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How Much Did U.S. Aid to Ukraine Really Cost? A Study by Economists for Ukraine
"The main goal of this study is to prevent disinformation regarding the aid provided by the United States to Ukraine. It also aims to demonstrate that European countries and the United Kingdom have provided Ukraine with equipment, weapons, and other types of aid in proportions comparable to the U.S. contribution," says one of the lead authors of the study, Anastassia Fedyk, professor of finance at the University of California, Berkeley
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in the USA, September 2024. Photo: Office of the President of Ukraine
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Over the past week, former President Donald Trump has mentioned various figures regarding the military aid the United States has provided to Ukraine over three years of war. He has cited amounts such as $500 billion and $350 billion.
According to estimates by the "Economists for Ukraine" group, the military aid transferred by the U.S. to Ukraine amounts to $18.3 billion. An additional $32.6 billion represents direct budgetary support in the form of reimbursements, which was distributed, among other means, through the World Bank. Meanwhile, the U.S. government has assessed the total volume of its military aid to Ukraine at $65.9 billion.
— We analyzed a vast amount of publicly available data and identified the reasons for discrepancies in the reported figures, — explains Anastassia Fedyk. — When considering only military aid, our experts assessed all the equipment and technology Ukraine was set to receive, taking into account their condition, age, and usability. It makes a significant difference whether equipment was newly manufactured by American companies last year or if it had been out of use for over a decade and was marked for decommissioning. Evaluating all such equipment at the same value is incorrect.
"In 2024, the total amount of military aid to Ukraine constituted 0.25% of the U.S. annual federal budget" — Anastassia Fedyk
For instance, while the U.S. Department of Defense reports that it has transferred $31 billion worth of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine (under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, which allows the U.S. president to provide military aid from Pentagon stockpiles without congressional approval), the majority of this equipment was outdated and no longer in use by the U.S. Armed Forces. According to expert estimates, the actual value of this aid is around $12.5 billion.
Another crucial aspect to consider when calculating expenses is how much the United States has gained in profit or other benefits by providing aid to Ukraine.
— We plan to analyze this aspect in detail in our next study and evaluate the specific economic benefits the U.S. has gained from military and financial support to Ukraine. This includes increased profits for the defense industry and new contracts for American companies, — notes Anastassia Fedyk.
Scholars from the University of California, Berkeley, the Stockholm School of Economics, Minerva University, and the AI for Good Foundation worked on the report for approximately two months. "The main goal of this study is to prevent disinformation and the spread of false data regarding U.S. aid to Ukraine. It also aims to demonstrate, using concrete figures, that European countries and the United Kingdom have provided Ukraine with equipment, weapons, and other types of aid in proportions comparable to the U.S. contribution," Fedyk explains. Notably, the European Union estimates the total volume of its financial, military, and humanitarian assistance at $145 billion, while the United Kingdom has provided nearly $16 billion.
Why, then, does former U.S. President Donald Trump exaggerate the aid figures so drastically? According to Anastassia Fedyk, this may be an attempt to negotiate more favorable terms in upcoming resource agreements or a strategy to discredit the previous administration by portraying its policies as unprofessional and wasteful. Specifically, Trump may be trying to create the impression that his predecessors neglected American citizens while allegedly spending "enormous" amounts to support Ukraine, which is suffering from the war with Russia.
— That is why it was important for us to present accurate data — specific amounts, figures, and facts — to show the real state of affairs. We wanted to prove that American citizens were not deprived of access to social or government services due to aid to Ukraine, explains Anastassia Fedyk.
On the contrary, many people gained jobs, and companies involved in the production and supply of aid expanded their manufacturing capacities and contributed to budget revenues
In her opinion, the results of this analysis will also be useful for Ukraine, as they will allow for negotiations on equal terms, provide a better understanding of the real value of the aid received, and prevent manipulations regarding its scale.
The researchers from "Economists for Ukraine" also analyzed allegations of corruption and possible embezzlement of funds coming from the U.S.
They found that the level of corruption associated with the use of American aid is among the lowest compared to all other countries that have received support from the United States
— Accusations of corruption can harm Ukraine’s reputation as an aid recipient. However, thorough audits indicate that Ukraine has handled the provided funds responsibly. Moreover, budgetary assistance was granted in the form of expense reimbursements based on receipts. This should be emphasized to prevent the formation of a negative image, which some try to impose, notes Professor Fedyk.
In her view, American citizens' attitudes toward Ukraine have not deteriorated, but many still do not fully understand the actual scale of aid provided to Ukraine. Americans continue to support Ukraine and consider their assistance important and beneficial. Therefore, it is crucial to spread truthful information to avoid misunderstandings, even when high-ranking officials fuel such misunderstandings.
Economists for Ukraine is a non-partisan economic think-tank, part of the AI for Good Foundation, a US 501(c)(3) Public Charity whose mission is to promote economic and community resilience. The Economists for Ukraine network includes more than 400 economists representing the world’s leading academic, scientific, and economic institutions.
Journalist, editor. She has lived in Poland since 2015 and has worked for various Ukrainian publications: «Postup», «Livyi Bereg», «Profil» and «Realist.online». She is the author of publications on Ukrainian-Polish cooperation, covering topics such as economic and border issues, cultural heritage and commemoration. She is also a co-organiser of journalistic initiatives promoting Ukrainian-Polish friendship. She has worked as a trainer for the EU programme «Women’s and Children’s Rights in Ukraine: Communication Component». Her interests include personal development and neurolinguistic programming, among others.
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Nothing survives without words. Together, we carry voices that must be heard.
