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German Bundestag member Roderich Kiesewetter: «The reduction of German support for Ukraine is the consequence of a lack of priorities»

«Germany is sending a really negative signal. Negative for Ukraine because Putin sees that Germany is weak in the knees», - German Parliament member Roderich Kiesewetter

Maryna Stepanenko

German MP Roderich Kiesewetter. Deutscher Bundestag / Inga Haa

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Following the announcements about the next year’s support reduction, Germany sent additional weaponry to Ukraine, among them are new Anti-aircraft weapons, UAVs, rifles and ammunition. But the amount of funds Germany will dedicate to Kyiv’s defence needs in 2025 remains unknown until Autumn.

What is the current mood within the government and the Bundestag? Will the support change, and could the successful raid in Kursk have an impact? Furthermore, how might the latest findings from the investigation into the Nord Stream pipeline explosions affect relations with Ukraine? These and other questions were addressed in an exclusive interview with Sestry by Roderich Kiesewetter, a member of the largest opposition faction, the CDU/CSU, in the German parliament.

Aid to Ukraine vs «Nord Stream»

Maryna Stepanenko: The German publication Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAS) reports that Germany will limit its aid to Ukraine in the near future. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already called this information manipulative, stating that negotiations regarding the budget for next year are still ongoing in your country. Last time, after lengthy negotiations, the funding level for 2024 was raised from 4 to almost 8 billion euros. What about next year? What is the current mood and thinking in the Bundestag?

Roderich Kiesewetter: The Bundestag and the government have differing views. The government would like to limit aid to Ukraine, with plans to cut it in half in 2025 and finance it outside the federal budget. This is not just indicated by the government itself, but also by the German Chancellor's Office.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence are advocating for increased support, but Scholz's office has instructed the Ministry of Finance to freeze it. We have an annual budget of around half a billion euros, and debates are focused on the 17 billion that are missing from the federal budget for next year.

And now, to compensate for those funds, the support for Ukraine has to be reduced, especially the military support

This reflects a lack of priorities and a clear position. The problem is that the government, particularly the Chancellor's Office, wants to cut aid to Ukraine for internal reasons. To justify this decision, one could tie it to the leaked information that Ukraine might have destroyed the Nord Stream pipelines. If this is the case, it is not even a punishment but a strange framing of incorrect, reckless information from certain investigative journalists. This does not seem like a coincidence.

It seems intentional that, in the same week when two different groups of investigative journalists try to blame Ukraine for the destruction of the Nord Stream, which could be a covert action by Russia, budget cuts that harm Ukraine are being discussed.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) investigation into the September 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines suggests the alleged involvement of Ukrainian officials - President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and then-head of the Armed Forces, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi. What are your thoughts on this?

The WSJ article came out in competition with a piece by the German publication Spiegel, which was released a day earlier. Both publications seem to be steering toward the conclusion that Ukrainian officials gave the order to destroy Nord Stream.

Nord Stream 2 September 2022 explosion site. Photo: DANISH DEFENCE / AFP / East News

The WSJ investigation is indeed puzzling because it claims that Russia was earning billions of euros from Nord Stream, which is not true. Since July 2022, not a single gallon of gas has flowed through the pipeline, and even in the preceding months, only 40 per cent of the promised supply was delivered. So, if Ukraine had destroyed it, they would have essentially been «killing a dead horse». Why would they expend their efforts on that?

Secondly, if Zelenskyy was unable to communicate with the team that received the order to destroy the Nord Stream, why was this team reachable via satellite phone? That also does not add up. Thirdly, there is mention of a person referred to as Volodymyr Z. (in German publications - Wolodymyr Z. or Wladimir S., depending on the transliteration - Author) with a Ukrainian passport, but no one mentions that he could have had other passports, like Diana B. (another suspect according to the investigators' version - Author). She was the owner of the company that rented the yacht «Andromeda», but she also held a Russian passport. She lived in Crimea and is now in Krasnodar, so she is Russian, not Ukrainian. Furthermore, there are no witnesses, there are only secret sources. In my opinion, the WSJ story is inconsistent and implausible.

