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Ярослав Грицак: «Ми ніби перебуваємо в 1938 році. Різниця в тому, що ми можемо як наближатися до катастрофи, так і віддалятись від неї»
Наприкінці 1980-х років доля Європи та світу значною мірою залежала від подій у Польщі. Сьогодні важливими є події в Україні. На думку історика, роль України схожа на роль Святої Землі, коли здавалося б регіональний конфлікт має глобальні наслідки
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— Пане Ярославе, завдяки зусиллям краківського MCK не так давно з вашою книгою "Ukraina. Wyrwać się z przeszłości" ознайомилися польські читачі. Її оригінальна назва дещо інша — "Подолати минуле". Уперше про "подолання минулого" на повний голос почали говорити в німецькій публічній дискусії повоєння, де це нещодавнє минуле було дуже складним. У будь-якому разі обидва варіанти назви знаменують нелегкий для українців процес транзиту до чогось кращого. Попри те, що ви писали цю книгу до повномасштабного вторгнення й Україна нині бореться зі страхітливим сучасним, з якого минулого має вона вирватися, а яке минуле подолати?
— Так, термін подолання минулого виник у контексті дискусії довкола найбільш ганебних сторінок німецької історії, зокрема Голокосту та інших злочинів націонал-соціалізму. Метою такої політики, яку впроваджує демократія, є допомога суспільству нарешті порадити зі спадщиною, позначеною диктатурою та злодіяннями, щоб могти рухатися вперед. Я вкладаю в цей термін дещо інше значення, оскільки мене мало цікавить дослідження історичної пам'яті. Віддаю перевагу вивченню "твердої" історії, історії фактів, процесів, тенденцій.
Якщо говорю про подолання минулого, то маю на думці те, що в минулому України є декілька тем, які насамперед її стосуються. Цими темами для мене є бідність та насильство, які зазвичай пов'язані між собою. За останні двісті років з'явилися країни, які поставили собі за довготривалу мету перебороти наслідки одного й іншого. Вони прагнули обмежити насильство до терпимої міри. Зробивши це, більшість країн ставала ще й успішною економічно. Тому мене зацікавило, як західні й інші країни зуміли вирватися з цього гріховного кола, і яка роль минулого в цьому. Тобто необхідно визначити, що ж такого було в нашій історії, що й досі тягне нас униз. Саме це стало інтенцією при написанні книги.
Приклад України парадоксальний ще й тому, що будучи винятково багатою на ресурси, вона залишається країною бідних людей.
— Чи модернізаційний досвід Польщі, який українцям ставили за приклад, досі є релевантним? Чи зміна світової геополітичної та економічної кон'юнктури робить його неактуальним?
— Я прихильник тези, що жодна нація не приречена на бідність та насильство. Водночас я переконаний, що історія та культура є тією гравітаційною силою, яка не дозволяє суспільству злетіти, тобто швидко змодернізуватися. Важливими текстами для розуміння цього для мене є статті американського історика економіки Александра Ґершенкрона, який народився на початку XX ст. в Одесі. Він займався вивченням історичних передумов відсталості та полемізував із прихильниками теорії стадій економічного розвитку, оскільки вважав, що малорозвинуті країни мають розробити власну стратегію подолання прірви відсталості.
В 1991 році Україна не могла повторити досвіду Польщі через те, що в неї були гірші стартові позиції, які не вимірюються тільки економічними показниками
При цьому досвід Польщі й надалі залишається актуальним. Якби Україна зуміла зробити подібну трансформацію, тоді й проблеми, які ми мали б, більше нагадували польські, а не українські до повномасштабного вторгнення.
Нині маємо проблеми іншого характеру. Не всі країни готові до цього швидкого перезавантаження. Для того, щоб воно могло статися, мають зійтися декілька чинників: наявність активного громадянського суспільства, традицій політичних стосунків між владою та елітами, демографія, економічна та зовнішньополітична кон’юнктура. Україна до великої війни перестала бути провінційною ізольованою територією, проте не зуміла провести низки реформ, передусім судової реформи, що дозволило їй тільки наблизитися до перезавантаження, але не розпочати його.
— Ваша книга, як і низка інших публічних виступів та панельних дискусій українських інтелектуалів останніх років, присвячена вписанню історії України до глобального контексту, а радше контекстів. Тімоті Снайдер, з яким ви співпрацюєте в межах проєкту "Українська історія: глобальна ініціатива", каже, що нинішня драматична ситуація довкола України є унікальною тому, що це вперше, коли світ розгледів, що ця країна може бути лакмусом та епіцентром змін у світі. Чи ви погоджуєтеся з такою тезою вашого колеги?
— Я б волів уникати слова "унікальний". Вважаю, що в історії різних країн та народів є подібності, а є й відмінності. Проте так, Україна нині є саме такою територією, де події, що там розгортатимуться, матимуть вагоме значення як для Європи, так і для долі світу. Наприкінці 80-их років XX ст. доля світу залежала від подій у Польщі. Утім різниця в тому, що Польща змогла зробити свій цивілізаційний стрибок у часи миру, упіймавши попутні вітри демократії, тоді як Україні випало робити перехід у набагато складніших умовах.