On August 25, the President of Poland announced a veto of the government bill that was meant to regulate protection and support for families fleeing the war. This decision, and the language that accompanied it – promises to make aid for children conditional on their parent’s employment, prolonging the path to citizenship, reigniting historical disputes – is not a matter of mood, but of cold political calculation.
It strikes at Ukrainian refugee women, at their children, at the elderly and the sick; it also strikes at our schools, doctors, and local governments. Instead of certainty, it brings fear; instead of calm, it threatens family separations, secondary migration, and the erosion of trust in the Polish state.
Imagine that you are the ones at war defending your homeland – and a neighboring country treats your wives, mothers, and daughters as hostages of politics.
After the President’s decision, thousands of homes across Poland were filled with shock, bitterness, and a sense of betrayal. Mothers who fled with children and sick parents from cities and villages turned to rubble now ask themselves: where are we supposed to flee next? Women who chose Poland out of love and trust now feel that this love has not been reciprocated.
A child is not a lifeless entry in a statute, and the aid granted to that child cannot be used as leverage against their mother. Solidarity is not seasonal, it is not a trend. If it is true in March, it must also be true in August. Memory is not a cudgel. A state that, instead of healing the wounds of history, reaches for easy symbols does not build community. A state cannot be a street theater. A serious state chooses responsibility, not political spectacle: procedures, clear communication, protection of the most vulnerable.
We, Polish women – mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, and grandmothers – say it plainly: no one has the right to impose conditions, in our name, on women fleeing war. We will not accept the pain and suffering of people in need of our support being turned into fuel for political disputes. We will not allow the destruction of the trust on which community stands. This is a matter of national interest and of our common conscience. It is bridges – not walls – that turn neighbors into allies, and it is predictable and just law, together with the language of respect, that strengthens Poland’s security more than populist shouting from the podium.
Europe – and therefore we as well – has committed to continuity of protection for civilians fleeing aggression. It is our duty to keep that word. This means one thing: to confirm publicly, clearly, and without ambiguity that the families who trusted Poland will not wake up tomorrow in a legal vacuum; that no child will be punished because their parent does not have employment; that the language of power will not divide people into “ours” and “others.” For a child and their single mother, the law must be a shield, not a tool of coercion into loyalty and obedience. Politics must be service, not spectacle.
We call on you, who make the law and represent the Republic, to restore certainty of protection and to reject words that stigmatize instead of protect. Let the law serve people, not political games. Let Poland remain a home where a mother does not have to ask: “Where to now?” – because the answer will always be: “Stay in a country that keeps its word.”
This is not a dispute over legal technicalities. It is a question of the face of the Republic. Will it be a state of the word that is kept – or a state of words thrown to the wind? Will we stand on the side of mothers and children – or on the side of fear?
Signed: Polish women – mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, grandmothers.
As of today, the letter has been endorsed by over two thousand women from across Poland — among them three former First Ladies of the Republic of Poland, Nobel Prize laureate Olga Tokarczuk, and internationally acclaimed filmmaker Agnieszka Holland. Their voices stand alongside those of hundreds of other women — mothers, daughters, sisters, grandmothers — who have chosen to sign as a gesture of solidarity and moral responsibility.
The full list of signatories is available at the link below:
Melania Krych: What is this Zryw [eng. Surge] all about?
Julia Wojciechowska: We’re the generation that, at the time of the government transition in 2015, was still in our teens. Our coming of age was marked by constant political debate — at home, at school, on the streets. And it was a debate that neither included us nor spoke to us. But times have changed.
Agnieszka Gryz: Do you know the playbook for apathy? When the key political events unfold right under your nose, shaping your tomorrow, and yet you can neither cast a vote nor even raise your voice. Zryw didn’t begin the day we registered the Foundation — it began, piece by piece, within each of us, years ago.
JW: And yes, now we run a Foundation. We’re not selling a cat in a bag: we are political, but we are not partisan. We want to build the next generation of state leaders. We’ve just finished recruitment for our first zryw, a four-day public leadership retreat in the Tatra mountains.
Why public servants? Don’t we have enough of those?
JW: The bench is short and not very attractive. We have experts, and we have politicians. The experts have spent the last eight years climbing corporate ladders or building Euro-careers in Brussels; they have families to support. And suddenly they’re supposed to destabilize their lives to take a ministry job for a quarter of the salary? Meanwhile, there are plenty of young people who can and want to step in but no one is inviting them. And what’s more, when they knock on the door themselves, no one cares to open it.
AG: Right now, the most reliable “pipeline” into public service is through party youth wings. Those are often comprised of people who, from a very young age, have been focused solely on securing a particular seat. And once they’re in it, they don’t want to leave. What would their alternative be? And while not all youth wings are the same, the young people we’ve met often had neither vision nor their own ideas, only the party line that raised them.
That’s not the kind of public service we want Zryw to represent. Our diagnosis isn’t about a lack of knowledge or experience. What’s missing are people willing to make decisions and take responsibility for them; to risk and bear the consequences. State leaders, not mouthpieces of the party. I still remember being deeply struck by the words of Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, then a minister. Asked about the stability of his profession, he replied that his coat always hung on the back of his chair: “I am a public servant and a politician, and I must always be ready… at any moment. If I have to leave, I take my coat and I go.” We want to fear neither stepping in nor out.
Who applied to the first Zryw? Who did you select?
AG: The range was incredible. From doctors and engineers to political science students and civil servants. We received applications from 149 towns across all 16 Polish regions, plus 12 cities abroad. The final group is eclectic in the best way: a trainee fighter jet pilot, a former health expert abroad, aspiring local government leader.