I do not believe this because if Ukraine had done something like this, it would have become public knowledge and would have caused harm to Kyiv. Therefore, I can not imagine that the Ukrainian government destroyed the Nord Stream pipelines or ordered such an action

The former head of German intelligence, August Hanning, previously suggested that Poland could be involved in the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines. In response to the ongoing investigation, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk advised all initiators and patrons of the blown-up pipelines to «apologise and keep quiet». How do you assess such a statement?

Hanning does not question the findings of these questionable investigative groups, which annoys me, but it does not surprise me. Many former high-ranking officials in Germany have very close ties with Russia and a longstanding pro-Russian tradition, which we need to take into account. Russia uses pro-Russian voices in science, media, economics, and politics for its information warfare and can use them for deeper psychological operations. These individuals may appear authoritative but, in reality, become tools of a hybrid war in favour of Russia.

There is a group in Germany trying to make Ukraine the scapegoat to justify halting support. I can not explain Tusk's role, and we must be very careful not to resort to insinuations or accusations

I know that the German federal prosecutor is very upset about this story because it jeopardises his own investigation - the leak likely came from politically responsible people in the Chancellor's Office. He can not work as he should because those who destroyed the Nord Stream pipelines are now warned. And that is where the danger lies now.

If these individuals are in Russia, they are breathing a sigh of relief since Germany believes that Ukraine destroyed the pipelines. Therefore, we must be very cautious with Hanning's statements, Tusk's remarks, and, in general, with any hasty accusations.

Friends of Russia in Germany

The German prosecutor's office has issued an arrest warrant for a Ukrainian suspected of sabotaging the Nord Stream pipelines. Two other suspects are also believed to be Ukrainian. Beyond military support, could this impact other areas of cooperation between Germany and Ukraine?

Those who spread these likely fake news stories about the Nord Stream pipelines aim to end German support for Ukraine, undermine trust, and force Ukraine into capitulation. However, they disregard Ukraine's will and strength and fail to consider the Ukrainian population, which does not want to live under a frozen conflict or Russian occupation.

In front of the «Neptune» floating storage and regasification facility, the length of the «Nord Stream-2» gas pipeline is depicted on the container. Photo: John MACDOUGALL / AFP/East News

Ukrainians would leave their country if Kyiv were forced into a ceasefire. This is because, on the other side of the border in Russia, brutal violence is being committed against civilians. Ukraine, therefore, does not want to be forced into a ceasefire, as some in Germany, like the Chancellor and others, might prefer. We must be very careful to ensure that no forces on the ground undermine Germany's willingness to support Ukraine.

We have upcoming local elections in Thuringia, Saxony (on September 1), and Brandenburg (on September 22). In these three federal states, there are forces influenced by Russia: the Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which are partially funded or influenced by Russia. Thus, we must be very cautious about any context that benefits the Russian Federation. There is no direct funding, but people from these parties receive money for their personal interests and work within the parties.

There is indeed competition within our country between those who want to see the strengthening of an international order based on the rule of law and those who support the principle of «might makes right» - the power of Russia - and who see Ukraine as a necessary sacrifice for peace with Russia

But they do not realise that Russia does not want peace. Russia considers Ukraine a legitimate part of itself. Therefore, the Russians will continue the war against Ukraine and their hybrid war against Moldova and the Baltic countries. There will be no peace. This is the imperial mindset of Russia, which is not understood by those who wish to stop supporting Ukraine.

Returning to the budget and aid, if German lawmakers allocate no more than 4 billion euros to Ukraine in 2025, what will this mean for Ukraine's defence capabilities?

First of all, Germany is not the only supporter and not the strongest one. Other countries that provide more aid relative to their GDP are Denmark, Norway, Poland, the Baltic states, Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom. So, there are other, much more reliable partners.