Це не вперше Україна є в епіцентрі подій. Просто раніше розмови про це нагадували мегаломанські вигадки націоналістичних істориків. Українське питання виникло в часи Першої світової війни. Подібно до польського питання в XIX столітті, воно мало вирішальне значення для балансу сил на Старому континенті та устрою самих наддержав, а також відігравало важливу роль під час обох світових воєн. Ніхто тоді не звертав на це належної уваги через відсутність суб’єктності України. Цього разу в України ця суб’єктність є, а її народ не перебуває в міжнародній ізоляції або на боці сил, які знаходяться за крок від програшу у війні. Щодо помітності України, то вона нагадує мені дитячу гру в хованки. Її видно в часи криз, коли у світі відбуваються тектонічні зрушення. Натомість вона є непомітною в перерві між ними.
Нагадаю, що 40 років тому вийшла стаття Мілана Кундери про викрадений Захід, у якій автор підкреслював що на наших очах остаточно зникає багатомільйонна українська нація. Він писав це не зі злості, а, напевно, із сумом для того, щоб підкреслити, що подібна доля може спіткати чехів і поляків. Через неповні вісім років СРСР розпався, а велику роль в його колапсі відіграли саме українці.
— Чи не вважаєте ви, що війна в Україні змусила задуматися про постгероїчний та постнаціональний світогляд, у якому панувала брехтівська максима "нещасна та країна, яка потребує героїв", адже, як бачимо, громадянський та етнічний націоналізми мобілізує не лише на завоювання, але й на опір?
— Друга світова війна надала багатьом важливим раніше для людей поняттям негативної конотації. Одним із таких понять є “Батьківщина” — "Vaterland". Цією концепцією в різний спосіб зловживали Гітлер та інші диктатори, тому вона й почала вважатися токсичною й такою, від якої потрбно відмовитися. У західному світі це слово досі часто вживається з негативним відтінком. Натомість у Східній Європі ставлення до цього поняття є кращим з огляду на те, що центрально- та східноєвропейські народи досі живуть з думкою про загрозу. Те ж у випадку із загроженою Україною, де вибір героїчної історії через це є неминучим.
Я полюбляю ілюструвати цю різницю між Сходом і Заходом через свій діалог з одним шведським політологом. Коли я запитав у нього, хто є національним героєм його країни, після короткої паузи він відповів: "Можливо, ABBA". Жодна історична спільнота не може існувати без міфів, які стали загальноприйнятим уявленням про спільне минуле. Вони є клеєм суспільства, чимось подібним до релігійних вірувань у минулому. Натомість допоки Україна лише на шляху до успіху, поки вона в небезпеці, ситуація докорінно не зміниться. З іншого боку, у цьому й полягає роль України. Своїм громадянським націоналізмом українці повертають світові розуміння цінностей, за які варто боротися бодай для того, щоб життя мало сенс.
— Втім, у німецькій мові, окрім Vaterland, є й поняття Heimat, яке означає більш емоційний зв'язок з рідними місцями. Це щось подібне до розрізнення в українській мові батьківщини з великої та малої літер.
— Так, це правда. Мені самому до вподоби цей красивий ліберальний зворот, проте проблема в тім, що малі батьківщини не можуть захищатися. Ці спільноти безсилі перед глобальними викликами, на кшталт глобального потепління, фінансової кризи чи війни.
— Думаю, ви погодитеся, що просити історика дати прогноз на майбутнє є справою невдячною. Проте сформулюю питання в більш пристойний спосіб. Як вважаєте, як про події в Україні писатимуть у підручниках з історії? Та чи знаходите ви аналогії поміж подіями довгого XX століття та можливими розвилками, перед якими стоїть світ та українська держава?
— Історики уникають опису процесів, які ще не завершилися. Вирішальним буде те, де саме зупиниться ця війна та яким буде її підсумок. Проте я впевнений, що про Україну обов’язково писатимуть як про одну з ключових територій, де визначався порядок денний розвитку світу на покоління вперед. На думку спадають дві ризиковані паралелі. Україна нині як Свята Земля, як така собі Палестина Європи, де на обмеженій географічно території точаться запеклі конфлікти. Попри нібито регіональне значення, вони часто мають значення для всього світу.
Як і у випадку безпрецедентного історичного експерименту зі створенням держави Ізраїль, від успішної відсічі України залежатиме доля ще одного історичного експерименту. Йдеться про найбільший у світі простір без воєн — Європейський Союз. Віками Європа була одним з найбільш конфліктних континентів.
Попри всі мінуси та скепсис до Брюсселя, саме завдяки ЄС з'явився такий великий простір взаємодії, спільного росту стандартів, удалих реформ, солідарності та взаємодопомоги
Україні потрібно полишити зону небезпеки, яку віками створює Росія. Проте європейці також не мають бути пасивними. Від того, чи зможуть вони відстояти власний цивілізаційний вибір, залежатиме те, чи будуть вони надалі взірцем для світу, чи зруйнують модус безконфліктного співіснування.
Друга паралель опирається на моє відчуття, що ми ніби перебуваємо в 1938 році. Різниця тільки в тому, що ми можемо як наближатися до катастрофи (тоді про війну в Україні писатимуть як про прелюдію Третьої світової війни), так і віддалятися від неї.