“Zryw” during introductory conversations. Photo: private archive
JW: But only 35% of applications came from women. However, among those invited for interviews, women made up half, because the candidates who did apply, were incredibly strong. That’s a slightly higher ratio than the proportion of women in our parliament. It shows that the imbalance of opportunities starts much earlier.
This won’t fix itself, but our group speaks for itself: neither Zryw nor Poland has a shortage of capable, ambitious women.
Right, I’ll tell you an anecdote. We recently received a lengthy comment on a blog post ["Our Favorite Elections: Who's Joining the September Zryw?" - Ed.], in which we mentioned the deficit of female applicants. Someone criticized us for “making up inequality,” since recruitment was open to everyone, they argued. “Anyone could click the link.” They claimed that bringing up such stats could discourage young men from public service because nowadays, any and all gender differences are painted as discrimination.
And how did you take that comment?
AG: Honestly, I was glad! Someone took the time to write out their thoughts. Polemic is a valuable legacy of Polish public life, and it’s an honor to partake in and to foster it. Of course, I disagreed with the arguments themselves, because discrimination and systemic inequality are not the same thing.
JW: In a nutshell, discrimination means unequal treatment or neglect. It would apply if one group had been treated preferentially. Then you could say the others were discriminated against. But we had no preferences. What we did consider were the ground realities of Poland’s education system and cultural patterns that shape what people feel is possible for them. And in Poland, that burden falls especially on young women, who are often brought up according to a different set of values. As girls, we’re taught to be polite, to obey. Boys will be boys: they get a pass to mess around, to take risks. And that carries over into adult life, including our careers.
AG: Equality doesn’t always mean equal opportunity. Leveling the playing field requires special attention to the needs shaped by years of conforming to social and cultural norms. And often, forms of exclusion that aren’t necessarily written into law but affect people’s lives nonetheless. Going forward, we pledge to ensure that women not only get access, but also an actual encouragement to apply.
JW: Many of us in Zryw studied abroad, which makes the contrast all the more striking. I was in England, where class divides are the bigger issue. But after returning to Poland, I’ve spoken with countless young women who face a powerful mental barrier—they doubt their own abilities and potential. And yet, so often, they have far greater knowledge and social awareness than many of the men I meet who are already part of the state apparatus.
As a Foundation, we can’t overlook this—when we see inequality, we take it into account.
How did Zryw come about?
AG: It all started with sleeping on mattresses. The year was 2023, a parliamentary election year — time to rise to the challenge. A dozen or so of us came together to build a campaign for Parliament from scratch. We barely knew each other. For several months, our candidate’s apartment turned into a kind of “transfer station”: it began with five people, by the end, there were fifteen, and many more passed through along the way. That group of fifteen became the core on which we built Zryw. Because we discovered something important — not only could we survive living on top of each other in one small flat, but we could actually make things happen together.
JW: It all started through word of mouth. In ’23 we were acting on our own initiative, and the news spread: to friends, and then to friends of friends. Take me and Aga, for example. We only knew each other from afar, and only virtually. Back during Covid, we happened to organize student conferences at the same time. Every now and then, we’d catch a glimpse of each other on Zoom or on social media. Then the parliamentary election came.
AG: That’s right. I asked if I could join the campaign; I texted Julia on Instagram, I had seen her repost something relating to our candidate. The timing was right, the whole thing was only getting started. After the successful election campaign, we wanted to harness that energy and channel it toward something. We realized there was no point in waiting for a window of opportunity, and we had to open it ourselves. That’s why we created Zryw: to capture that national surge of energy, give it shape, and direct it where it’s needed most.
From left to right: Agnieszka Gryz, Alicja Dryja, Alicja Kępka, Agnieszka Homańska. Photo: private archive
So, where is it needed most?
JW: Over the past two years, we’ve seen how much absurdity and inertia you run into when working in ministries. Take salaries, for example—some of them, quite frankly, make it impossible to live in the capital. 3,200 zł net? That’s an extreme case, but a real one. And many people in Zryw know this firsthand. They came back from abroad, wanting to work for the state, and were willing to accept those conditions because they had a vision. Some managed to endure, while others left—whether due to financial strain or a lack of room to grow.
AG: We believe that a qualitative generational shift in Poland’s public service is possible from within. For systemic change to take hold, you need to sow it in many places at once—because, in the end, the state needs capable people in both offices and the legislative process. But it’s also about showing that there are people worth making that change for.
We don’t want to open a showroom where all you can do is admire a luxury car from the outside. Zryw should be a garage, a place where you can actually get under the hood of your own car. We’ll give you the workshop, the tools, and access to great mechanics. And then it’s time to hit the road—with our support and community alongside you.
Who do you work with?
JW: Last year, we were the only organization from Poland accepted into the accelerator run by the Apolitical Foundation, which supports what they call political entrepreneurs. And despite the name, it’s not about businesspeople, but rather about those who create new models of civic and political engagement.
We’re also supported by, among others, the EFC Foundation, founded in memory of Roman Czernecki — a social innovator and educator. At Zryw, we believe that democracy requires not only institutions, but above all people: competent, empathetic and ready to act. In this sense, our mission and projects align deeply with EFC’s vision of building a strong democratic community.
AG: Among our allies is also the Mentors4Starters Foundation. From them, we’re learning how to build meaningful mentor–mentee relationships that truly benefit both sides. Maria Belka and Zofia Kłudka bring a wealth of practical knowledge and an equal willingness to share it with us.
How do you imagine the future of Zryw?
JW: Our mission is to find capable, driven people, encourage them either to stay in Poland or to come back, and equip them with the tools and knowledge they need to be effective in public service.