Secondly, 4 billion euros are already planned. They will be invested in spare parts, ammunition, air defence, and so on. But there is no room for additional support from the regular budget. Therefore, it is crucial for Germany to provide Ukraine with additional assistance ranging from 4 to 10 billion euros next year. The government claims that the interest rate on frozen Russian assets should serve Ukraine's interests.

However, there is still no unified position on this in the European Union. This issue is absolutely unclear and depends, for example, on Hungary's support

In any case, the entirety of frozen Russian assets already belongs to Ukraine. This does not replace the necessary support from Germany and other countries. Therefore, the German government's argument is a kind of distraction, an excuse, and an evasion of responsibility.

On February 16, the German Chancellor, together with President Zelenskyy, signed a security agreement. On that date, he committed to supporting Ukraine for as long as needed, within its 1991 borders. But that signature is not worth the ink it is written with if Germany does not increase its support, and the security agreement holds no real value.

Ukraine and Germany signed a security agreement on February 16th 2024. Photo: Office of the President of Ukraine

Kursk offensive and German Taurus

In February, in one of your interviews, you said, «the war must be brought to Russian territory», and that «Russian military facilities and headquarters must be destroyed». Six months later, the Ukrainian Armed Forces began an operation in the Kursk region. What was your first reaction?

It was a sigh of relief because, in February, I demanded that we allow Ukraine to transfer the war to Russian territory, cut off Russian strongholds and supply chains, and strike Russian positions, ammunition depots, and those responsible for the war - their ministries, command centres, and logistics zones. For this, I was criticised by my party colleagues and some media. Now, I feel vindicated.

Such operations make sense from a military strategy standpoint, are permitted under international law, and, if successful, provide operational advantages. I am a former military officer. Before entering our parliament, I worked for almost 30 years in international organisations, NATO, the European Union, and the Armed Forces. I have a good understanding of what war entails and what is necessary to deter it and conduct successful operations.

On the other hand, as our defence minister said, it is quite normal for a country under attack to conduct war on the aggressor's territory. This is an entirely normal phenomenon in the world - our defence minister said last April on a talk show. But when I mentioned it in February of this year, people responded that this was warmongering. I argued that it was a necessity, and that is indeed the case.

Ukraine's operation in Kursk seems both correct and effective. We will see how sustainable its success will be, but for now, it is a significant victory for Ukraine. This is the right response to those who still believe in appeasement with Russia

Germany does not question the legality of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region and does not object to the use of German weapons on Russian territory. However, does the Kursk offensive change the opinions of German politicians about supplying Ukraine with long-range TAURUS missiles?

Unfortunately, no, because in the Social Democratic Party, the faction leader and a very important high-ranking politician in the Chancellor's Office oppose allowing Ukraine to destroy Russian communications, supply chains, etc. This is a deadlock.

My party, the CDU/CSU, strongly supports the transfer of TAURUS missiles, but Chancellor Scholz's office is blocking this. The defence minister wants to proceed with the supply, and the foreign minister supports it as well, but there is no political will because a unanimous government vote is required, and the Social Democratic Party is blocking this issue.

It is necessary, now more than ever, to supply several hundred high-precision, long-range strike systems, such as the TAURUS missiles. We also need to enable our defence industry to produce more tanks, more ammunition and more artillery.

However, this reflects a lack of political will and a deficiency in strategic culture and thinking. It is a spirit of appeasement, reminiscent of Chamberlain in 1938, rather than the approach of Churchill. We have yet to experience a «Churchill moment» in Germany. I am working on changing that
Transfer of German weapons to Ukraine. Photo: OPU

Pressure on Putin

In your opinion, how might the Ukrainian raid impact the situation inside Russia?

In the past, we have seen that when Putin has been under pressure, as during the Wagner Group mutiny, he has shown a preference for negotiations. At that time, he instructed Lukashenko of Belarus to help defuse the tense situation. Lukashenko persuaded Prigozhin to stop and go into exile in Belarus, but Putin later had him killed. So, when Putin is under pressure, he tends to negotiate or make concessions.

