Exclusive
Disinformation
20
хв

The war of narratives: how Russia manipulates the information space in Ukraine and Europe

Direct threats to Ukraine with new weaponry - including «Orieshnik», suggestions to European countries that they might also be targeted, an extensive network of agents in Europe persuading governments to stop aiding Ukraine, discrediting the Ukrainian authorities and military - these are the key messages Russia has been advancing over the past six months

Kateryna Tryfonenko

Russia’s Manipulations: What is the Kremlin Doing in Europe? Photo: Shutterstock

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Together with experts in combating disinformation, Sestry analysed the most common Russian narratives found in Ukraine, Poland, Germany and Europe in general. They examined how these messages are tailored for different audiences, the platforms where Russian propaganda is most frequently encountered, how to distinguish destructive content, and whether it achieves its goals.

Constructing Reality

Propaganda always strives to construct an alternative reality and aims to make it as simple as possible, explains Doctor of Political Science and Professor at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, Lidiia Smola:

- Let me give an example: for weeks, the idea has been spreading that Trump will prohibit the supply of weapons to Ukraine. Moreover, Trump’s extravagant statements provide grounds for various interpretations. This narrative, this framework about a ban on weapons for Ukraine, is continuously supplemented with informational messages.

This starts to destabilise society, making people think: that is it - Trump will come, and it will all end for us

The fundamental goal of Russians, continues Lidiia Smola, is to divide and demoralise:

- To demoralise the part of Ukrainian society engaged in volunteering, making them think there is no point in doing so. To demoralise those on the frontline, to sow discord with messages such as: while you are at war, those in the rear are having fun. That is, to create conflict between those fighting and those in the rear, between those who left and those still in Ukraine.

Russia is not just active, it systematically analyses all the sensitive points in Ukraine

Propaganda for Poland

When it comes to Poland, the current primary goal of Russian propaganda is to instigate fear, negative emotions and disinformation, says Director of the «Democracy and Civil Society» programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych), Sonia Horonziak:

- This is achieved mainly through the dissemination of fake news online, styled to resemble authentic press reports. These news items predominantly concern Poland’s involvement in the war in Ukraine, the border situation, and the country’s internal affairs.

The strategic goal of Russian propaganda in Poland is to create a situation where, if not pro-Russian, at least neutral attitudes towards Russia prevail, alongside anti-American and anti-European sentiments, notes Michał Marek, head of the external threats analysis group at the National Research Institute NASK:

- Russia’s main objective is to withdraw Poland from the European Union and NATO, to ensure the absence of troops and bases of our Western partners. However, on the way to this goal, they pursue smaller objectives. For instance, they fuel anti-Ukrainian sentiments to make Poland and its government reduce support for Ukraine.

Do they succeed in this? Michał Marek believes not entirely. But where they do succeed, in his opinion, is in inflaming the issues that irritate both Ukrainians and Poles the most.

Propaganda Techniques

«Stop Supporting Ukraine» - this has been Russia’s main narrative in Germany for some time, notes Lea Frühwirth, Senior Research Fellow at the German Centre for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy (CeMAS):

- This can be presented in various forms: claims about the danger posed by Ukrainian refugees or assertions that continued support for Ukraine threatens the German economy. We also frequently observe content suggesting that supporting Ukraine places Germans under a direct threat of war.

Typical markers of pro-Russian content focus primarily on Ukraine, crafting a particular image of the conflict to dissuade people from supporting Ukraine, continues Lea Frühwirth. Another emphasis seems to be on attacks against the current German government, aligning with Russia’s goal of gradually destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

Putin uses various channels to influence people, including traditional television. Photo: Rex Features/East News

In recent weeks, Russia has applied a tactic in Ukraine’s information space which might be labelled as «mental fatigue». The idea is that a psychologically and emotionally drained Ukrainian society might eventually accept a frozen conflict and agree to territorial losses, notes Doctor of Political Science and Professor at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, Lidiia Smola. Russian propaganda attempts to place all responsibility solely on the Ukrainian authorities. While there are indeed many questions to be asked of them, the lack of effective communication, coupled with the absence of public and transparent discussions on significant issues, creates a space for Russian propaganda to act, the expert continues:

- And Russia focuses on this. Had the system of strategic communication at the governmental level operated effectively, had the media endeavoured not just to quickly fill the information space with provocative and manipulative headlines but aimed to inform society thoughtfully, the situation could have been different. Another issue is the credibility of so-called experts.