AG: While our zrywy [eng. surges]—the lowercase ones, meaning our short multi-day gatherings—are largely aimed at students who study in Poland and see their future here, we also see ourselves as a kind of “repatriation hub.” When you go abroad for your studies, you find countless networks and support systems that help you adapt to a new place. We believe Poland needs a similar network, but for those considering a return.
JW: Exactly. A Pole abroad is rarely alone. But a Pole returning after studies is a different story. For a long time, such a decision carried the stigma of disappointment or even failure. Nonsense! Poland is beautiful, innovative, and above all, it’s home. This is where we feel purpose, and this is where we see our future. And we want the privilege we had—finding each other in 2023, and being able to start working together—to be available to many more people. Because in the end, you need both something and someone to come back to. The flight home is just one plane ticket, but the decision to board it isn’t so simple. We want to show, in very concrete terms, that the return is worth it, and that it opens up incredible opportunities.
While NATO leaders reaffirm their commitment to supporting Ukraine, and the EU once again demonstrates the fragility of its unity under pressure from Budapest, Russia not only refuses to halt its aggression but is intensifying its actions - both on the battlefield and in the information war. The summit in The Hague did not result in a breakthrough: promises without guarantees, talk of «peace through strength», hints at dialogue with Putin - all amid the increasingly evident decline in American ambition. Simultaneously, Hungary is blocking new sanctions, and the Kremlin is launching sophisticated cyber operations, pretending the world has already accepted its presence.
On how the West’s strategy has changed, what risks stem from illusions about Russia, what the new wave of disinformation means, and why Europe must take the lead in deterring aggression, Sestry spoke with Keir Giles - a leading British expert on security and Russia, and Senior Consulting Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House.
Trump, NATO and Russia: an alliance on the brink of compromise and challenges
Maryna Stepanenko: «Peace through strength» was declared the main theme of the talks between Trump and Zelensky. After the meeting, the head of the White House hinted at dialogue with Putin and possible Patriot missile deliveries, but no firm commitments were made. In this context, how, in your opinion, could the formula «peace through strength» be applied to Russia, and how ready is the US to take on a real role in exerting pressure?
Keir Giles: We have always known that the only way to ensure European security is to provide Ukraine with the maximum possible support. So now we are dealing with the consequences of the policy of several successive US administrations that decided a different approach was needed. They are profoundly mistaken, and this causes enormous damage not only to European security and, of course, to Ukraine itself, but also to global security.
It is precisely such restraint and refusal to confront aggression that has led to the outbreak of global conflicts around the world
We are witnessing escalating situations, increasing casualties, and more wars breaking out - all because of this new American idea that confronting the aggressor is more dangerous than allowing the victim to be destroyed
The NATO summit recognised Russia as a long-term threat to the entire Alliance. Photo: CHRISTIAN HARTMANN/AFP/East News
The meeting between US and Ukrainian leaders once again raised the question: what model of support for Kyiv does Washington envisage? Are we speaking about a strategic partnership or rather about controlled containment of the war without long-term commitments?
There is a serious question as to whether a genuine strategic partnership with Donald Trump is even possible. After all, the United States sought partnership with Russia - and even that does not work particularly well, despite Trump being willing to do whatever it takes to give Russia everything it wants. Any country, any traditional friend, ally or partner of the United States must remember that the relationships upon which America’s former prosperity and security were built no longer have any real meaning for Trump. We are in an entirely new global environment.
This means that countries that take European security seriously, and therefore also the security and future of Ukraine, must step up to fill the gap left by the United States. This applies primarily to Europe’s neighbours, but also to liberal democracies around the world that have a shared interest in ending aggression.
Recently, there were rumours in Brussels that Russia might be removed from the list of NATO’s main threats, leaving only international terrorism. This seems strange considering that it is Russia that continues the war in Europe and destabilises the situation globally, from Africa to the Middle East. In the final communiqué, Russia was recognised as a long-term threat to the entire Alliance. However, do you generally observe an attempt by the West to «normalise» the aggressor?
The United States has long pretended that Russia is not a problem, and we should not rule out the possibility that NATO, in its desperate efforts to retain the US in the alliance, may go along with this rhetoric.
We have already seen signs that NATO is prepared to take extraordinary measures to placate Trump: take, for example, the letter written to him by Secretary General Mark Rutte, deliberately composed in «Trump’s language». It must have been extremely difficult to imitate the verbal expressions of a five-year-old child in order to accomplish this.
Therefore, we cannot confidently predict how far NATO might go to ensure continued US participation in the Alliance. But European countries must harbour no illusions about whether Russia has ceased to be a threat, regardless of the efforts of the current US administration to convince itself otherwise.
The resilience of regimes and the fragility of decisions: what will determine the duration of the war
Despite sanctions, battlefield losses and growing isolation, Putin’s regime is holding firm - at least on the surface. Given your expertise, what is the source of this system’s resilience today, and what could destabilise it from within?
There is little chance that the Russian regime will be brought down from within, as it appears to be a regime with which the overwhelming majority of the Russian population is entirely satisfied.
Ultimately, it is a self-sufficient system in which those who have gained wealth and power within it have no interest in its destruction. Therefore, there is currently no reason to believe that Russia will deviate from its aggressive course, despite the long-term damage and the catastrophic consequences for the country’s economy and its population.
Assuming the end of the war is neither imminent nor hopelessly distant, what factors, in your view, might break the current deadlock? You have outlined internal collapse as unlikely, but could it be external pressure or something else we have yet to articulate?
The answer to this question has always been and will remain the same: European countries must provide Ukraine with maximum physical and financial support to help it defeat Russia, by any means available. Not necessarily on the front lines, but also through other forms of support.
European countries are slowly realising that their future is closely linked to the future of Ukraine, and that they can no longer rely on the United States as the primary sponsor of these efforts. But Europe will need to do much more for Ukraine to continue holding the front line and repelling the aggressor.