The Ukrainian raid provides an opportunity to not only create a buffer zone but also gain leverage in negotiations. For example, if there are future negotiations where Russia is required to withdraw from all of Ukraine, they might be allowed to retain the Kursk region in exchange. This could strengthen Kyiv's negotiating position, but pressure on the Donbas continues to mount. We will see whether the offensive in the Kursk region will ease the situation on other parts of the front, forcing Russia to retreat and redeploy its troops.

Ukraine is losing territory and hundreds of soldiers every day, so Western support needs to increase. In this regard, Germany is sending a very negative signal

Negative for Ukraine because Putin sees that Germany is weak in the knees. It is also problematic for the United States, as those who support isolationists, including Trump, could argue: «Why should we support Ukraine when the Germans are stepping back?» The narrative becomes, «This is Europe's issue, not that of the United States».

It would be a major failure for Germany if we were to lose the United States' support during the upcoming election campaign. That is why we need to invest more and do more. Ukraine must hold its ground and even expand its territory, it should continue the war on Russian soil to be in a better position if forced into negotiations. Ukraine needs to destroy Russian military targets such as missile launchers, airfields, and ammonia depots to limit and, hopefully, stop Russian attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure and civilian populations.

I see that there are people in the German government who would like to lift the artificial restriction that the United States and Germany have placed on Ukraine's use of Western weapons on Russian territory. We need countries like the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Scandinavian nations, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and others to increase pressure on Putin, as well as to press Germany to do more. At the moment, Germany is increasingly isolating itself in Europe as a country that does not act according to its economic power. We need to do more and motivate other countries to do the same.

After all, when it comes to rebuilding Ukraine, why should Germany benefit from it? The countries that have genuinely supported Ukraine should be the ones involved in Ukraine's post-war revival.

«We should all fear a weak and unprepared Germany»

Michael Giss, the Commander of the Bundeswehr's Hamburg Regional Command, recently stated that Germany must be prepared for a potential Russian attack within the next five years, given its role as a key NATO transport hub. What is Berlin currently doing to strengthen its defence capabilities?

That is an excellent question. Firstly, it is important to note that we are not talking about five years but rather two to three years. Russia is aware that the West is increasing its pace and losing time and resources. Therefore, they will intensify pressure through disinformation, sabotage and preparation for war over the next two to three years to outpace Europe's efforts.

Secondly, Germany experienced its Zeitenwende in 2022 (referring to Chancellor Olaf Scholz's address to the Bundestag on February 27 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, where Scholz described the attack as a «historic turning point»). However, that was just a speech - it is already history.

The Defence Minister is not receiving the necessary funding. All his requests have been curtailed. He is getting less money than needed to offset inflation and increase soldiers' pay. As a result, the German Armed Forces lack the support needed to improve their position. This situation is expected to worsen in the next two to three years.

By the late 2020s, when the German Armed Forces are truly at the limits of their capabilities, we will need much more fresh funding. We are talking about an additional 300 billion euros by the end of this decade to modernise our military, but they are only receiving between 5 to 10 billion euros - a small fraction of what is required.

This will reduce the capabilities of the Armed Forces and lower the morale of German soldiers. It is a victory for pacifists and the Social Democratic Party, who are deliberately weakening our military. We have Pistorius, the best Defence Minister in the last 20 years, yet he is not getting the necessary funds. He is a Social Democrat, but even he is not receiving the money needed, which isolates him. And that is very unfortunate.

One day, we may wake up to even greater pressure from Russian propaganda and increased Russian aggression. If we do not recover, we could face a situation akin to the second Jena and Auerstedt (the destruction of the Prussian army by Napoleon in 1806 - Author). Therefore, we need to raise this issue within Germany, but our friends and partners must also step up the pressure.

We need a strong Germany, as Radosław Sikorski said 12-13 years ago: «I fear a weak Germany much more than a strong one» 

We should all fear a weak and unprepared Germany because that would be an invitation for Putin.