Nowadays, anyone can call themselves an expert, which completely undermines the notion of expertise

In Polish information space, false and fake news is most commonly disseminated online, especially on major social media platforms and far-right internet portals, says Sonia Horonziak, Director of the «Democracy and Civil Society» programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych). Often, this information immediately provokes strong emotions, portrays the Polish government in an extremely negative light, and highlights events that adversely affect Polish society:

- Disseminated messages often combine partially truthful information or images but provide them with false context. Thus, we see an authentic photograph associated with a completely different past event.

Moreover, the role of artificial intelligence in creating increasingly sophisticated fake images or videos depicting certain events or individuals, often from the political world, is growing

From a structural perspective, disinformation campaigns such as «Twin» are well-studied and usually follow the same pattern, making them relatively easy to identify, notes Lea Frühwirth, Senior Research Fellow at CeMAS:

- For example, if a self-proclaimed news site appeared in my feed, resembling a well-known German newspaper but disseminating only overtly pro-Russian material, I would automatically become cautious.

Channels of Influence

There are several channels of fake communication in general, continues Lea Frühwirth. The first is the attempt to fill the information space with disinformation on topics of interest to Russia. However, it appears they focus more on the quantity of these messages than on their quality:

- To be manipulative, this content does not even need to contain outright lies. Simply highlighting one aspect of a problem while ignoring others, or pretending to be German citizens expressing concern while actually being part of a bot network, is also misleading. On the other hand, there are local pro-Russian influencers who repeat typical Kremlin talking points. Usually, we cannot determine their motivation - they might be paid or genuinely believe in it.

The war against Ukraine is one of the topics used daily by creators of fake news. This is detailed in a report by SCIENCE+, the largest journalistic network combating disinformation in Central Europe. In 2024, no new key disinformation narratives emerged, instead, existing ones were adapted to current events. The report records manipulations around the threat of war with Russia, societal divisions over positions on Ukraine, and the myth of a conflict between «the West» and «the East». These narratives became part of widespread attacks on democratic elections in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania.

Young people are most frequently targeted by disinformation. Most do not engage with traditional media and instead obtain information from unreliable influencers. This contributes to a tendency among the youth to support radical or populist politicians.

A striking example is Romania, where the Constitutional Court annulled the results of the first round of presidential elections after President Klaus Iohannis declassified intelligence data showing that Russia had organised thousands of social media accounts to promote the radical pro-Russian politician Călin Georgescu through platforms like TikTok and Telegram. In 2025, presidential elections will be held in Poland. Russia will undoubtedly seek to exert influence, says Michał Marek, head of the external threats analysis group at the National Research Institute NASK:

- But in our current situation in Poland, the Romanian scenario is unlikely. They will not succeed in seriously influencing these elections.

Pro-Russian agents might have an impact on parliamentary elections. However, when it comes to presidential elections, I would not overestimate their ability to exert influence

Tactics, markers, and effectiveness of propaganda

Propaganda typically evokes extreme emotions, explains Sonia Horonziak, Director of the «Democracy and Civil Society» programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych):

- You should ask yourself why you have not heard this information on public television or radio. Secondly, you should verify this information through various official sources. Most often, such information is not confirmed in any way. Some social networks also add contextual information to certain content, which can influence its perception. It is always worth searching for additional context.

Among the popular tools of Russian propaganda are aggressive rhetoric, threats, intimidation and nuclear blackmail. During the so-called year-end summary, the Russian president reiterated the claim that there are no air defence systems capable of intercepting the «Orieshnik» missile. According to Putin, even the missile defence systems in Poland and Romania would not intercept this missile. However, there is a percentage of people in Poland under the influence of Russian propaganda who might take such threats seriously and perceive other Russian narratives as real, says Michał Marek, head of the external threats analysis group at the National Research Institute NASK:

- Overall, the Polish society does not seem to fear this. It is clear that for many Poles, the war in Europe is perceived as a reality - in Europe, meaning between NATO and Russia. But the threats themselves, the «Orieshnik» topic, are not a factor widely believed by us Poles. Russians have been trying to frighten us for years - with nuclear strikes, with claims we would freeze to death without Russian gas.