Russia and Belarus have announced the «Zapad-2025» exercises. In the past, such manoeuvres have served as a prelude to aggression. Is there currently a risk of this scenario being repeated, and is the West capable of responding adequately amid political fragmentation?
People always become anxious ahead of the «Zapad» exercises - this has been the case long before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and even before the annexation of Crimea. And yes, it always creates an opportunity to do something unrelated to the training itself.
But at this stage, when there is already an intense conflict ongoing, should we consider «Zapad» as just another element of battlefield deception, part of a broader deception within the ongoing war, rather than the start of a new one?
Of course, Western intelligence services will be closely monitoring who is doing what and where in the context of the Russian-Belarusian exercises - even in this new reality, where a significant part of Russia’s ground forces is already deeply engaged in Ukraine and has limited capacity for operations in other regions.
«The invisible front»: how Russia is waging war against the West in the information space
Mr Giles, you yourself became the target of a new, sophisticated phishing attack by Russian hackers - disguised as an employee of the US State Department. The attackers used Gmail’s «delegate access» function to gain hidden access to your inbox, bypassing two-factor authentication. This operation likely required weeks of effort. In this context, how has Russia’s tactic in the information war changed over the past year? And what does this say about the new level of threat?
I am confident the entire operation took far longer - several weeks just for the execution, so the planning stage must have begun much earlier.
On the one hand, this new technique, this new approach to gaining access to people’s email, indicates that Russia is being forced to develop more refined methods because its previous, more primitive attempts have failed. For many years, there have been numerous attempts to hack my email, some laughably primitive, others highly complex and sophisticated.
But on the other hand, this new method highlights that we are all vulnerable
The way the suspected Russian attackers exploited a built-in Gmail feature available in every user’s account to create, essentially, a «side door» that bypasses all our usual security measures (two-factor authentication, mobile codes, confirmation requests) shows that no one is truly safe.
Until companies such as Google, Microsoft and others fix this loophole, it is inevitable that this technique will be used much more broadly, not only against targets like me.
This summer, Europe witnessed a wave of fake messages sent on behalf of Western governments, social media manipulations, and interference in election campaigns in individual EU member states. How exactly is Russia trying to influence public opinion in Europe today, and which narratives is it primarily promoting?
Some of Russia’s narratives are entirely consistent over time, while others are tied to specific political events. It is important to remember that the campaigns conducted by Russia are ongoing and are not limited to dates on the democratic calendar.
Russia is constantly working to undermine the forces that unite Europe: solidarity among European states, societal cohesion, trust in institutions and, above all, support for Ukraine in resisting Russian aggression
These campaigns are permanent. In addition, there are targeted, time-sensitive efforts aimed at influencing the outcomes of specific democratic processes in specific countries at specific times.
Sanctions fatigue: Is the West’s pressure on the Kremlin still effective?
In addition to the NATO summit, another event important for Ukraine took place - the European Council summit. There, both a new sanctions package against the Russian Federation and support for Ukraine’s negotiation process with the EU were discussed - both initiatives were blocked by Hungary. Sanctions - also by Slovakia. To what extent do such actions undermine trust in EU unity, and what self-defence mechanisms against internal sabotage does the EU need?
This is yet another illustration of how consensus-based organisations - NATO and the EU - are vulnerable to the lowest common denominator. If there is a saboteur or a disruptor within, it can effectively paralyse the entire organisation, especially in the case of the EU, which is primarily a trade organisation rather than a structure designed to address geopolitical conflicts.
In many ways, the very structure of Europe’s supranational institutions does not meet the challenges they currently face
Nevertheless, it is impressive how far they have come in maintaining unity and a shared understanding of the importance of supporting Ukraine. I hope and believe that it will once again be possible to find a workaround to move forward, even without the cooperation of countries such as Hungary, Slovakia or others.
The EU summit failed to adopt a joint statement in support of Ukraine - Hungary blocked it. Photo: Geert Vanden Wijngaert/Associated Press/East News
What does it signify that the United States currently does not intend to increase sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation from its side?
Well, the message from the United States has been very clear. At present, they are partners with Russia and are seeking to impose on Ukraine the terms of capitulation dictated by Moscow. This is the reality with which Ukraine and Europe must now contend.
And it is precisely the adaptation to this reality, and the speed with which it occurs, that will determine the future security of the entire continent.
Cover photo: Office of the President of Ukraine
This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation
On May 20th, the European Union adopted its largest and most ambitious package of sanctions against Russia - the seventeenth to date. It targets the deployment of the Russian Federation’s «shadow fleet», which helps circumvent the oil embargo, as well as strengthening restrictions on Russian energy companies and blocking the assets of Kremlin allies in various countries. At the same time, the eighteenth package is already being prepared, which may include a ban on the import of Russian gas and uranium, and the use of frozen Russian assets for the reconstruction of Ukraine.
These sanctions are a key instrument of pressure on the Kremlin, yet their effectiveness, coordination with partners and consequences for European unity remain open questions. Ondřej Kolář, Member of the European Parliament from the Czech Republic, answered the most important of these in an exclusive interview with Sestry.
Sanctions against Russia: EU unity challenges and the position of the USA
Maryna Stepanenko: Mr Kolář, what do you believe is the main advantage of the seventeenth EU sanctions package in combating the circumvention of the Russian oil embargo? Can this package seriously complicate the activities of the so-called «shadow fleet»?
Ondřej Kolář: This is a complex issue. The fact that this is already the seventeenth sanctions package indicates that the policy is not working as effectively as it should. We allow too many exceptions, lack proper enforcement, and are unable to stop large-scale sanctions from being circumvented not only by individual companies but also by entire third countries. Sanctions do matter, but we must implement and enforce them much better.
