess their impact on the EU’s political direction? Could they change the balance of power within the European People’s Party (EPP)?

Under the leadership of Manfred Weber, the European People’s Party has at times adopted positions aligned with the far right, allowing it to build a majority that extends beyond the classic centrist coalition of the EPP, liberals, social democrats, and greens. For instance, on certain provisions of the Green Deal, the EPP diverged from von der Leyen and pushed the Commission toward more right-leaning, pro-agricultural stances.

However, on strategic issues — European defense, support for Ukraine, and global trade agreements — its stance remains fully aligned with the EPP’s. The real problems tend to come from the left, particularly the socialists and the greens. One example was von der Leyen’s strong reaction to the situation in Israel and Gaza, which many EU members — including socialists and greens — saw as hasty and one-sided in favor of Israel.

So while the EPP has influenced von der Leyen’s program to some extent, on key strategic matters it remains close to her views.

Given the far-right parties’ support for the vote of no confidence against von der Leyen, could their goal be not just to change the leadership but to influence the overall direction of the EU?

Yes, that’s exactly what they’re trying to do. They aim for tactical victories by gathering as many votes as possible for a no-confidence motion against Ursula von der Leyen. They’re unlikely to win such votes, but their goal is to send a political message.

If you look at Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric, it becomes clear that Brussels is his enemy — and no one personifies Brussels more than Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission.
Of course, there are other influential figures — the Presidents of the Parliament and the Council, and High Representative Kaja Kallas — but von der Leyen is the most powerful of them all.

That’s why she has become a symbol of the EU institutions, which, according to Orbán, have grown too powerful and have led Europe in the wrong direction. Together with the Patriots for Europe (PFE) and other far-right groups, he wants to attack her publicly — and, through her, attack the very idea of the European Union.

They want to turn it into a grand political show.

Hungary, under Orbán’s leadership, has repeatedly blocked EU initiatives — especially those related to sanctions against Russia. How do you assess Orbán’s actions and their impact on von der Leyen’s position?

Viktor Orbán has effectively sided with Putin — he’ll never admit it, but that’s the truth. He believes the future belongs to dictators, wants to maintain close relations with them, and ultimately aspires to become one himself. He might even lose the next election, but that remains his worldview.

He rejects everything the EU stands for: shared sovereignty, strong Brussels institutions, and majority voting in the Council. He has also been a vocal opponent of Ukraine’s EU membership. However, in the coming weeks, the Council may attempt to bypass Hungary’s veto on sanctions against Russia.

At this point, not only Brussels institutions but also most EU member states have had enough of Orbán and are looking for ways to work around Hungary — and, in some cases, Slovakia as well.

That’s a major shift. Previously, member states disliked Orbán but rarely confronted him directly. Now, countries like Poland, the Baltic states, the Nordics, and even Germany sometimes do so openly. Orbán feels cornered. He continues to portray Brussels as the villain and the member states as the “good guys,” but in reality, most governments now openly oppose him. His fallback strategy is to delegitimize them by labeling them “elites” or “globalists” who no longer represent their nations. But since those governments were democratically elected, Orbán’s position is increasingly difficult.

Von der Leyen has publicly supported ending the EU’s unanimity rule in certain policy areas. Can this move be seen as radical or risky for her political career?

No, because she’s not the driving force behind this process. And she’s being very wise not to be — it would only reinforce the stereotype of her as a power-hungry Eurocrat bent on limiting member states’ rights. Let’s not forget that several member states themselves remain hesitant about majority voting in crucial areas.

It would be much better if another influential figure in Brussels — in this case, European Council President António Costa — took the lead, with member states’ backing. That way, the issue would appear political, not personal. Honestly, I don’t think the debate over majority voting will harm her career.

Disinformation and Russia’s Natural Enemy

How do you assess the role of disinformation in EU politics, particularly in campaigns targeting von der Leyen?

Its influence is significant. Russia is doing everything it can to increase tensions in European politics — both within member states and inside the Brussels bubble. The negative image of Ursula von der Leyen is part of that effort to fuel conflict. And of course, Russian disinformation and propaganda target her directly because of her strong and consistent stance on Ukraine. She is, quite simply, their natural enemy.