Cover photo: Action Press/Shutterstock/Rex Features/East News

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation as part of the «Support Ukraine» program, implemented by the «Education for Democracy» Foundation

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Ukrainian journalist. Worked at the Ukrainian edition of Radio France Internationale. She was the senior editor of the English-language project of the Multimedia Broadcasting Platform of Ukraine. She held the position of international news department columnist at the «Inter» TV channel. She has also been involved in documentary filmmaking in the past. Currently, she is developing a Ukrainian-language YouTube project as an editor and scriptwriter.

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Her second term as President of the European Commission has been marked by growing attempts to challenge her authority. In July, Ursula von der Leyen narrowly survived a vote of no confidence.
During the current plenary session of the European Parliament (October 6–9), the issue of trust in her leadership will once again be put to a vote.
Support from centrists and moderate forces should grant the Commission President a temporary sense of stability — but will that support last?

Roland Freudenstein. Photos from a private archive

The Best person for the job

Maryna Stepanenko: Since 2014, no President of the European Commission has faced a vote of no confidence, yet Ursula von der Leyen has found herself in this situation for the second time. What is the source of this political crisis?

Roland Freudenstein: Within the European Commission, critical voices toward its President are becoming more frequent — not only from political extremists but also from some centrists. However, everyone understands that, in reality, there is no alternative. That’s why the upcoming vote of no confidence is unlikely to succeed.

Some call Ursula von der Leyen “Europe’s strong voice in the world” and a consistent advocate for Ukraine’s interests across the continent. Others claim she lacks the persistence needed to see major initiatives through to the end. What would you identify as von der Leyen’s main strengths and weaknesses as a politician?

I would say her greatest strength lies in the power of her convictions and her incredible work ethic.

She is often described as a workaholic. She even turned her room on the 13th floor of the Commission’s headquarters in Brussels into a makeshift office.

Naturally, not everyone appreciates that. Some people dislike strong Commission Presidents; others simply dislike strong women. She has also faced criticism for not devoting enough attention to certain projects — though, in most cases, the circumstances worked against her.

The best example is the European Green Deal — an effort to balance Europe’s economic competitiveness with the fight against climate change. For years, the pendulum of public sentiment swung toward saving the planet, but that moment has passed. Now, von der Leyen is unable to deliver on all the “green course” initiatives she once championed at the start of her second term.

Although the summer’s vote of no confidence was unsuccessful, it exposed deep divisions within the European Parliament. How do you assess von der Leyen’s ability to maintain the support of various political groups during her second term?

— The very fact that her most ardent critics come from the far left and the far right is what ensures her survival. The left doesn’t want to vote with the right — and vice versa. Moreover, there truly is a sense, even among her critics, that no one else could do this job better than she does.

If we look at their own criteria — especially in areas such as social legislation, environmental policy, and respect for member states — I simply cannot imagine anyone else capable of fulfilling this role.

Her critics know this too, particularly those in the political center who may be dissatisfied with her style or certain decisions. In the end, even they admit it.

Is Ursula von der Leyen able to adjust her policies to satisfy both centrist and right-wing parties while maintaining the unity of the EU?

No, that’s impossible — you can’t please everyone. It’s the same in national politics: no head of government can satisfy all voters. That’s why von der Leyen must rely on a coalition of centrist forces.

Yet even within that coalition, maintaining consensus is extremely difficult — it requires constant compromise. And this is precisely where her strength and her work discipline play a positive role. To make compromises, you must be strong and guided by strong convictions. At the same time, you have to work relentlessly and cooperate with a vast number of decision-makers.

I am deeply convinced that Ursula von der Leyen is currently the best person for this job.

To save time, Ursula von der Leyen has in the European Commission building not only an office, but also an apartment. Photo: @ursulavonderleyen

The Political Show of the Far Right

The influence of right-wing parties in the European Parliament is growing. How do you assess their impact on the EU’s political direction? Could they change the balance of power within the European People’s Party (EPP)?

Under the leadership of Manfred Weber, the European People’s Party has at times adopted positions aligned with the far right, allowing it to build a majority that extends beyond the classic centrist coalition of the EPP, liberals, social democrats, and greens. For instance, on certain provisions of the Green Deal, the EPP diverged from von der Leyen and pushed the Commission toward more right-leaning, pro-agricultural stances.