So new threats are mostly viewed as just another scare tactic. The effectiveness of such Russian propaganda, frankly speaking, is not very high

Critical thinking

Anyone can fall into the trap of propaganda, says Lea Frühwirth, Senior Research Fellow at the German Centre for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy (CeMAS):

- Human information processing is imperfect. It is not a pleasant thought, but it is the first step to awareness. We all need to establish a basic level of awareness and critical thinking. I would recommend using reliable and authoritative media outlets that adhere to journalistic standards to stay informed about what is happening in the world. Social media, on the other hand, is an information sphere where we must be prepared to encounter misleading content. If you notice something suddenly causing you excessive emotions, it is worth taking a step back and evaluating rationally to avoid contributing to the spread of fake news.

Among the popular tools of Russian propaganda are aggressive rhetoric, threats, intimidation and nuclear blackmail. Photo: Shutterstock

Russian propaganda typically divides the world into «black» and «white», «us» and «them», attempting to impose this division on Ukrainians. A characteristic approach is the emotional pressure - all these visualisations, publications of videos showing killed Ukrainian soldiers, notes Lidiia Smola, Doctor of Political Science and Professor at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute:

- A marker of propaganda is that you are urged to act impulsively and emotionally. For example, you go to social media and see a photo of an unfamiliar person appealing emotionally, for instance, «like this post because I am going to the frontline». And such posts then garner thousands of likes. Why? Because people want to feel part of something important. However, how these pages are used later and what is disseminated through them is rarely considered.

That is why it is crucial to critically evaluate resources and not succumb to manipulative calls for immediate action

For Ukraine, the factor of despair, constantly fuelled by hostile propagandists, is also significant. This is the narrative of an unbeatable Russia, notes Lidiia Smola:

- It works through emotional swings: from a state of sharp excitement to depression, when people write: everything is lost, we cannot win, Russia is winning. In such cases, I always ask where Russia was in 2022 with all its powerful and prepared army, and where it is now.

This project is co-funded by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme implemented by the «Education for Democracy» Foundation

 

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Ukrainian journalist. She worked as the Chief Editor of the Ukrainian editorial office of RFI and in the international editorial team of TSN (1+1 TV channel). She was an international correspondent in Brussels and collaborated with various Ukrainian TV channels. She also worked in the news service of Ukrainian Radio. Currently, she is involved in information and analytical projects for Ukrainian YouTube.

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Her second term as President of the European Commission has been marked by growing attempts to challenge her authority. In July, Ursula von der Leyen narrowly survived a vote of no confidence.
During the current plenary session of the European Parliament (October 6–9), the issue of trust in her leadership will once again be put to a vote.
Support from centrists and moderate forces should grant the Commission President a temporary sense of stability — but will that support last?

Roland Freudenstein. Photos from a private archive

The Best person for the job

Maryna Stepanenko: Since 2014, no President of the European Commission has faced a vote of no confidence, yet Ursula von der Leyen has found herself in this situation for the second time. What is the source of this political crisis?

Roland Freudenstein: Within the European Commission, critical voices toward its President are becoming more frequent — not only from political extremists but also from some centrists. However, everyone understands that, in reality, there is no alternative. That’s why the upcoming vote of no confidence is unlikely to succeed.

Some call Ursula von der Leyen “Europe’s strong voice in the world” and a consistent advocate for Ukraine’s interests across the continent. Others claim she lacks the persistence needed to see major initiatives through to the end. What would you identify as von der Leyen’s main strengths and weaknesses as a politician?

I would say her greatest strength lies in the power of her convictions and her incredible work ethic.

She is often described as a workaholic. She even turned her room on the 13th floor of the Commission’s headquarters in Brussels into a makeshift office.

Naturally, not everyone appreciates that. Some people dislike strong Commission Presidents; others simply dislike strong women. She has also faced criticism for not devoting enough attention to certain projects — though, in most cases, the circumstances worked against her.

The best example is the European Green Deal — an effort to balance Europe’s economic competitiveness with the fight against climate change. For years, the pendulum of public sentiment swung toward saving the planet, but that moment has passed. Now, von der Leyen is unable to deliver on all the “green course” initiatives she once championed at the start of her second term.

Although the summer’s vote of no confidence was unsuccessful, it exposed deep divisions within the European Parliament. How do you assess von der Leyen’s ability to maintain the support of various political groups during her second term?

— The very fact that her most ardent critics come from the far left and the far right is what ensures her survival. The left doesn’t want to vote with the right — and vice versa. Moreover, there truly is a sense, even among her critics, that no one else could do this job better than she does.

If we look at their own criteria — especially in areas such as social legislation, environmental policy, and respect for member states — I simply cannot imagine anyone else capable of fulfilling this role.