Russia is always trying to heighten political tensions and internal divisions within the European Union.

At the same time, I notice that people expressing Eurosceptic views or criticizing von der Leyen or Ukraine aren’t always doing so because the Kremlin is paying them. Sometimes, they genuinely believe what they say. That’s why I would be cautious about labeling every form of criticism as Russian disinformation or assuming that someone is on Putin’s payroll.

We need to counter such criticism with political arguments — not just by pointing fingers.

There is a widespread sense of frustration — a belief that things are going in the wrong direction, that wealth is distributed unfairly, that Europe isn’t generating enough economic growth, that too much is spent on defense and too little on social issues, and so on. These feelings are real. Russia seeks to exploit them to intensify political tensions. However, the right way to respond to this criticism is through political action — not merely by accusing people of taking money from Moscow.

Is the European Union responding actively enough to the threat of disinformation from third countries? What more should be done to strengthen the EU’s information security?

Neither national governments nor the EU itself should directly hire people to fight disinformation. Instead, they should fund projects that strengthen and empower civil society — for example, investigative journalists who expose networks of Russian influence.

Of course, governments should use their intelligence services to detect influence operations. But the primary response of a free society to authoritarian threats — whether in the information sphere, social media, or the economy — must come from civil society itself. This means foundations, political parties, think tanks, associations, universities, and the media.

Ukraine itself has achieved remarkable success in countering Russian disinformation since the early years following the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas in 2014. It was Ukrainian civil society that responded — and far more quickly than the government. The same should happen within the European Union. Governments should fund and support civil society, but the real work must be done by the citizens themselves.

Ukraine’s Integration with the EU: Just the Beginning

In her State of the Union address, Ursula von der Leyen emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s integration with the European Union. How do you assess the role of the President of the European Commission in this process?

She sets concrete goals and defines the direction for Ukraine’s path toward EU membership. And this is not merely her personal initiative — it is the initiative of the entire European Commission. She is implementing the will of the member states within the EU Council, yet there are still many aspects she manages independently.

The EU’s assistance to Ukraine — particularly the EU-financed military support — is one of Ursula von der Leyen’s major personal achievements, as she has invested enormous energy into it. The same goes for Ukraine’s accession process. However, the final decisions will be made by the member states, not by the Commission or von der Leyen personally.

Could Ukraine become an EU member by 2030?

That is the plan. I wouldn’t say it’s impossible, but the EU has had surprisingly mixed experiences with setting a fixed date before successfully closing all negotiation chapters and fully implementing the necessary legislation in the candidate country.

Ukraine still has work to do — not so much in adopting legislation, which is largely ready, but in enforcing it, especially in strengthening the rule of law and the fight against corruption. This year has brought certain setbacks, which have certainly not helped accelerate Ukraine’s accession process. But Ukraine has the potential to meet these challenges.

<frame>"More knowledge, less fear" is the slogan of our new publication series. Safety is based on facts, verified information, and solid arguments. The more we know, the better we will be prepared for the future. <frame>

Is Poland ready for a crisis? In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, the war in Ukraine, and rising tensions across Europe, education and societal organisation are crucial. By welcoming over a million Ukrainian refugees, Poland has not only gained new residents but also unique knowledge and experience from people who have learned civil protection under the harshest conditions—under bombs and rocket fire. This is capital that must not be wasted. 

The new law on civil protection and civil defence, in force since January 1, is a concrete response to real threats. At the same time, it offers an opportunity for deeper integration, allowing Poles and Ukrainians living in Poland to prepare together for crises. 

Poland has learned from the tragic events of recent years. The new law emphasises three key areas: modernising and constructing shelters and hiding places, improving alarm and notification systems, and launching widespread civic education to ensure every citizen has basic knowledge of how to act during a crisis. The context of the war in Ukraine makes this even more urgent.

Many Ukrainians living in Poland have priceless experience in civil protection - whether as survivors, organisers, or leaders of evacuation and shelter operations.

This is an opportunity Poland must not miss. When war strikes, no system is ever fully ready. What matters then is how effectively we can use what we already have.

What can serve as a shelter? A practical approach to civil protection begins with this question. Knowledge—that is our first "shelter"!