<frame>Ярослав Грицак (нар. 1960) — історик, доктор історичних наук, професор Українського католицького університету у Львові, директор Інституту історичних досліджень Львівського національного університету ім. І. Франка у Львові. Викладав, зокрема, у Центральноєвропейському університеті в Будапешті (1996-2009), Гарвардському університеті (2000, 2001) та Колумбійському університеті (1994, 2004). Автор численних публікацій з історії та сучасної ідентичності Центральної та Східної Європи. Книга Ярослава Грицака "Подолати минуле" (пол. "Ukraina. Wyrwać się z przeszłości") у перекладі Катажини Котинської та Йоанни Маєвської-Грабовської вийшла друком у краківському видавництві MCK<frame>
Her second term as President of the European Commission has been marked by growing attempts to challenge her authority. In July, Ursula von der Leyen narrowly survived a vote of no confidence. During the current plenary session of the European Parliament (October 6–9), the issue of trust in her leadership will once again be put to a vote. Support from centrists and moderate forces should grant the Commission President a temporary sense of stability — but will that support last?
Roland Freudenstein. Photos from a private archive
The Best person for the job
Maryna Stepanenko: Since 2014, no President of the European Commission has faced a vote of no confidence, yet Ursula von der Leyen has found herself in this situation for the second time. What is the source of this political crisis?
Roland Freudenstein: Within the European Commission, critical voices toward its President are becoming more frequent — not only from political extremists but also from some centrists. However, everyone understands that, in reality, there is no alternative. That’s why the upcoming vote of no confidence is unlikely to succeed.
Some call Ursula von der Leyen “Europe’s strong voice in the world” and a consistent advocate for Ukraine’s interests across the continent. Others claim she lacks the persistence needed to see major initiatives through to the end. What would you identify as von der Leyen’s main strengths and weaknesses as a politician?
I would say her greatest strength lies in the power of her convictions and her incredible work ethic.
She is often described as a workaholic. She even turned her room on the 13th floor of the Commission’s headquarters in Brussels into a makeshift office.
Naturally, not everyone appreciates that. Some people dislike strong Commission Presidents; others simply dislike strong women. She has also faced criticism for not devoting enough attention to certain projects — though, in most cases, the circumstances worked against her.
The best example is the European Green Deal — an effort to balance Europe’s economic competitiveness with the fight against climate change. For years, the pendulum of public sentiment swung toward saving the planet, but that moment has passed. Now, von der Leyen is unable to deliver on all the “green course” initiatives she once championed at the start of her second term.
Although the summer’s vote of no confidence was unsuccessful, it exposed deep divisions within the European Parliament. How do you assess von der Leyen’s ability to maintain the support of various political groups during her second term?
— The very fact that her most ardent critics come from the far left and the far right is what ensures her survival. The left doesn’t want to vote with the right — and vice versa. Moreover, there truly is a sense, even among her critics, that no one else could do this job better than she does.
If we look at their own criteria — especially in areas such as social legislation, environmental policy, and respect for member states — I simply cannot imagine anyone else capable of fulfilling this role.
Her critics know this too, particularly those in the political center who may be dissatisfied with her style or certain decisions. In the end, even they admit it.
Is Ursula von der Leyen able to adjust her policies to satisfy both centrist and right-wing parties while maintaining the unity of the EU?
No, that’s impossible — you can’t please everyone. It’s the same in national politics: no head of government can satisfy all voters. That’s why von der Leyen must rely on a coalition of centrist forces.
Yet even within that coalition, maintaining consensus is extremely difficult — it requires constant compromise. And this is precisely where her strength and her work discipline play a positive role. To make compromises, you must be strong and guided by strong convictions. At the same time, you have to work relentlessly and cooperate with a vast number of decision-makers.
I am deeply convinced that Ursula von der Leyen is currently the best person for this job.
To save time, Ursula von der Leyen has in the European Commission building not only an office, but also an apartment. Photo: @ursulavonderleyen
The Political Show of the Far Right
The influence of right-wing parties in the European Parliament is growing. How do you assess their impact on the EU’s political direction? Could they change the balance of power within the European People’s Party (EPP)?
Under the leadership of Manfred Weber, the European People’s Party has at times adopted positions aligned with the far right, allowing it to build a majority that extends beyond the classic centrist coalition of the EPP, liberals, social democrats, and greens. For instance, on certain provisions of the Green Deal, the EPP diverged from von der Leyen and pushed the Commission toward more right-leaning, pro-agricultural stances.
However, on strategic issues — European defense, support for Ukraine, and global trade agreements — its stance remains fully aligned with the EPP’s. The real problems tend to come from the left, particularly the socialists and the greens. One example was von der Leyen’s strong reaction to the situation in Israel and Gaza, which many EU members — including socialists and greens — saw as hasty and one-sided in favor of Israel.
So while the EPP has influenced von der Leyen’s program to some extent, on key strategic matters it remains close to her views.
Given the far-right parties’ support for the vote of no confidence against von der Leyen, could their goal be not just to change the leadership but to influence the overall direction of the EU?
Yes, that’s exactly what they’re trying to do. They aim for tactical victories by gathering as many votes as possible for a no-confidence motion against Ursula von der Leyen. They’re unlikely to win such votes, but their goal is to send a political message.
If you look at Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric, it becomes clear that Brussels is his enemy — and no one personifies Brussels more than Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission. Of course, there are other influential figures — the Presidents of the Parliament and the Council, and High Representative Kaja Kallas — but von der Leyen is the most powerful of them all.
That’s why she has become a symbol of the EU institutions, which, according to Orbán, have grown too powerful and have led Europe in the wrong direction. Together with the Patriots for Europe (PFE) and other far-right groups, he wants to attack her publicly — and, through her, attack the very idea of the European Union.
They want to turn it into a grand political show.
Hungary, under Orbán’s leadership, has repeatedly blocked EU initiatives — especially those related to sanctions against Russia. How do you assess Orbán’s actions and their impact on von der Leyen’s position?