However, on strategic issues — European defense, support for Ukraine, and global trade agreements — its stance remains fully aligned with the EPP’s. The real problems tend to come from the left, particularly the socialists and the greens. One example was von der Leyen’s strong reaction to the situation in Israel and Gaza, which many EU members — including socialists and greens — saw as hasty and one-sided in favor of Israel.

So while the EPP has influenced von der Leyen’s program to some extent, on key strategic matters it remains close to her views.

Given the far-right parties’ support for the vote of no confidence against von der Leyen, could their goal be not just to change the leadership but to influence the overall direction of the EU?

Yes, that’s exactly what they’re trying to do. They aim for tactical victories by gathering as many votes as possible for a no-confidence motion against Ursula von der Leyen. They’re unlikely to win such votes, but their goal is to send a political message.

If you look at Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric, it becomes clear that Brussels is his enemy — and no one personifies Brussels more than Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission.
Of course, there are other influential figures — the Presidents of the Parliament and the Council, and High Representative Kaja Kallas — but von der Leyen is the most powerful of them all.

That’s why she has become a symbol of the EU institutions, which, according to Orbán, have grown too powerful and have led Europe in the wrong direction. Together with the Patriots for Europe (PFE) and other far-right groups, he wants to attack her publicly — and, through her, attack the very idea of the European Union.

They want to turn it into a grand political show.

Hungary, under Orbán’s leadership, has repeatedly blocked EU initiatives — especially those related to sanctions against Russia. How do you assess Orbán’s actions and their impact on von der Leyen’s position?

Viktor Orbán has effectively sided with Putin — he’ll never admit it, but that’s the truth. He believes the future belongs to dictators, wants to maintain close relations with them, and ultimately aspires to become one himself. He might even lose the next election, but that remains his worldview.

He rejects everything the EU stands for: shared sovereignty, strong Brussels institutions, and majority voting in the Council. He has also been a vocal opponent of Ukraine’s EU membership. However, in the coming weeks, the Council may attempt to bypass Hungary’s veto on sanctions against Russia.

At this point, not only Brussels institutions but also most EU member states have had enough of Orbán and are looking for ways to work around Hungary — and, in some cases, Slovakia as well.

That’s a major shift. Previously, member states disliked Orbán but rarely confronted him directly. Now, countries like Poland, the Baltic states, the Nordics, and even Germany sometimes do so openly. Orbán feels cornered. He continues to portray Brussels as the villain and the member states as the “good guys,” but in reality, most governments now openly oppose him. His fallback strategy is to delegitimize them by labeling them “elites” or “globalists” who no longer represent their nations. But since those governments were democratically elected, Orbán’s position is increasingly difficult.

Von der Leyen has publicly supported ending the EU’s unanimity rule in certain policy areas. Can this move be seen as radical or risky for her political career?

No, because she’s not the driving force behind this process. And she’s being very wise not to be — it would only reinforce the stereotype of her as a power-hungry Eurocrat bent on limiting member states’ rights. Let’s not forget that several member states themselves remain hesitant about majority voting in crucial areas.

It would be much better if another influential figure in Brussels — in this case, European Council President António Costa — took the lead, with member states’ backing. That way, the issue would appear political, not personal. Honestly, I don’t think the debate over majority voting will harm her career.

Disinformation and Russia’s Natural Enemy

How do you assess the role of disinformation in EU politics, particularly in campaigns targeting von der Leyen?

Its influence is significant. Russia is doing everything it can to increase tensions in European politics — both within member states and inside the Brussels bubble. The negative image of Ursula von der Leyen is part of that effort to fuel conflict. And of course, Russian disinformation and propaganda target her directly because of her strong and consistent stance on Ukraine. She is, quite simply, their natural enemy.

With Volodymyr Zelensky in Brussels, August 17, 2025. Photo: OPU

Russia is always trying to heighten political tensions and internal divisions within the European Union.