With this seventeenth package, I hope we have finally recognised how serious the problem is, especially when it comes to the «shadow fleet», which Russia uses very effectively to bypass restrictions. I am glad that the EU is following the example of the United Kingdom on this issue, although it is disappointing that it took us about six months just to start discussing this step.
The EU is moving too slowly. Russia makes decisions quickly and decisively, while we lag behind. This must change - we must be the ones who set the agenda
I welcome this package and the fact that we have finally focused on what truly matters, such as the export of fossil fuels, on which Russia is heavily dependent. The more we block this flow, the better it is for us and for Ukraine. But we must act faster and more precisely. We cannot afford to continue playing catch-up.
You mentioned sanctions circumvention, and the seventeenth package targets not only Russian companies but also their partners in countries such as China and the UAE. You also said that the EU often reacts rather than sets the agenda. Do you see a realistic path for the EU to stay one step ahead of Russia? Is there a way to truly block all the loopholes it uses to bypass sanctions?
I am afraid not. In order to close all avenues of evasion, the EU would have to persuade the entire world to stop cooperating with Russia, and that is simply impossible. Countries such as North Korea, Iran and many from the BRICS group still maintain ties with Moscow, helping it to create the image of a nation merely defending itself and aspiring to a «normal life». This is dangerous, and we cannot accept it. Our only real instruments here are diplomacy and international trade.
The main mistake of the United States was the abandonment of USAID - this created gaps now being filled by other countries such as China and Russia
The EU lacks equivalent resources to intervene fully, but we cannot yield these spaces. We must compete, demonstrate that we are the better partner, and discard the notion that our colonial past makes us unwelcome. What China is doing in many places is simply a new form of colonialism.
We shall not defeat Russia on the battlefield as Nazi Germany was defeated in the Second World War. Therefore, we must use all the other tools at our disposal. Diplomacy and trade are areas where we can stay a step ahead.
Following the negotiations in Istanbul, the European Union is preparing its eighteenth package of sanctions targeting the Russian energy sector, financial system and «shadow fleet». Do you believe the EU is ready to act independently of the United States' position, particularly given the calls by the newly appointed Chief of Staff to the German Chancellor, Thorsten Frei, for tougher measures, including a ban on the import of Russian gas and uranium?
I would very much like greater independence from Russia because, if we do not achieve it fully, we shall only let ourselves down. Independence from the United States, however, is more complicated. We are still heavily dependent on Washington in matters of defence, security and trade. The United States has been our principal partner for eighty years. Nonetheless, everything changes.
Finnish border guards escort an oil tanker belonging to Russia’s «shadow fleet». Photo: AFP/East News
We cannot afford to react to everything Donald Trump says. The chaos following his inauguration is colossal. In the morning, he says one thing, by lunchtime another, and in the evening he denies both statements. European leaders have realised that it is better to be patient and not to chase after every change in his rhetoric.
The main thing now is to stand on our own feet. This means being proactive and projecting the EU on a global scale. For too long, the EU has been focused on internal development - enlargement and domestic matters, which was important, but we have neglected our global role. Europe has always been a global player, and it must remain one if it is to succeed.
Europe is highly attractive - people seek a better life here because of our unparalleled social security system and quality of life. However, we cannot take this for granted. We must defend it ourselves.
Dependence on the United States is no longer acceptable. They must remain our closest partner, not our guardian
President Trump, in a private conversation with European leaders, acknowledged that Putin was not ready to end the war, but simultaneously refused new sanctions, instead proposing peace talks at the Vatican. How do you assess such a stance by the United States?
Donald Trump is a naïve man who does not understand what is happening. He has been deceived many times by Putin, and he does not even realise it. He cannot evaluate his mistakes because he simply does not acknowledge them. One cannot play poker with one’s cards face up, yet that is exactly what he is doing - showing his hand to Russia, announcing his plans, sending to Moscow unqualified people with no experience.
When he tells European leaders that he forced Putin to join negotiations with Ukraine, a week after those negotiations already took place in Istanbul - it is the same as saying: «I have been asleep for three years».
It is madness. He does not know what he is doing, what he is saying to the world or to his allies
European leaders now realise that they have a clown for a partner. I hope they have enough patience and the necessary tools to calmly and clearly explain to Trump that he is wrong, that he is making matters worse, not better. And that the Russians are playing him. They must make him understand that Russia is not interested in compromise. Unfortunately, we must admit that the current President of the United States is utterly confused and of no help whatsoever.
The United States Congress has introduced the Sanctioning Russia Act, which provides for a 500% tariff on imports from countries that purchase Russian oil and for the expansion of sanctions against Russian sovereign debt. Can Congress, even without support from the Trump administration, independently advance this initiative?
I would be pleased if it were successfully implemented. However, observing how Donald Trump treats American democracy, I am very pessimistic. He does not care about Congress, the Senate or the courts - only about himself and his propaganda.
It does not matter what Congress decides. If Trump does not like it, he will boycott it just as he ignores court rulings and anything else with which he disagrees. This complicates everything greatly.
One day he says he will impose harsh sanctions against Russia, and the next day - the opposite. So where do we stand? What game are we even playing? Nothing is clear.
I am grateful to American legislators for this initiative, but I am cautious. If Trump dislikes it, he will block it without hesitation. I should like to be mistaken, but I do not believe he will support anything that does not serve him.