Viktor Orbán has effectively sided with Putin — he’ll never admit it, but that’s the truth. He believes the future belongs to dictators, wants to maintain close relations with them, and ultimately aspires to become one himself. He might even lose the next election, but that remains his worldview.
He rejects everything the EU stands for: shared sovereignty, strong Brussels institutions, and majority voting in the Council. He has also been a vocal opponent of Ukraine’s EU membership. However, in the coming weeks, the Council may attempt to bypass Hungary’s veto on sanctions against Russia.
At this point, not only Brussels institutions but also most EU member states have had enough of Orbán and are looking for ways to work around Hungary — and, in some cases, Slovakia as well.
That’s a major shift. Previously, member states disliked Orbán but rarely confronted him directly. Now, countries like Poland, the Baltic states, the Nordics, and even Germany sometimes do so openly. Orbán feels cornered. He continues to portray Brussels as the villain and the member states as the “good guys,” but in reality, most governments now openly oppose him. His fallback strategy is to delegitimize them by labeling them “elites” or “globalists” who no longer represent their nations. But since those governments were democratically elected, Orbán’s position is increasingly difficult.
Von der Leyen has publicly supported ending the EU’s unanimity rule in certain policy areas. Can this move be seen as radical or risky for her political career?
No, because she’s not the driving force behind this process. And she’s being very wise not to be — it would only reinforce the stereotype of her as a power-hungry Eurocrat bent on limiting member states’ rights. Let’s not forget that several member states themselves remain hesitant about majority voting in crucial areas.
It would be much better if another influential figure in Brussels — in this case, European Council President António Costa — took the lead, with member states’ backing. That way, the issue would appear political, not personal. Honestly, I don’t think the debate over majority voting will harm her career.
Disinformation and Russia’s Natural Enemy
How do you assess the role of disinformation in EU politics, particularly in campaigns targeting von der Leyen?
Its influence is significant. Russia is doing everything it can to increase tensions in European politics — both within member states and inside the Brussels bubble. The negative image of Ursula von der Leyen is part of that effort to fuel conflict. And of course, Russian disinformation and propaganda target her directly because of her strong and consistent stance on Ukraine. She is, quite simply, their natural enemy.
With Volodymyr Zelensky in Brussels, August 17, 2025. Photo: OPU
Russia is always trying to heighten political tensions and internal divisions within the European Union.
At the same time, I notice that people expressing Eurosceptic views or criticizing von der Leyen or Ukraine aren’t always doing so because the Kremlin is paying them. Sometimes, they genuinely believe what they say. That’s why I would be cautious about labeling every form of criticism as Russian disinformation or assuming that someone is on Putin’s payroll.
We need to counter such criticism with political arguments — not just by pointing fingers.
There is a widespread sense of frustration — a belief that things are going in the wrong direction, that wealth is distributed unfairly, that Europe isn’t generating enough economic growth, that too much is spent on defense and too little on social issues, and so on. These feelings are real. Russia seeks to exploit them to intensify political tensions. However, the right way to respond to this criticism is through political action — not merely by accusing people of taking money from Moscow.
Is the European Union responding actively enough to the threat of disinformation from third countries? What more should be done to strengthen the EU’s information security?
Neither national governments nor the EU itself should directly hire people to fight disinformation. Instead, they should fund projects that strengthen and empower civil society — for example, investigative journalists who expose networks of Russian influence.
Of course, governments should use their intelligence services to detect influence operations. But the primary response of a free society to authoritarian threats — whether in the information sphere, social media, or the economy — must come from civil society itself. This means foundations, political parties, think tanks, associations, universities, and the media.
Ukraine itself has achieved remarkable success in countering Russian disinformation since the early years following the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas in 2014. It was Ukrainian civil society that responded — and far more quickly than the government. The same should happen within the European Union. Governments should fund and support civil society, but the real work must be done by the citizens themselves.
Ukraine’s Integration with the EU: Just the Beginning
In her State of the Union address, Ursula von der Leyen emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s integration with the European Union. How do you assess the role of the President of the European Commission in this process?
She sets concrete goals and defines the direction for Ukraine’s path toward EU membership. And this is not merely her personal initiative — it is the initiative of the entire European Commission. She is implementing the will of the member states within the EU Council, yet there are still many aspects she manages independently.
The EU’s assistance to Ukraine — particularly the EU-financed military support — is one of Ursula von der Leyen’s major personal achievements, as she has invested enormous energy into it. The same goes for Ukraine’s accession process. However, the final decisions will be made by the member states, not by the Commission or von der Leyen personally.
Could Ukraine become an EU member by 2030?
That is the plan. I wouldn’t say it’s impossible, but the EU has had surprisingly mixed experiences with setting a fixed date before successfully closing all negotiation chapters and fully implementing the necessary legislation in the candidate country.
Ukraine still has work to do — not so much in adopting legislation, which is largely ready, but in enforcing it, especially in strengthening the rule of law and the fight against corruption. This year has brought certain setbacks, which have certainly not helped accelerate Ukraine’s accession process. But Ukraine has the potential to meet these challenges.
<frame>"More knowledge, less fear" is the slogan of our new publication series. Safety is based on facts, verified information, and solid arguments. The more we know, the better we will be prepared for the future. <frame>
Is Poland ready for a crisis? In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, the war in Ukraine, and rising tensions across Europe, education and societal organisation are crucial. By welcoming over a million Ukrainian refugees, Poland has not only gained new residents but also unique knowledge and experience from people who have learned civil protection under the harshest conditions—under bombs and rocket fire. This is capital that must not be wasted.