At the same time, I notice that people expressing Eurosceptic views or criticizing von der Leyen or Ukraine aren’t always doing so because the Kremlin is paying them. Sometimes, they genuinely believe what they say. That’s why I would be cautious about labeling every form of criticism as Russian disinformation or assuming that someone is on Putin’s payroll.

We need to counter such criticism with political arguments — not just by pointing fingers.

There is a widespread sense of frustration — a belief that things are going in the wrong direction, that wealth is distributed unfairly, that Europe isn’t generating enough economic growth, that too much is spent on defense and too little on social issues, and so on. These feelings are real. Russia seeks to exploit them to intensify political tensions. However, the right way to respond to this criticism is through political action — not merely by accusing people of taking money from Moscow.

Is the European Union responding actively enough to the threat of disinformation from third countries? What more should be done to strengthen the EU’s information security?

Neither national governments nor the EU itself should directly hire people to fight disinformation. Instead, they should fund projects that strengthen and empower civil society — for example, investigative journalists who expose networks of Russian influence.

Of course, governments should use their intelligence services to detect influence operations. But the primary response of a free society to authoritarian threats — whether in the information sphere, social media, or the economy — must come from civil society itself. This means foundations, political parties, think tanks, associations, universities, and the media.

Ukraine itself has achieved remarkable success in countering Russian disinformation since the early years following the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas in 2014. It was Ukrainian civil society that responded — and far more quickly than the government. The same should happen within the European Union. Governments should fund and support civil society, but the real work must be done by the citizens themselves.

Ukraine’s Integration with the EU: Just the Beginning

In her State of the Union address, Ursula von der Leyen emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s integration with the European Union. How do you assess the role of the President of the European Commission in this process?

She sets concrete goals and defines the direction for Ukraine’s path toward EU membership. And this is not merely her personal initiative — it is the initiative of the entire European Commission. She is implementing the will of the member states within the EU Council, yet there are still many aspects she manages independently.

The EU’s assistance to Ukraine — particularly the EU-financed military support — is one of Ursula von der Leyen’s major personal achievements, as she has invested enormous energy into it. The same goes for Ukraine’s accession process. However, the final decisions will be made by the member states, not by the Commission or von der Leyen personally.

Could Ukraine become an EU member by 2030?

That is the plan. I wouldn’t say it’s impossible, but the EU has had surprisingly mixed experiences with setting a fixed date before successfully closing all negotiation chapters and fully implementing the necessary legislation in the candidate country.

Ukraine still has work to do — not so much in adopting legislation, which is largely ready, but in enforcing it, especially in strengthening the rule of law and the fight against corruption. This year has brought certain setbacks, which have certainly not helped accelerate Ukraine’s accession process. But Ukraine has the potential to meet these challenges.

20
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Ursula von der Leyen: A Leader Without an Alternative

Maryna Stepanenko

<frame>"More knowledge, less fear" is the slogan of our new publication series. Safety is based on facts, verified information, and solid arguments. The more we know, the better we will be prepared for the future. <frame>

Is Poland ready for a crisis? In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, the war in Ukraine, and rising tensions across Europe, education and societal organisation are crucial. By welcoming over a million Ukrainian refugees, Poland has not only gained new residents but also unique knowledge and experience from people who have learned civil protection under the harshest conditions—under bombs and rocket fire. This is capital that must not be wasted. 

The new law on civil protection and civil defence, in force since January 1, is a concrete response to real threats. At the same time, it offers an opportunity for deeper integration, allowing Poles and Ukrainians living in Poland to prepare together for crises. 

Poland has learned from the tragic events of recent years. The new law emphasises three key areas: modernising and constructing shelters and hiding places, improving alarm and notification systems, and launching widespread civic education to ensure every citizen has basic knowledge of how to act during a crisis. The context of the war in Ukraine makes this even more urgent.

Many Ukrainians living in Poland have priceless experience in civil protection - whether as survivors, organisers, or leaders of evacuation and shelter operations.