According to the new law, every basement, underground garage, or tunnel can serve as a hiding place. It’s worth taking a moment to look around and ask yourself, "What would I do in case of danger?" 

It’s better to know in advance than to scramble during chaos. 

Here, the experience of Ukrainians in Poland becomes invaluable. Those who have survived bomb alerts can share practical knowledge with Poles, including how to organise life in shelters, secure water and food supplies, address the psychological aspects of survival, and utilise mobile alert apps that have become critical tools in Ukraine. This is not theory. These are real-life experiences from people who face the consequences of war every single day.
Their testimony is more valuable than any textbook could be. 

Education in this field is the key to safety. Poland must harness the knowledge of Ukrainians and launch a wide educational campaign as soon as possible. 
According to the new law, local governments and fire services will play a central role in civil protection. However, in practice, the system will only function effectively if hundreds of thousands of people are involved. 

Ukrainians who have faced real threats can become instructors, educators, and leaders of this change. NGOS are already playing a significant role in organising training for both Ukrainians and Poles. 

This will benefit everyone. Polish municipalities urgently need practitioners who understand the realities of crises.

Every citizen on the front lines.

The new law places local governments in charge of implementing the civil protection system, meaning the battle for the effectiveness of this law will be fought where Poles and Ukrainians live nearby. It is essential to acknowledge that women played a vital role in Ukraine’s civil protection efforts, from rescue workers and volunteers to leaders of humanitarian organisations. They ensured survival amid chaos. 

In Poland, too, women can become the driving force behind such changes, joining local governments, NGOS, and educational teams. 

Is Poland ready for a crisis and civil protection?

Poland is better prepared today than it was a few years ago. The new law represents a significant step forward, but infrastructure alone will not be sufficient.

What will truly matter is the genuine engagement of citizens in education and crisis response, the effective application of Ukrainian experience, and practical cooperation among local governments, NGOS, and the central government.

Today, Poland is in a better situation than a few years ago. The new law is an important step, but one infrastructure is not enough. The real involvement of citizens in training and the elimination of the consequences of emergencies, the wise use of Ukrainians' experience and effective cooperation between local governments, organizations and the government will be crucial.

This isn’t a Hollywood disaster movie scenario. It’s reality—a reality we must understand and prepare for.  In the 21st century, security isn’t just about armies; it’s about conscious, organised societies. And building them starts with education—education based on facts, not fearmongering. 

Security is our shared responsibility.

It’s not just the domain of the state. It’s not something the government can "provide" like a service.  It’s something we build and give to each other.  Of course, institutions, regulations, alarm systems, and shelters are vital. But what truly determines survival during a crisis is people—their relationships, willingness to help, ability to act under stress, and the awareness that, in challenging moments, we are not alone. 
Every one of us is part of the security system—from the teacher who teaches first aid, to the neighbour who knows the nearest shelter location, to the volunteer who helps newly arrived refugees adjust to a new reality. 

The strength of a nation lies in the strength of its society—and society is strong when its members know they can count on one another. 

In the past, those who realised that the best defence wasn’t walls or bunkers, but well-prepared, united people, were the ones who prevailed.  In Ukraine, social mobilisation saved thousands of lives.  In Poland, we have a chance to learn from this experience before a crisis forces us to.

While NATO leaders reaffirm their commitment to supporting Ukraine, and the EU once again demonstrates the fragility of its unity under pressure from Budapest, Russia not only refuses to halt its aggression but is intensifying its actions - both on the battlefield and in the information war. The summit in The Hague did not result in a breakthrough: promises without guarantees, talk of «peace through strength», hints at dialogue with Putin - all amid the increasingly evident decline in American ambition. Simultaneously, Hungary is blocking new sanctions, and the Kremlin is launching sophisticated cyber operations, pretending the world has already accepted its presence.

On how the West’s strategy has changed, what risks stem from illusions about Russia, what the new wave of disinformation means, and why Europe must take the lead in deterring aggression, Sestry spoke with Keir Giles - a leading British expert on security and Russia, and Senior Consulting Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House.

Trump, NATO and Russia: an alliance on the brink of compromise and challenges

Maryna Stepanenko: «Peace through strength» was declared the main theme of the talks between Trump and Zelensky. After the meeting, the head of the White House hinted at dialogue with Putin and possible Patriot missile deliveries, but no firm commitments were made. In this context, how, in your opinion, could the formula «peace through strength» be applied to Russia, and how ready is the US to take on a real role in exerting pressure?