Her critics know this too, particularly those in the political center who may be dissatisfied with her style or certain decisions. In the end, even they admit it.

Is Ursula von der Leyen able to adjust her policies to satisfy both centrist and right-wing parties while maintaining the unity of the EU?

No, that’s impossible — you can’t please everyone. It’s the same in national politics: no head of government can satisfy all voters. That’s why von der Leyen must rely on a coalition of centrist forces.

Yet even within that coalition, maintaining consensus is extremely difficult — it requires constant compromise. And this is precisely where her strength and her work discipline play a positive role. To make compromises, you must be strong and guided by strong convictions. At the same time, you have to work relentlessly and cooperate with a vast number of decision-makers.

I am deeply convinced that Ursula von der Leyen is currently the best person for this job.

To save time, Ursula von der Leyen has in the European Commission building not only an office, but also an apartment. Photo: @ursulavonderleyen

The Political Show of the Far Right

The influence of right-wing parties in the European Parliament is growing. How do you assess their impact on the EU’s political direction? Could they change the balance of power within the European People’s Party (EPP)?

Under the leadership of Manfred Weber, the European People’s Party has at times adopted positions aligned with the far right, allowing it to build a majority that extends beyond the classic centrist coalition of the EPP, liberals, social democrats, and greens. For instance, on certain provisions of the Green Deal, the EPP diverged from von der Leyen and pushed the Commission toward more right-leaning, pro-agricultural stances.

However, on strategic issues — European defense, support for Ukraine, and global trade agreements — its stance remains fully aligned with the EPP’s. The real problems tend to come from the left, particularly the socialists and the greens. One example was von der Leyen’s strong reaction to the situation in Israel and Gaza, which many EU members — including socialists and greens — saw as hasty and one-sided in favor of Israel.

So while the EPP has influenced von der Leyen’s program to some extent, on key strategic matters it remains close to her views.

Given the far-right parties’ support for the vote of no confidence against von der Leyen, could their goal be not just to change the leadership but to influence the overall direction of the EU?

Yes, that’s exactly what they’re trying to do. They aim for tactical victories by gathering as many votes as possible for a no-confidence motion against Ursula von der Leyen. They’re unlikely to win such votes, but their goal is to send a political message.

If you look at Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric, it becomes clear that Brussels is his enemy — and no one personifies Brussels more than Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission.
Of course, there are other influential figures — the Presidents of the Parliament and the Council, and High Representative Kaja Kallas — but von der Leyen is the most powerful of them all.

That’s why she has become a symbol of the EU institutions, which, according to Orbán, have grown too powerful and have led Europe in the wrong direction. Together with the Patriots for Europe (PFE) and other far-right groups, he wants to attack her publicly — and, through her, attack the very idea of the European Union.

They want to turn it into a grand political show.

Hungary, under Orbán’s leadership, has repeatedly blocked EU initiatives — especially those related to sanctions against Russia. How do you assess Orbán’s actions and their impact on von der Leyen’s position?

Viktor Orbán has effectively sided with Putin — he’ll never admit it, but that’s the truth. He believes the future belongs to dictators, wants to maintain close relations with them, and ultimately aspires to become one himself. He might even lose the next election, but that remains his worldview.

He rejects everything the EU stands for: shared sovereignty, strong Brussels institutions, and majority voting in the Council. He has also been a vocal opponent of Ukraine’s EU membership. However, in the coming weeks, the Council may attempt to bypass Hungary’s veto on sanctions against Russia.

At this point, not only Brussels institutions but also most EU member states have had enough of Orbán and are looking for ways to work around Hungary — and, in some cases, Slovakia as well.

That’s a major shift. Previously, member states disliked Orbán but rarely confronted him directly. Now, countries like Poland, the Baltic states, the Nordics, and even Germany sometimes do so openly. Orbán feels cornered. He continues to portray Brussels as the villain and the member states as the “good guys,” but in reality, most governments now openly oppose him. His fallback strategy is to delegitimize them by labeling them “elites” or “globalists” who no longer represent their nations. But since those governments were democratically elected, Orbán’s position is increasingly difficult.

Von der Leyen has publicly supported ending the EU’s unanimity rule in certain policy areas. Can this move be seen as radical or risky for her political career?

No, because she’s not the driving force behind this process. And she’s being very wise not to be — it would only reinforce the stereotype of her as a power-hungry Eurocrat bent on limiting member states’ rights. Let’s not forget that several member states themselves remain hesitant about majority voting in crucial areas.