Challenges on Ukraine’s path to European integration
In March, Hungary threatened to veto the extension of EU sanctions against Russia, which could have led to the unfreezing of substantial assets. Although a compromise was reached, Budapest continues to express criticism not only regarding sanctions but also concerning EU enlargement. How serious a risk is Hungary’s stance for the unity of the European Union in the context of Ukraine’s European integration? What consequences could it have for the integration process itself?
Hungary plays the role of a useful idiot in the EU - Vladimir Putin’s «Trojan horse». They are bringing others over to their side, with a certain degree of success in Slovakia, whose government has become lost in Russian falsehoods. While Ukraine is in the spotlight, the situation in the Western Balkans is even more serious.
Hungary loudly spreads nonsense about the Hungarian minority in Ukraine but quietly undermines the EU elsewhere - especially in Georgia and the Western Balkans, where Hungarian diplomats actively export Russian lies
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary is part of EUFOR (European Union Force - a military mission led by the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina tasked with maintaining peace and stability in accordance with the Dayton Agreement - Edit.) and closely cooperates with leaders of Republika Srpska connected to Putin. They play a disgraceful role in blocking EU enlargement, parroting Russian propaganda.
The EU has realised that it must bypass Hungary, but this creates dangerous precedents. Forming a «coalition of the willing» simply to circumvent Hungary and Slovakia could undermine confidence in the rules and integrity of the EU.
Orbán blocks Ukraine’s accession to the EU, citing economic threats. Photo: LEON NEAL/AFP/East News
Ultimately, the Hungarian people must choose change. We can only hope that the next elections will bring a new government and with it a fundamentally different position on Ukraine and the region. Until then, we must wait and be patient.
The European Parliament actively supports Ukraine’s European integration, in particular by accelerating the accession process and opening negotiation clusters. How do you assess the role of the European Parliament in this process and its influence on the decisions of the EU Council?
Parliament is a legislative body, so almost everything in the EU passes through it. However, it does not play a decisive role in enlargement, although we do influence the process.
For example, I am a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and we closely monitor every country seeking to join the EU. Parliament prepares, votes on and publishes reports on the progress of each country - assessing how well they meet the accession criteria and offering recommendations.
We can also send missions for direct engagement with national partners to discuss the reforms necessary for moving closer to EU membership. But the final decision on enlargement does not rest with us.
We only provide support and guidance. The majority of Parliament supports enlargement, recognising that a larger EU is a stronger EU. Our role is to cooperate with national parliaments, not to pressure them, but to assist in carrying out the required reforms.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted that Ukraine could join the EU by 2030 if reforms continue at the current pace. How realistic do you consider this timeframe for Ukraine's accession?
I would be pleased, but much depends on when the war ends. That does not mean Ukraine should not join the EU before the war concludes - in fact, I believe it deserves a special status.
I often use the example of Puerto Rico - not a full US state, but a special territory with certain rights and responsibilities. Ukraine's situation is unique. None of the other candidate countries - Moldova, Montenegro, Albania or Serbia - have been at war since 2014. Ukraine has been at war for eleven years. We cannot treat it like an ordinary country.
Ukraine could become an EU member before 2030 - President of the European Commission. Photo: NICOLAS TUCAT/AFP/East News
It is important to set ambitious goals - they give us energy. But is 2030 realistic? Frankly, we do not even know what tomorrow will bring. When will the war end? How will it end? Will Russia keep its word?
That is why I believe a special status could be more effective and might even accelerate the process. Ukraine is being treated as if nothing has happened, and that is wrong.
Hybrid warfare and EU information security
In May 2025, Poland faced an unprecedented wave of hybrid attacks from Russia on the eve of its presidential elections. Do you believe the EU is adequately prepared for complex Russian information operations? What steps must be taken to strengthen information security in Europe?
Europe is not ready, not at all. Still, some states are more prepared than others. If you look at the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, their approach is completely different from that of Central Europe. It is strange, given our shared history. The Baltic countries were part of the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia was occupied, but not for as long. Yet Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland are now very effective in countering hybrid threats. Meanwhile, countries like Hungary and Slovakia have completely lost their bearings.
Their minds have been washed by Russian propaganda
Poland, to its credit, speaks out loudly about the problem and wants to act. But in the Czech Republic, officials appear on television and say that disinformation does not exist - this is the worst possible approach.
We are lucky that bombs are not falling on our heads, but we are in a state of information warfare. And we are losing. In Brussels, no one even talks about Russian propaganda. It is not a topic. It seems that a country’s position depends on its historical experience with Russia.
We only began acknowledging the problem because Russia continues to escalate. They blew up an ammunition depot in the Czech Republic in 2014, and all we did was expel a few diplomats. Russian officials still move freely throughout the Schengen Area. No one can stop them.
Frankly, we lack courage. We have been unable to recognise Russia as an enemy for far too long. It does not want to be our friend - it wants to defeat us and reshape the world. Europe is unprepared, it is losing, and it has no coordinated response to hybrid threats. Each country acts on its own, and Russia exploits this chaos.
Russia influences EU countries not only through cyberattacks or disinformation, but also through so-called «soft power» - pro-Russian organisations, media outlets and even economic ties. How serious do you consider this threat to be? And what can the EU do to detect and stop such influence in time?
Yes, it is a serious threat - and Europe still cannot acknowledge it. We must stop convincing ourselves that Russia cannot be that bad. It is that bad. We must take Russian propaganda at face value - they broadcast exactly what the Kremlin thinks and wants.
We must respond to the warnings of our own security services. For example, in the Czech Republic, our intelligence has long stated that Russia’s ownership of numerous real estate properties poses a threat. Yet when it comes to confiscating them, the authorities suddenly claim that it is legally impossible. This fear of Russia must end. Yes, they have nuclear weapons, but their economy is ruined. They are not capable of winning a global conflict.