Keir Giles: We have always known that the only way to ensure European security is to provide Ukraine with the maximum possible support. So now we are dealing with the consequences of the policy of several successive US administrations that decided a different approach was needed. They are profoundly mistaken, and this causes enormous damage not only to European security and, of course, to Ukraine itself, but also to global security.

It is precisely such restraint and refusal to confront aggression that has led to the outbreak of global conflicts around the world

We are witnessing escalating situations, increasing casualties, and more wars breaking out - all because of this new American idea that confronting the aggressor is more dangerous than allowing the victim to be destroyed

The meeting between US and Ukrainian leaders once again raised the question: what model of support for Kyiv does Washington envisage? Are we speaking about a strategic partnership or rather about controlled containment of the war without long-term commitments?

There is a serious question as to whether a genuine strategic partnership with Donald Trump is even possible. After all, the United States sought partnership with Russia - and even that does not work particularly well, despite Trump being willing to do whatever it takes to give Russia everything it wants. Any country, any traditional friend, ally or partner of the United States must remember that the relationships upon which America’s former prosperity and security were built no longer have any real meaning for Trump. We are in an entirely new global environment.

This means that countries that take European security seriously, and therefore also the security and future of Ukraine, must step up to fill the gap left by the United States. This applies primarily to Europe’s neighbours, but also to liberal democracies around the world that have a shared interest in ending aggression.

Recently, there were rumours in Brussels that Russia might be removed from the list of NATO’s main threats, leaving only international terrorism. This seems strange considering that it is Russia that continues the war in Europe and destabilises the situation globally, from Africa to the Middle East. In the final communiqué, Russia was recognised as a long-term threat to the entire Alliance. However, do you generally observe an attempt by the West to «normalise» the aggressor?

The United States has long pretended that Russia is not a problem, and we should not rule out the possibility that NATO, in its desperate efforts to retain the US in the alliance, may go along with this rhetoric.

We have already seen signs that NATO is prepared to take extraordinary measures to placate Trump: take, for example, the letter written to him by Secretary General Mark Rutte, deliberately composed in «Trump’s language». It must have been extremely difficult to imitate the verbal expressions of a five-year-old child in order to accomplish this.

Therefore, we cannot confidently predict how far NATO might go to ensure continued US participation in the Alliance. But European countries must harbour no illusions about whether Russia has ceased to be a threat, regardless of the efforts of the current US administration to convince itself otherwise.

The resilience of regimes and the fragility of decisions: what will determine the duration of the war

Despite sanctions, battlefield losses and growing isolation, Putin’s regime is holding firm - at least on the surface. Given your expertise, what is the source of this system’s resilience today, and what could destabilise it from within?

There is little chance that the Russian regime will be brought down from within, as it appears to be a regime with which the overwhelming majority of the Russian population is entirely satisfied.

Ultimately, it is a self-sufficient system in which those who have gained wealth and power within it have no interest in its destruction. Therefore, there is currently no reason to believe that Russia will deviate from its aggressive course, despite the long-term damage and the catastrophic consequences for the country’s economy and its population.

Assuming the end of the war is neither imminent nor hopelessly distant, what factors, in your view, might break the current deadlock? You have outlined internal collapse as unlikely, but could it be external pressure or something else we have yet to articulate?

The answer to this question has always been and will remain the same: European countries must provide Ukraine with maximum physical and financial support to help it defeat Russia, by any means available. Not necessarily on the front lines, but also through other forms of support.

European countries are slowly realising that their future is closely linked to the future of Ukraine, and that they can no longer rely on the United States as the primary sponsor of these efforts. But Europe will need to do much more for Ukraine to continue holding the front line and repelling the aggressor.

Russia and Belarus have announced the «Zapad-2025» exercises. In the past, such manoeuvres have served as a prelude to aggression. Is there currently a risk of this scenario being repeated, and is the West capable of responding adequately amid political fragmentation?

People always become anxious ahead of the «Zapad» exercises - this has been the case long before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and even before the annexation of Crimea. And yes, it always creates an opportunity to do something unrelated to the training itself.