It would be much better if another influential figure in Brussels — in this case, European Council President António Costa — took the lead, with member states’ backing. That way, the issue would appear political, not personal. Honestly, I don’t think the debate over majority voting will harm her career.

Disinformation and Russia’s Natural Enemy

How do you assess the role of disinformation in EU politics, particularly in campaigns targeting von der Leyen?

Its influence is significant. Russia is doing everything it can to increase tensions in European politics — both within member states and inside the Brussels bubble. The negative image of Ursula von der Leyen is part of that effort to fuel conflict. And of course, Russian disinformation and propaganda target her directly because of her strong and consistent stance on Ukraine. She is, quite simply, their natural enemy.

With Volodymyr Zelensky in Brussels, August 17, 2025. Photo: OPU

Russia is always trying to heighten political tensions and internal divisions within the European Union.

At the same time, I notice that people expressing Eurosceptic views or criticizing von der Leyen or Ukraine aren’t always doing so because the Kremlin is paying them. Sometimes, they genuinely believe what they say. That’s why I would be cautious about labeling every form of criticism as Russian disinformation or assuming that someone is on Putin’s payroll.

We need to counter such criticism with political arguments — not just by pointing fingers.

There is a widespread sense of frustration — a belief that things are going in the wrong direction, that wealth is distributed unfairly, that Europe isn’t generating enough economic growth, that too much is spent on defense and too little on social issues, and so on. These feelings are real. Russia seeks to exploit them to intensify political tensions. However, the right way to respond to this criticism is through political action — not merely by accusing people of taking money from Moscow.

Is the European Union responding actively enough to the threat of disinformation from third countries? What more should be done to strengthen the EU’s information security?

Neither national governments nor the EU itself should directly hire people to fight disinformation. Instead, they should fund projects that strengthen and empower civil society — for example, investigative journalists who expose networks of Russian influence.

Of course, governments should use their intelligence services to detect influence operations. But the primary response of a free society to authoritarian threats — whether in the information sphere, social media, or the economy — must come from civil society itself. This means foundations, political parties, think tanks, associations, universities, and the media.

Ukraine itself has achieved remarkable success in countering Russian disinformation since the early years following the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas in 2014. It was Ukrainian civil society that responded — and far more quickly than the government. The same should happen within the European Union. Governments should fund and support civil society, but the real work must be done by the citizens themselves.

Ukraine’s Integration with the EU: Just the Beginning

In her State of the Union address, Ursula von der Leyen emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s integration with the European Union. How do you assess the role of the President of the European Commission in this process?

She sets concrete goals and defines the direction for Ukraine’s path toward EU membership. And this is not merely her personal initiative — it is the initiative of the entire European Commission. She is implementing the will of the member states within the EU Council, yet there are still many aspects she manages independently.

The EU’s assistance to Ukraine — particularly the EU-financed military support — is one of Ursula von der Leyen’s major personal achievements, as she has invested enormous energy into it. The same goes for Ukraine’s accession process. However, the final decisions will be made by the member states, not by the Commission or von der Leyen personally.

Could Ukraine become an EU member by 2030?

That is the plan. I wouldn’t say it’s impossible, but the EU has had surprisingly mixed experiences with setting a fixed date before successfully closing all negotiation chapters and fully implementing the necessary legislation in the candidate country.

Ukraine still has work to do — not so much in adopting legislation, which is largely ready, but in enforcing it, especially in strengthening the rule of law and the fight against corruption. This year has brought certain setbacks, which have certainly not helped accelerate Ukraine’s accession process. But Ukraine has the potential to meet these challenges.

20
хв

Ursula von der Leyen: A Leader Without an Alternative

Maryna Stepanenko

<frame>"More knowledge, less fear" is the slogan of our new publication series. Safety is based on facts, verified information, and solid arguments. The more we know, the better we will be prepared for the future. <frame>

Is Poland ready for a crisis? In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, the war in Ukraine, and rising tensions across Europe, education and societal organisation are crucial. By welcoming over a million Ukrainian refugees, Poland has not only gained new residents but also unique knowledge and experience from people who have learned civil protection under the harshest conditions—under bombs and rocket fire. This is capital that must not be wasted. 

The new law on civil protection and civil defence, in force since January 1, is a concrete response to real threats. At the same time, it offers an opportunity for deeper integration, allowing Poles and Ukrainians living in Poland to prepare together for crises. 