This is an opportunity Poland must not miss. When war strikes, no system is ever fully ready. What matters then is how effectively we can use what we already have.

What can serve as a shelter? A practical approach to civil protection begins with this question. Knowledge—that is our first "shelter"!

April 19, 2024 - Children entering a bomb shelter at the Perspectiva Gymnasium in Novovasylivka, Zaporizhzhia region, where classes are held in a hybrid format. Photo: Ukrinform/East News/Dmytro Smolienko

According to the new law, every basement, underground garage, or tunnel can serve as a hiding place. It’s worth taking a moment to look around and ask yourself, "What would I do in case of danger?" 

It’s better to know in advance than to scramble during chaos. 

Here, the experience of Ukrainians in Poland becomes invaluable. Those who have survived bomb alerts can share practical knowledge with Poles, including how to organise life in shelters, secure water and food supplies, address the psychological aspects of survival, and utilise mobile alert apps that have become critical tools in Ukraine. This is not theory. These are real-life experiences from people who face the consequences of war every single day.
Their testimony is more valuable than any textbook could be. 

Education in this field is the key to safety. Poland must harness the knowledge of Ukrainians and launch a wide educational campaign as soon as possible. 
According to the new law, local governments and fire services will play a central role in civil protection. However, in practice, the system will only function effectively if hundreds of thousands of people are involved. 

Ukrainians who have faced real threats can become instructors, educators, and leaders of this change. NGOS are already playing a significant role in organising training for both Ukrainians and Poles. 

This will benefit everyone. Polish municipalities urgently need practitioners who understand the realities of crises.

Every citizen on the front lines.

The new law places local governments in charge of implementing the civil protection system, meaning the battle for the effectiveness of this law will be fought where Poles and Ukrainians live nearby. It is essential to acknowledge that women played a vital role in Ukraine’s civil protection efforts, from rescue workers and volunteers to leaders of humanitarian organisations. They ensured survival amid chaos. 

In Poland, too, women can become the driving force behind such changes, joining local governments, NGOS, and educational teams. 

Is Poland ready for a crisis and civil protection?

Poland is better prepared today than it was a few years ago. The new law represents a significant step forward, but infrastructure alone will not be sufficient.

What will truly matter is the genuine engagement of citizens in education and crisis response, the effective application of Ukrainian experience, and practical cooperation among local governments, NGOS, and the central government.

Today, Poland is in a better situation than a few years ago. The new law is an important step, but one infrastructure is not enough. The real involvement of citizens in training and the elimination of the consequences of emergencies, the wise use of Ukrainians' experience and effective cooperation between local governments, organizations and the government will be crucial.

April 1, 2024 – Zaporizhzhia. Two workers in a new modular underground bomb shelter for 100 people, being built in the courtyard of a five-story residential building damaged by a Russian S-300 missile on October 6, 2022, now under repair. Photo: Ukrinform/East News/Dmytro Smolienko 

This isn’t a Hollywood disaster movie scenario. It’s reality—a reality we must understand and prepare for.  In the 21st century, security isn’t just about armies; it’s about conscious, organised societies. And building them starts with education—education based on facts, not fearmongering. 

Security is our shared responsibility.

It’s not just the domain of the state. It’s not something the government can "provide" like a service.  It’s something we build and give to each other.  Of course, institutions, regulations, alarm systems, and shelters are vital. But what truly determines survival during a crisis is people—their relationships, willingness to help, ability to act under stress, and the awareness that, in challenging moments, we are not alone. 
Every one of us is part of the security system—from the teacher who teaches first aid, to the neighbour who knows the nearest shelter location, to the volunteer who helps newly arrived refugees adjust to a new reality. 

The strength of a nation lies in the strength of its society—and society is strong when its members know they can count on one another. 

In the past, those who realised that the best defence wasn’t walls or bunkers, but well-prepared, united people, were the ones who prevailed.  In Ukraine, social mobilisation saved thousands of lives.  In Poland, we have a chance to learn from this experience before a crisis forces us to.

20
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Knowledge is our first shelter

Julia Boguslavska

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