But at this stage, when there is already an intense conflict ongoing, should we consider «Zapad» as just another element of battlefield deception, part of a broader deception within the ongoing war, rather than the start of a new one?

Of course, Western intelligence services will be closely monitoring who is doing what and where in the context of the Russian-Belarusian exercises - even in this new reality, where a significant part of Russia’s ground forces is already deeply engaged in Ukraine and has limited capacity for operations in other regions.

«The invisible front»: how Russia is waging war against the West in the information space

Mr Giles, you yourself became the target of a new, sophisticated phishing attack by Russian hackers - disguised as an employee of the US State Department. The attackers used Gmail’s «delegate access» function to gain hidden access to your inbox, bypassing two-factor authentication. This operation likely required weeks of effort. In this context, how has Russia’s tactic in the information war changed over the past year? And what does this say about the new level of threat?

I am confident the entire operation took far longer - several weeks just for the execution, so the planning stage must have begun much earlier.

On the one hand, this new technique, this new approach to gaining access to people’s email, indicates that Russia is being forced to develop more refined methods because its previous, more primitive attempts have failed. For many years, there have been numerous attempts to hack my email, some laughably primitive, others highly complex and sophisticated.

But on the other hand, this new method highlights that we are all vulnerable

The way the suspected Russian attackers exploited a built-in Gmail feature available in every user’s account to create, essentially, a «side door» that bypasses all our usual security measures (two-factor authentication, mobile codes, confirmation requests) shows that no one is truly safe.

Until companies such as Google, Microsoft and others fix this loophole, it is inevitable that this technique will be used much more broadly, not only against targets like me.

This summer, Europe witnessed a wave of fake messages sent on behalf of Western governments, social media manipulations, and interference in election campaigns in individual EU member states. How exactly is Russia trying to influence public opinion in Europe today, and which narratives is it primarily promoting?

Some of Russia’s narratives are entirely consistent over time, while others are tied to specific political events. It is important to remember that the campaigns conducted by Russia are ongoing and are not limited to dates on the democratic calendar.

Russia is constantly working to undermine the forces that unite Europe: solidarity among European states, societal cohesion, trust in institutions and, above all, support for Ukraine in resisting Russian aggression

These campaigns are permanent. In addition, there are targeted, time-sensitive efforts aimed at influencing the outcomes of specific democratic processes in specific countries at specific times.

Sanctions fatigue: Is the West’s pressure on the Kremlin still effective?

In addition to the NATO summit, another event important for Ukraine took place - the European Council summit. There, both a new sanctions package against the Russian Federation and support for Ukraine’s negotiation process with the EU were discussed - both initiatives were blocked by Hungary. Sanctions - also by Slovakia. To what extent do such actions undermine trust in EU unity, and what self-defence mechanisms against internal sabotage does the EU need?

This is yet another illustration of how consensus-based organisations - NATO and the EU - are vulnerable to the lowest common denominator. If there is a saboteur or a disruptor within, it can effectively paralyse the entire organisation, especially in the case of the EU, which is primarily a trade organisation rather than a structure designed to address geopolitical conflicts.

In many ways, the very structure of Europe’s supranational institutions does not meet the challenges they currently face

Nevertheless, it is impressive how far they have come in maintaining unity and a shared understanding of the importance of supporting Ukraine. I hope and believe that it will once again be possible to find a workaround to move forward, even without the cooperation of countries such as Hungary, Slovakia or others.

‍What does it signify that the United States currently does not intend to increase sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation from its side?

Well, the message from the United States has been very clear. At present, they are partners with Russia and are seeking to impose on Ukraine the terms of capitulation dictated by Moscow. This is the reality with which Ukraine and Europe must now contend.

And it is precisely the adaptation to this reality, and the speed with which it occurs, that will determine the future security of the entire continent.