Poland has learned from the tragic events of recent years. The new law emphasises three key areas: modernising and constructing shelters and hiding places, improving alarm and notification systems, and launching widespread civic education to ensure every citizen has basic knowledge of how to act during a crisis. The context of the war in Ukraine makes this even more urgent.

Many Ukrainians living in Poland have priceless experience in civil protection - whether as survivors, organisers, or leaders of evacuation and shelter operations.

This is an opportunity Poland must not miss. When war strikes, no system is ever fully ready. What matters then is how effectively we can use what we already have.

What can serve as a shelter? A practical approach to civil protection begins with this question. Knowledge—that is our first "shelter"!

April 19, 2024 - Children entering a bomb shelter at the Perspectiva Gymnasium in Novovasylivka, Zaporizhzhia region, where classes are held in a hybrid format. Photo: Ukrinform/East News/Dmytro Smolienko

According to the new law, every basement, underground garage, or tunnel can serve as a hiding place. It’s worth taking a moment to look around and ask yourself, "What would I do in case of danger?" 

It’s better to know in advance than to scramble during chaos. 

Here, the experience of Ukrainians in Poland becomes invaluable. Those who have survived bomb alerts can share practical knowledge with Poles, including how to organise life in shelters, secure water and food supplies, address the psychological aspects of survival, and utilise mobile alert apps that have become critical tools in Ukraine. This is not theory. These are real-life experiences from people who face the consequences of war every single day.
Their testimony is more valuable than any textbook could be. 

Education in this field is the key to safety. Poland must harness the knowledge of Ukrainians and launch a wide educational campaign as soon as possible. 
According to the new law, local governments and fire services will play a central role in civil protection. However, in practice, the system will only function effectively if hundreds of thousands of people are involved. 

Ukrainians who have faced real threats can become instructors, educators, and leaders of this change. NGOS are already playing a significant role in organising training for both Ukrainians and Poles. 

This will benefit everyone. Polish municipalities urgently need practitioners who understand the realities of crises.

Every citizen on the front lines.

The new law places local governments in charge of implementing the civil protection system, meaning the battle for the effectiveness of this law will be fought where Poles and Ukrainians live nearby. It is essential to acknowledge that women played a vital role in Ukraine’s civil protection efforts, from rescue workers and volunteers to leaders of humanitarian organisations. They ensured survival amid chaos. 

In Poland, too, women can become the driving force behind such changes, joining local governments, NGOS, and educational teams. 

Is Poland ready for a crisis and civil protection?

Poland is better prepared today than it was a few years ago. The new law represents a significant step forward, but infrastructure alone will not be sufficient.

What will truly matter is the genuine engagement of citizens in education and crisis response, the effective application of Ukrainian experience, and practical cooperation among local governments, NGOS, and the central government.

Today, Poland is in a better situation than a few years ago. The new law is an important step, but one infrastructure is not enough. The real involvement of citizens in training and the elimination of the consequences of emergencies, the wise use of Ukrainians' experience and effective cooperation between local governments, organizations and the government will be crucial.

April 1, 2024 – Zaporizhzhia. Two workers in a new modular underground bomb shelter for 100 people, being built in the courtyard of a five-story residential building damaged by a Russian S-300 missile on October 6, 2022, now under repair. Photo: Ukrinform/East News/Dmytro Smolienko 

This isn’t a Hollywood disaster movie scenario. It’s reality—a reality we must understand and prepare for.  In the 21st century, security isn’t just about armies; it’s about conscious, organised societies. And building them starts with education—education based on facts, not fearmongering. 

Security is our shared responsibility.

It’s not just the domain of the state. It’s not something the government can "provide" like a service.  It’s something we build and give to each other.  Of course, institutions, regulations, alarm systems, and shelters are vital. But what truly determines survival during a crisis is people—their relationships, willingness to help, ability to act under stress, and the awareness that, in challenging moments, we are not alone. 
Every one of us is part of the security system—from the teacher who teaches first aid, to the neighbour who knows the nearest shelter location, to the volunteer who helps newly arrived refugees adjust to a new reality. 

The strength of a nation lies in the strength of its society—and society is strong when its members know they can count on one another. 

In the past, those who realised that the best defence wasn’t walls or bunkers, but well-prepared, united people, were the ones who prevailed.  In Ukraine, social mobilisation saved thousands of lives.  In Poland, we have a chance to learn from this experience before a crisis forces us to.

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Knowledge is our first shelter

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