The new law on civil protection and civil defence, in force since January 1, is a concrete response to real threats. At the same time, it offers an opportunity for deeper integration, allowing Poles and Ukrainians living in Poland to prepare together for crises.
Poland has learned from the tragic events of recent years. The new law emphasises three key areas: modernising and constructing shelters and hiding places, improving alarm and notification systems, and launching widespread civic education to ensure every citizen has basic knowledge of how to act during a crisis. The context of the war in Ukraine makes this even more urgent.
Many Ukrainians living in Poland have priceless experience in civil protection - whether as survivors, organisers, or leaders of evacuation and shelter operations.
This is an opportunity Poland must not miss. When war strikes, no system is ever fully ready. What matters then is how effectively we can use what we already have.
What can serve as a shelter? A practical approach to civil protection begins with this question. Knowledge—that is our first "shelter"!
April 19, 2024 - Children entering a bomb shelter at the Perspectiva Gymnasium in Novovasylivka, Zaporizhzhia region, where classes are held in a hybrid format. Photo: Ukrinform/East News/Dmytro Smolienko
According to the new law, every basement, underground garage, or tunnel can serve as a hiding place. It’s worth taking a moment to look around and ask yourself, "What would I do in case of danger?"
It’s better to know in advance than to scramble during chaos.
Here, the experience of Ukrainians in Poland becomes invaluable. Those who have survived bomb alerts can share practical knowledge with Poles, including how to organise life in shelters, secure water and food supplies, address the psychological aspects of survival, and utilise mobile alert apps that have become critical tools in Ukraine. This is not theory. These are real-life experiences from people who face the consequences of war every single day. Their testimony is more valuable than any textbook could be.
Education in this field is the key to safety. Poland must harness the knowledge of Ukrainians and launch a wide educational campaign as soon as possible. According to the new law, local governments and fire services will play a central role in civil protection. However, in practice, the system will only function effectively if hundreds of thousands of people are involved.
Ukrainians who have faced real threats can become instructors, educators, and leaders of this change. NGOS are already playing a significant role in organising training for both Ukrainians and Poles.
This will benefit everyone. Polish municipalities urgently need practitioners who understand the realities of crises.
Every citizen on the front lines.
The new law places local governments in charge of implementing the civil protection system, meaning the battle for the effectiveness of this law will be fought where Poles and Ukrainians live nearby. It is essential to acknowledge that women played a vital role in Ukraine’s civil protection efforts, from rescue workers and volunteers to leaders of humanitarian organisations. They ensured survival amid chaos.
In Poland, too, women can become the driving force behind such changes, joining local governments, NGOS, and educational teams.
Is Poland ready for a crisis and civil protection?
Poland is better prepared today than it was a few years ago. The new law represents a significant step forward, but infrastructure alone will not be sufficient.
What will truly matter is the genuine engagement of citizens in education and crisis response, the effective application of Ukrainian experience, and practical cooperation among local governments, NGOS, and the central government.
Today, Poland is in a better situation than a few years ago. The new law is an important step, but one infrastructure is not enough. The real involvement of citizens in training and the elimination of the consequences of emergencies, the wise use of Ukrainians' experience and effective cooperation between local governments, organizations and the government will be crucial.
April 1, 2024 – Zaporizhzhia. Two workers in a new modular underground bomb shelter for 100 people, being built in the courtyard of a five-story residential building damaged by a Russian S-300 missile on October 6, 2022, now under repair. Photo: Ukrinform/East News/Dmytro Smolienko
This isn’t a Hollywood disaster movie scenario. It’s reality—a reality we must understand and prepare for. In the 21st century, security isn’t just about armies; it’s about conscious, organised societies. And building them starts with education—education based on facts, not fearmongering.
Security is our shared responsibility.
It’s not just the domain of the state. It’s not something the government can "provide" like a service. It’s something we build and give to each other. Of course, institutions, regulations, alarm systems, and shelters are vital. But what truly determines survival during a crisis is people—their relationships, willingness to help, ability to act under stress, and the awareness that, in challenging moments, we are not alone. Every one of us is part of the security system—from the teacher who teaches first aid, to the neighbour who knows the nearest shelter location, to the volunteer who helps newly arrived refugees adjust to a new reality.
The strength of a nation lies in the strength of its society—and society is strong when its members know they can count on one another.
In the past, those who realised that the best defence wasn’t walls or bunkers, but well-prepared, united people, were the ones who prevailed. In Ukraine, social mobilisation saved thousands of lives. In Poland, we have a chance to learn from this experience before a crisis forces us to.
Olga Pakosh: In light of what is happening today, how can we talk about building bridges?
Krzysztof Czyżewski: We first need to realize how few of them we have actually built.
Why?
We were given time—time we largely failed to use. Today comes the test of what we did with it, and it turns out it could have been much more. Too few bridges were built—between Poles and Ukrainians, but also many others. Because all these bridges are interconnected. Fear of the other very easily turns into scapegoating—of the foreigner, someone of another nationality, culture, or skin color. And this shows that we could have done far more, especially from the bottom up, at the grassroots, organically. We lacked investment in local government, in education—from primary school through every level—in cultural and community-building activities. Had we put more effort into these, we would be in a completely different place today.