Cover photo: Office of the President of Ukraine

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

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On May 20th, the European Union adopted its largest and most ambitious package of sanctions against Russia - the seventeenth to date. It targets the deployment of the Russian Federation’s «shadow fleet», which helps circumvent the oil embargo, as well as strengthening restrictions on Russian energy companies and blocking the assets of Kremlin allies in various countries. At the same time, the eighteenth package is already being prepared, which may include a ban on the import of Russian gas and uranium, and the use of frozen Russian assets for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

These sanctions are a key instrument of pressure on the Kremlin, yet their effectiveness, coordination with partners and consequences for European unity remain open questions. Ondřej Kolář, Member of the European Parliament from the Czech Republic, answered the most important of these in an exclusive interview with Sestry.

Sanctions against Russia: EU unity challenges and the position of the USA

Maryna Stepanenko: Mr Kolář, what do you believe is the main advantage of the seventeenth EU sanctions package in combating the circumvention of the Russian oil embargo? Can this package seriously complicate the activities of the so-called «shadow fleet»?

Ondřej Kolář: This is a complex issue. The fact that this is already the seventeenth sanctions package indicates that the policy is not working as effectively as it should. We allow too many exceptions, lack proper enforcement, and are unable to stop large-scale sanctions from being circumvented not only by individual companies but also by entire third countries. Sanctions do matter, but we must implement and enforce them much better.

With this seventeenth package, I hope we have finally recognised how serious the problem is, especially when it comes to the «shadow fleet», which Russia uses very effectively to bypass restrictions. I am glad that the EU is following the example of the United Kingdom on this issue, although it is disappointing that it took us about six months just to start discussing this step.

The EU is moving too slowly. Russia makes decisions quickly and decisively, while we lag behind. This must change - we must be the ones who set the agenda

I welcome this package and the fact that we have finally focused on what truly matters, such as the export of fossil fuels, on which Russia is heavily dependent. The more we block this flow, the better it is for us and for Ukraine. But we must act faster and more precisely. We cannot afford to continue playing catch-up.

You mentioned sanctions circumvention, and the seventeenth package targets not only Russian companies but also their partners in countries such as China and the UAE. You also said that the EU often reacts rather than sets the agenda. Do you see a realistic path for the EU to stay one step ahead of Russia? Is there a way to truly block all the loopholes it uses to bypass sanctions?

I am afraid not. In order to close all avenues of evasion, the EU would have to persuade the entire world to stop cooperating with Russia, and that is simply impossible. Countries such as North Korea, Iran and many from the BRICS group still maintain ties with Moscow, helping it to create the image of a nation merely defending itself and aspiring to a «normal life». This is dangerous, and we cannot accept it. Our only real instruments here are diplomacy and international trade.

The main mistake of the United States was the abandonment of USAID - this created gaps now being filled by other countries such as China and Russia

The EU lacks equivalent resources to intervene fully, but we cannot yield these spaces. We must compete, demonstrate that we are the better partner, and discard the notion that our colonial past makes us unwelcome. What China is doing in many places is simply a new form of colonialism.

We shall not defeat Russia on the battlefield as Nazi Germany was defeated in the Second World War. Therefore, we must use all the other tools at our disposal. Diplomacy and trade are areas where we can stay a step ahead.

Following the negotiations in Istanbul, the European Union is preparing its eighteenth package of sanctions targeting the Russian energy sector, financial system and «shadow fleet». Do you believe the EU is ready to act independently of the United States' position, particularly given the calls by the newly appointed Chief of Staff to the German Chancellor, Thorsten Frei, for tougher measures, including a ban on the import of Russian gas and uranium?

I would very much like greater independence from Russia because, if we do not achieve it fully, we shall only let ourselves down. Independence from the United States, however, is more complicated. We are still heavily dependent on Washington in matters of defence, security and trade. The United States has been our principal partner for eighty years. Nonetheless, everything changes.

We cannot afford to react to everything Donald Trump says. The chaos following his inauguration is colossal. In the morning, he says one thing, by lunchtime another, and in the evening he denies both statements. European leaders have realised that it is better to be patient and not to chase after every change in his rhetoric.

The main thing now is to stand on our own feet. This means being proactive and projecting the EU on a global scale. For too long, the EU has been focused on internal development - enlargement and domestic matters, which was important, but we have neglected our global role. Europe has always been a global player, and it must remain one if it is to succeed.

Europe is highly attractive - people seek a better life here because of our unparalleled social security system and quality of life. However, we cannot take this for granted. We must defend it ourselves.

Dependence on the United States is no longer acceptable. They must remain our closest partner, not our guardian

President Trump, in a private conversation with European leaders, acknowledged that Putin was not ready to end the war, but simultaneously refused new sanctions, instead proposing peace talks at the Vatican. How do you assess such a stance by the United States?

Donald Trump is a naïve man who does not understand what is happening. He has been deceived many times by Putin, and he does not even realise it. He cannot evaluate his mistakes because he simply does not acknowledge them. One cannot play poker with one’s cards face up, yet that is exactly what he is doing - showing his hand to Russia, announcing his plans, sending to Moscow unqualified people with no experience.

When he tells European leaders that he forced Putin to join negotiations with Ukraine, a week after those negotiations already took place in Istanbul - it is the same as saying: «I have been asleep for three years».

It is madness. He does not know what he is doing, what he is saying to the world or to his allies

European leaders now realise that they have a clown for a partner. I hope they have enough patience and the necessary tools to calmly and clearly explain to Trump that he is wrong, that he is making matters worse, not better. And that the Russians are playing him. They must make him understand that Russia is not interested in compromise. Unfortunately, we must admit that the current President of the United States is utterly confused and of no help whatsoever.

The United States Congress has introduced the Sanctioning Russia Act, which provides for a 500% tariff on imports from countries that purchase Russian oil and for the expansion of sanctions against Russian sovereign debt. Can Congress, even without support from the Trump administration, independently advance this initiative?

I would be pleased if it were successfully implemented. However, observing how Donald Trump treats American democracy, I am very pessimistic. He does not care about Congress, the Senate or the courts - only about himself and his propaganda.

It does not matter what Congress decides. If Trump does not like it, he will boycott it just as he ignores court rulings and anything else with which he disagrees. This complicates everything greatly.

One day he says he will impose harsh sanctions against Russia, and the next day - the opposite. So where do we stand? What game are we even playing? Nothing is clear.

I am grateful to American legislators for this initiative, but I am cautious. If Trump dislikes it, he will block it without hesitation. I should like to be mistaken, but I do not believe he will support anything that does not serve him.

Challenges on Ukraine’s path to European integration

In March, Hungary threatened to veto the extension of EU sanctions against Russia, which could have led to the unfreezing of substantial assets. Although a compromise was reached, Budapest continues to express criticism not only regarding sanctions but also concerning EU enlargement. How serious a risk is Hungary’s stance for the unity of the European Union in the context of Ukraine’s European integration? What consequences could it have for the integration process itself?

Hungary plays the role of a useful idiot in the EU - Vladimir Putin’s «Trojan horse». They are bringing others over to their side, with a certain degree of success in Slovakia, whose government has become lost in Russian falsehoods. While Ukraine is in the spotlight, the situation in the Western Balkans is even more serious.

Hungary loudly spreads nonsense about the Hungarian minority in Ukraine but quietly undermines the EU elsewhere - especially in Georgia and the Western Balkans, where Hungarian diplomats actively export Russian lies

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary is part of EUFOR (European Union Force - a military mission led by the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina tasked with maintaining peace and stability in accordance with the Dayton Agreement - Edit.) and closely cooperates with leaders of Republika Srpska connected to Putin. They play a disgraceful role in blocking EU enlargement, parroting Russian propaganda.

The EU has realised that it must bypass Hungary, but this creates dangerous precedents. Forming a «coalition of the willing» simply to circumvent Hungary and Slovakia could undermine confidence in the rules and integrity of the EU.

Ultimately, the Hungarian people must choose change. We can only hope that the next elections will bring a new government and with it a fundamentally different position on Ukraine and the region. Until then, we must wait and be patient.

The European Parliament actively supports Ukraine’s European integration, in particular by accelerating the accession process and opening negotiation clusters. How do you assess the role of the European Parliament in this process and its influence on the decisions of the EU Council?

Parliament is a legislative body, so almost everything in the EU passes through it. However, it does not play a decisive role in enlargement, although we do influence the process.

For example, I am a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and we closely monitor every country seeking to join the EU. Parliament prepares, votes on and publishes reports on the progress of each country - assessing how well they meet the accession criteria and offering recommendations.