That’s why the work of rooting is so important—in a place, in oneself, in our identity. When the full-scale war in Ukraine broke out, refugee children came to Krasnogruda. One of the first projects we did with them was an animated film.
The children called it Pokój (“Room/Peace”), because they discovered that in Polish the word has two meanings: “absence of war” and “my space to live.” It was precisely this space they had lost—their room, their home—and that’s what they longed for. They also understood that the one who starts a war is the one who has no room of their own.
People deprived of rootedness and a sense of community are more easily swayed by ideologies that lead to hatred and violence. That’s why we need time to rebuild this rootedness, which our region still lacks because of its history of wars and regimes. We simply wasted the time we were given.
We invested in roads—because that’s easy, because every politician wants to boast about them. But investments in schools, cultural centers, civic organizations—in people—were never a priority. And yet those are precisely the investments that could give us the strength to stand against hatred and war.
The Comfortable Role of the Victim
What is hatred? No one is born with hatred. It always has a source, usually in the early stages of life. Something must have happened in our environment—in the family, at school, in the community. Something that made us susceptible to this illness called hatred.
To confront it, we must go back to its beginnings. To the moment when a child or young person found themselves in a situation where no one defended them, protected them, or taught them how to cope with harm. It’s the environment that shapes a person, and if it is not built on peace, it creates space for hatred. Hatred often grows out of emptiness, resentment, and a sense of loss. A person who experiences pain at the hands of others, lacking the tools to understand it, builds a defense mechanism: they start believing that hatred will make them stronger.
Imagine a young Czesław Miłosz. He dreams of Western Europe, of Paris—and during a trip with friends, he reaches a bridge on the Swiss–French border. There he sees a sign: “No entry for Slavs, Gypsies, Jews.” Such a blow can trigger two reactions. One is to respond in kind: return home and put up a sign against the French or the Germans. But one can also react differently: do everything not to answer hostility with hostility. Yet to choose this path, one needs support—spiritual, moral, found in an authority or a community.
We encounter such “signs” even today—in a metaphorical sense—living in multicultural societies. We often, and unwittingly, hurt others with words or gestures. These are moments when we can take Miłosz’s path: to dedicate our life and work to opposing the philosophy of exclusion. But choosing this path means loneliness. As in the case of Miłosz, who in interwar Vilnius—governed by nationalists—was told that history did not belong to him.
The “signpost philosophy” always builds a fortress. It assumes one must close off, build walls, and cast outsiders in a bad light. It’s the feeling that strength comes from isolation. I have met people who build such fortresses. Today this is very visible in Ukraine. My Ukrainian friends wrote to me after February 24th: “I hate. That’s my state of mind.” I understand this. In the face of aggression, one builds defensive embankments, protects family and community. Perhaps a soldier needs hatred as a weapon—it gives determination and strength.
But the crucial question is about the boundary. Between the person who can treat hatred like a shield, then set it aside after the fight and return to normal life—and the person who becomes its captive. If you can put it down, hatred remains a temporary weapon. If you cannot, the illness takes control. Then hatred doesn’t end with the war—it begins to destroy life, relationships, one’s entire world.
How can we defend ourselves against hatred in today’s world?
Sometimes a person must build a fortress, but a fortress is not a natural environment for life. When a new generation arrives—our children—they will feel curiosity and the need to go out into the open world. Because a fortress, if accepted as a permanent home, becomes a prison—and everyone wants to escape from prison.
So the question is: if I build a bridge to the other side, risking my own shore and the possibility that an enemy may use it—am I acting against life?
Would it be better to stay on my side and live more safely, more comfortably? This is how supporters of extreme, xenophobic ideologies think: that it’s best to be only among one’s own. Except that in human nature such a scenario never proves life-giving. Sooner or later it leads to illness—xenophobia or hatred.
That’s why courage is always necessary. To resist hatred, we must cultivate inner strength to overcome our emotions. And yet we have a tendency to justify our hostility easily: we pick at resentments, repeat that someone wronged us. It feels comfortable to wear the skin of the victim, because then we are always ostensibly on the “good side.” But staying in the role of the victim also leads nowhere. It breeds weakness and fear—fear of opening up, of encountering the other.
What does this mean in practice? If I, as a Pole, am afraid to admit that in Jedwabne, during the Holocaust, a crime was committed against Jewish neighbors and I prefer to conceal this truth—where is my patriotism then? Where is my courage?
There is no courage in falsifying history. Courage is born when I can look into the eyes of those who were victims, when I do the work on myself. It is difficult, critical work of memory. If we want to build bridges with others, let’s start with ourselves. Let us ask: are there not painful places in our own history that we should work through—acknowledge, beat our breast, return the truth to others, or at least try to listen? Paradoxically, this does not weaken us—it makes us stronger.
On the doorstep of the house where Polish writer and philosopher Stanisław Vincenz once lived — Hutsul region, Ukraine.
Pop Culture Pure
How would you explain the shift from the immense openness toward Ukrainians in February 2022 to the current state, where some say that help was unappreciated or that newcomers “give nothing in return”? Is it fatigue, lack of courage, or something deeper in human nature?
What’s missing is something else. What’s very dangerous is what politicians often try to convince us of: that our attitude toward Ukrainians must be conditioned by interest. In my view, the spontaneous, magnificent reaction of people was simply a human reaction. No one asked then what we would get out of it. It was as Pope Francis said in Lampedusa about the Church: it should be like a field hospital.
It doesn’t matter what your faith, nationality, or skin color is—you simply serve a person in need. This is an absolute human duty. Without asking about interest, advantage, or profit.
If we step down from that level—and today many try to frame help for Ukrainians in terms of budgets, gains, or losses—we reduce the field hospital to a marketplace.
And that’s exactly what we see in the world. It used to be unthinkable that states would give weapons only in exchange for raw materials. Today this approach is part of the political mainstream. It’s a moral collapse.
Of course, rationality, logic, and common sense are needed—especially in politics and strategic decisions.
At the same time, we must act on a human level. Because we are Christians, Poles, Ukrainians, people. There are no narrow categories here. It’s not about nationality or religion, but about a human being in need.
The first wave of refugees from Ukraine made this very clear. I remember Viktoria Amelina [a Ukrainian writer who died in hospital on July 1, 2023, from injuries sustained during a Russian attack on Kramatorsk—ed.] in Krasnogruda telling me that at the border she felt treated better than refugees from other countries. She was privileged simply because she was Ukrainian. That shows the limit of our wonderful Polish–Ukrainian period of solidarity—right next to the Belarusian border, the symbol of non-solidarity.
When such selection creeps into our responses, we see a symptom of illness: our assistance and attitudes are no longer fully true or natural. It’s not about judging people—we’re all in the same boat; we all have oversights and limitations. But it’s also part of a great moral decline, a degradation we’re witnessing worldwide. It shows how much fear, anxiety, and uncertainty we harbor, and how little of the peace that children talk about. And how easily populist politics can lead us astray.
Why does hatred take root in us so easily? Is it politics, ideology, indoctrination (imposing certain ideas and beliefs on a person — Ed.)?
Or perhaps pop culture? And culture? How is it possible that in a democratic society we separated pop culture from culture—that pop culture is meant to reach people who “won’t understand” culture because it’s too difficult, not for them?
If we accept that conversations about values, morality, and understanding the other are intended only for those in that “other” culture and not for everyone, the tragedy begins.
The tragedy is that in a democracy we don’t trust people. We don’t believe they can make difficult decisions themselves, hold values, and take responsibility for them.
We persist in the belief that we must speak to people in a simplified way, otherwise they “won’t understand.” Politicians and the media often take this path. They create a “pop-cultural mush,” and we pay the price. We’ve created pop-cultural politics, pop-cultural politicians, and politics characterized by leveling down. It’s the result of our underestimating culture and failing to understand that conscience—our spiritual culture—is an obligation for everyone, without exception.
Szewczenko or Miłosz are for everyone, and with everyone we can talk about values, demand reflection, action, and responsibility. It’s like the wisdom of the Gospels—they are not reserved for the chosen. We have lost faith that this has anything to do with everyday life. Even people who consider themselves Christians often craft their own “life-gospel,” at odds with the true Gospel, while politicians offer a discourse full of xenophobia and hatred.
Here lies a serious neglect, for which we are now paying the price. A vast arrogance and paternalism that we have allowed to speak. As a result, we’ve lost many citizens—people who felt utterly marginalized not only in terms of material well-being but also in terms of trust and co-responsibility for the world’s affairs. Pushed aside and often stigmatized as xenophobes.
I never use such labels for anyone. Because when you call someone a chauvinist or a xenophobe, you put them against a wall. You strip them of the ability to move—and thus the chance to change. Culture should provide space and time for us to change, learn, and mature. That’s what our culture often lacks: patience for process, the understanding that change takes time.
The history we come from, and the new tragic circumstances, place demands on us that often exceed our strength. Sometimes we are too weak to bear them. But does that mean we are immediately bad—and forever? Perhaps we can still be partners—for conversation, for cooperation, for living together—even if we handle our emotions differently.
We are very good at cornering people. “You are this—period.” Meanwhile, we should learn to understand ourselves and others, to transcend our own limitations, to practice the art of dialogue—because only then is true transformation possible.
You speak of empathy, which was so visible at the beginning. But haven’t you noticed that today the word “neighbors” has practically disappeared from the media when we speak about Ukrainians?
“Neighborhood” is a good word, isn’t it? A neighbor is already part of our life. And if we drive them out, a feeling arises… that there is no threat, and no need for effort or even sacrifice, because a neighbor demands more from me.
A neighbor is someone you can rightly offer hospitality to, someone you can share with, someone you coexist with and share responsibility for something with. Simply by existing, a neighbor touches deeply rooted values in us—and puts them to the test.
If we succumb to confrontational, hateful ideology, we push out words like “neighborhood,” “kinship,” “the common good.”
I won’t even dwell on the fact that politicians try to convince us that it’s in our interest to cut ourselves off from Ukraine—which is absurd, because Ukraine provides us with security. If we were rational and sober about what is truly good for us, we should do everything to make our neighborhood as deep and as close as possible.
Anna Łazar, Yuri Andrukhovych and Krzysztof Czyżewski. Private Archive
Meanwhile, we allow ourselves to be ruled by what is irrational or aimed at short-term effects (which amounts to the same). We let weakness work within us and perceive threats where they do not truly exist.
I would also like to address Ukrainians—to understand that sometimes it’s not worth attaching too much importance to these momentary crises—just as in the life of an individual, so in a collective body we sometimes succumb to weakness, and politicians draw out the worst in us. We should not believe that this is a permanent state, nor should we immediately put Poles against the wall, assuming that “this is how they are now.”