We can also send missions for direct engagement with national partners to discuss the reforms necessary for moving closer to EU membership. But the final decision on enlargement does not rest with us.

We only provide support and guidance. The majority of Parliament supports enlargement, recognising that a larger EU is a stronger EU. Our role is to cooperate with national parliaments, not to pressure them, but to assist in carrying out the required reforms.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted that Ukraine could join the EU by 2030 if reforms continue at the current pace. How realistic do you consider this timeframe for Ukraine's accession?

I would be pleased, but much depends on when the war ends. That does not mean Ukraine should not join the EU before the war concludes - in fact, I believe it deserves a special status.

I often use the example of Puerto Rico - not a full US state, but a special territory with certain rights and responsibilities. Ukraine's situation is unique. None of the other candidate countries - Moldova, Montenegro, Albania or Serbia - have been at war since 2014. Ukraine has been at war for eleven years. We cannot treat it like an ordinary country.

It is important to set ambitious goals - they give us energy. But is 2030 realistic? Frankly, we do not even know what tomorrow will bring. When will the war end? How will it end? Will Russia keep its word?

That is why I believe a special status could be more effective and might even accelerate the process. Ukraine is being treated as if nothing has happened, and that is wrong.

Hybrid warfare and EU information security

In May 2025, Poland faced an unprecedented wave of hybrid attacks from Russia on the eve of its presidential elections. Do you believe the EU is adequately prepared for complex Russian information operations? What steps must be taken to strengthen information security in Europe?

Europe is not ready, not at all. Still, some states are more prepared than others. If you look at the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, their approach is completely different from that of Central Europe. It is strange, given our shared history. The Baltic countries were part of the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia was occupied, but not for as long. Yet Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland are now very effective in countering hybrid threats. Meanwhile, countries like Hungary and Slovakia have completely lost their bearings.

Their minds have been washed by Russian propaganda

Poland, to its credit, speaks out loudly about the problem and wants to act. But in the Czech Republic, officials appear on television and say that disinformation does not exist - this is the worst possible approach.

We are lucky that bombs are not falling on our heads, but we are in a state of information warfare. And we are losing. In Brussels, no one even talks about Russian propaganda. It is not a topic. It seems that a country’s position depends on its historical experience with Russia.

We only began acknowledging the problem because Russia continues to escalate. They blew up an ammunition depot in the Czech Republic in 2014, and all we did was expel a few diplomats. Russian officials still move freely throughout the Schengen Area. No one can stop them.

Frankly, we lack courage. We have been unable to recognise Russia as an enemy for far too long. It does not want to be our friend - it wants to defeat us and reshape the world. Europe is unprepared, it is losing, and it has no coordinated response to hybrid threats. Each country acts on its own, and Russia exploits this chaos.

Russia influences EU countries not only through cyberattacks or disinformation, but also through so-called «soft power» - pro-Russian organisations, media outlets and even economic ties. How serious do you consider this threat to be? And what can the EU do to detect and stop such influence in time?

Yes, it is a serious threat - and Europe still cannot acknowledge it. We must stop convincing ourselves that Russia cannot be that bad. It is that bad. We must take Russian propaganda at face value - they broadcast exactly what the Kremlin thinks and wants.

We must respond to the warnings of our own security services. For example, in the Czech Republic, our intelligence has long stated that Russia’s ownership of numerous real estate properties poses a threat. Yet when it comes to confiscating them, the authorities suddenly claim that it is legally impossible. This fear of Russia must end. Yes, they have nuclear weapons, but their economy is ruined. They are not capable of winning a global conflict.

Europe acts as if it has Stockholm syndrome. Russia cannot match us economically or strategically, and they are not suicidal enough to start a nuclear war

We must acknowledge that Russia is the enemy and stop legitimising people associated with it. There is no reason why, especially in Central Europe, communists and pro-Russian populists should continue to be given media platforms. This must stop.

Russian propaganda must be banned. We must be tough on everyone: individuals, companies and institutions that help Russia gain influence. Bribery, manipulation, espionage - all of this must be tracked and punished. And those who speak out against Russia must be louder, clearer and relentless in explaining the reality. Because we are still unable to tell people what is really happening - and there is no excuse for what Russia is doing. None whatsoever.

Cover photo: Associated Press/East News

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

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