Of course, we should set standards for ourselves—now I’m speaking about Poles in the context of the situation in Ukraine. But at the same time, it is worth giving ourselves a chance to change: to be more understanding, more empathetic, to trust that change is possible. I also don’t attach excessive importance to momentary gusts in social media—those winds change very quickly.
I would rather focus on long-term, grassroots, organic building—creating things that won’t bear fruit today but will do so in a few years. Because trust has extraordinary power. If I, Ms. Olga, believe that even if you (purely hypothetically) feel prejudice, resentment, or hatred toward me, it won’t be forever—and I don’t close myself off to our mutual presence—and if I believe our relationship can change—then you will not remain indifferent to that. You will sense in me not an enemy, but a person open to change. That is precisely what releases positive energy between us.
Sometimes it demands more of us than we could realistically expect—greater generosity than daily life calls for. And that’s what builds a person, gives extraordinary strength. For me, beauty lies in the Ukrainian word peremoha. When I travel the world, I always urge people to learn it not in translation (“victory”) but in its Ukrainian meaning.
Peremohty, mohty—it means the ability to act beyond one’s own capacities. Even if we have limitations, traumas, weaknesses, there is such a thing as peremohty: to be able to do more than we can. And that is true victory.
To achieve this, we must extend ourselves a credit of trust, create good energies that allow us to do more than we believe possible. Two years ago our borders opened, solidarity emerged, and suddenly we were able to show a better face—better than before, in the context of the Belarusian border. Even those who previously stood for radical confrontation and closing the border to refugees could not silence their own consciences in the face of need—children in the Białowieża Forest who needed a simple glass of water. You can’t calm your conscience that way. Ideological arguments aren’t enough.
And suddenly Ukrainians appeared, toward whom we could be entirely different. It was a moment when we became better than ourselves, though such moments never last long. Our wisdom should lie in knowing how to appeal to what is best in us, building on that, and not giving up the work of maturing into those values.
There Are More People of Good Will
After the president vetoed the law on assistance for Ukrainian mothers and as a wave of hatred grew, one of my colleagues asked: what should I do now? Where should I go? I chose to stay in Poland, and I don’t know what I should feel or how to live, if I’m even afraid to speak Ukrainian with my child on the street.
For a moment I thought that it’s increasingly difficult today to advise your colleague where she might go to be better off. There are fewer and fewer such places in the world. Of course, that is no excuse for what’s happening in our country. But it is one of those painful lessons we receive from the modern world. I return to the idea that we are part of communicating vessels. What happens here is interdependent with other places in the world, and we often struggle to cope with that.
Let’s have no illusions: we live in an era of moral decline, a degradation of humanism.
Of course, I would like people like the one you describe to remain in Poland—because we need them. I don’t mean this in terms of budget revenue, though that’s obvious. That’s not the logic I’m using. These people are needed so that we can grow into the maturity demanded of us by the situation in the world—and so that we have a chance to change our own attitudes. Your colleague, experiencing intolerance in Poland yet still engaging in building good neighborliness, has a chance to be part of a process of change—one that won’t happen overnight and will surely bring her suffering, but in the long run it carries hope.
Because in this process there is strength and potential—we change the world where we are, not by endlessly fleeing elsewhere.
My philosophy largely rests on changing the world from within. There is a growing temptation to flee from various environments, institutions, religions, or countries because something seems unbearable or contrary to our beliefs. But that’s escape. Then we become perpetual nomads.
The answer is to stay, to find a room, to take root, and to work—with an understanding of all the conditions that come with it. Such rootedness is not the same as returning to a lost place (though may such returns be possible). It is staying within a new situation and learning it mutually—this gives a chance for growth.
A second reflection is that there are more of us than we think: us, people of good will. We live in a world that often minimizes our presence because it amplifies drama, conflict, pain, and injustice. The voice of harm reaches the media; it is harder to express good and positive emotions. This is also my work: to help people give voice to the good emotions that, I believe, dwell in everyone—even in those who hate deeply. In everyone there is a spark of a need to do something good. The problem is often how to do it, how to give it form.
We lack holidays, language, and culture for this—and politics even more so—because we live in a world where harm, pain, and hatred are easy to express. Sometimes it’s about a wise perspective: perhaps there are more of us than it seems; perhaps the politician who has won and seems monstrous does not, in fact, have all our votes.
Where is that other half of Poland? It exists—and there are ways to reach it. It’s difficult, but it gives hope.
I’ve lived in Poland for 10 years, and I’ve heard from various people that humans are inherently good—which I never heard in Ukraine. Two Poles also told me that even if people do something bad, they later regret it.
What I’m talking about is close to what I earlier called the spark of good in every person—something hard to bring out. I speak of it because it was passed on to me by people who went through real hell. Starting with Miłosz, who survived two world wars; with Holocaust survivors; with Bosnian Muslims whose relatives lie buried in Srebrenica. They could have said that the world is evil, that our actions are meaningless in the face of the destructive forces of dictatorial regimes, that building bridges is weak against military and ideological violence. And yet it was precisely they who taught me not to lose faith in the good—in that small light present in every person, regardless of which “side” they are on.
They taught me that it’s worth working to help others and ourselves—to free the good within us, to find words and time so that our conscience can be spoken, not stifled. And despite the “sober skeptics,” whose voice I respect, and despite having witnessed the core of darkness revealed by wars, I stand with my teachers, who allowed themselves neither nihilism nor agreement that good in this world is doomed to defeat.
Because if they weren’t right, would we be able to have this conversation at all, Ms. Olga?
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