Europe acts as if it has Stockholm syndrome. Russia cannot match us economically or strategically, and they are not suicidal enough to start a nuclear war
We must acknowledge that Russia is the enemy and stop legitimising people associated with it. There is no reason why, especially in Central Europe, communists and pro-Russian populists should continue to be given media platforms. This must stop.
Russian propaganda must be banned. We must be tough on everyone: individuals, companies and institutions that help Russia gain influence. Bribery, manipulation, espionage - all of this must be tracked and punished. And those who speak out against Russia must be louder, clearer and relentless in explaining the reality. Because we are still unable to tell people what is really happening - and there is no excuse for what Russia is doing. None whatsoever.
Cover photo: Associated Press/East News
This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation
The West had all the tools to foresee Russia's war against Ukraine - and chose to ignore them. Even before 2014, analysis reached NATO's highest offices: the annexation of Crimea, the threat to Mariupol, the Russian Federation's dominance in the Black Sea. The forecasts were accurate, but most member states opted for the illusion of partnership with the Kremlin.
Are changes still possible? What is required to achieve them? And can NATO remain an effective security alliance in a new era of threats? These and other questions were addressed in an interview with Sestry by Dr Stefanie Babst - one of the most influential security strategists in Europe, who worked at NATO for over 20 years, including as Head of the Strategic Foresight Team. Today, she is an independent analyst, the author of a book on the West's «blind spots» in its strategy toward Russia, and an active participant in international discussions on war, peace and security.
Ukraine, Russia and the strategic miscalculations of the West
Maryna Stepanenko: You led NATO's Strategic Foresight Team. How do you assess the West's ability to foresee Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Were there signals that were simply not heard, or perhaps deliberately ignored?
Stefanie Babst: There were many warnings that went unheeded. Allow me to explain. In international relations, it is crucial to accurately assess the mindset, capabilities and intentions of another actor. NATO failed to do this with Russia. As the Head of Strategic Foresight at the Alliance, I issued the first serious warning in 2013 - a few months before the annexation of Crimea. I presented an analysis outlining Russia's malicious intentions and its military preparations against Ukraine.
It was reviewed by the Secretary General and discussed with member states, but no action was taken
Some countries - the Baltic States and Poland - took the analysis seriously. Others - notably Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom - preferred to maintain the NATO-Russia partnership. From 2014 onwards, we intensified our analysis, forecasting actions such as the seizure of Mariupol, dominance in the Black Sea and the use of Donbas as a staging ground. These forecasts were presented at the highest levels, including the NATO Council, but were ultimately dismissed.
In 2015 and 2016, we broadened our focus to include China and its ties with Russia, offering future scenarios and forecasting so-called «black swans» - high-impact events that are hard to predict, seem unlikely but could have serious consequences if they occur. Again, many perceived this only as «intellectual exercises». Thus, NATO possessed the tools of foresight - and chose to ignore them. And that comes at a very high cost.
In your work, you call for a review of the West's strategy toward Russia. In your view, what «blind spots» remain in Western approaches - particularly regarding support for Ukraine?
Three years ago, I called for a powerful, multifaceted deterrence strategy to help Ukraine not just freeze the war but win it. I invoked George Kennan's Cold War approach, urging the use of all available instruments - economic, diplomatic and military - to push Russia out of Ukraine. But apart from some Baltic and Northern European countries, no one took this seriously.
NATO and the EU still lack a defined end goal. If Ukraine's victory were the objective, a corresponding strategy would have been developed
Instead, Western leaders underestimated Ukraine's resilience and failed to act decisively even after Russia crossed countless red lines. President Biden, despite his commitment to Ukraine, framed his approach around what the United States would not do: we will not provoke Russia, we will not give Ukrainians long-range weapons, we will not do this or that. This is not a strategy. Now, with Trump’s return, many European governments are passively hoping for a US-Russian agreement that merely freezes the war - something I believe is dangerous both for Ukraine and Europe.
My main criticism is the lack of political will in the West. Too many still see this as Russia's war against Ukrainians. But it is our war too
Stefanie, why do you think Europe failed to prepare effectively for Trump’s presidency?
Planning within NATO and European governments is often difficult, as politicians typically focus on short-term goals, usually only a month ahead. In times of emergency, particularly due to Washington's unpredictability, Europe must abandon crisis management mode and stop reacting to every event, such as a new tweet.
Europe must be firm with the United States, clearly communicating that their actions - including threats to countries like Canada and Denmark, withholding intelligence from Ukraine and halting cyber operations against Russia - are unacceptable. These decisions had deadly consequences, and member states should not be afraid to hold the United States accountable for violating the fundamental principles of the Washington Treaty.
Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, recently visited Florida to meet President Trump, hoping to impress him with defence spending figures. He praised Trump’s leadership and even claimed that Trump had «broken the deadlock» in relations with Russia. However, this is detached from the reality of ongoing Russian attacks.
If the NATO Secretary General lacks a clear message, the best approach is silence, focusing on supporting member states and protecting them from any threat. We do not have time for empty words and political games.
Europeans must remain immune to American political theatre, focusing on strengthening defence capability and supporting Ukraine’s defence industry so it can resist Russian aggression
Rutte: NATO wants to make Ukraine a strong state. Photo: Office of the President of Ukraine
Migration and war
Germany is no longer the EU leader in asylum requests from South American and Middle Eastern refugees. At the same time, in the first quarter of 2025, applications from Ukrainians rose by 84 per cent. What does this indicate?
It is entirely understandable that many Ukrainians have chosen to leave their country for personal and professional reasons - this is natural, and no one should be blamed for it. But this migration has political consequences in Germany, particularly when far-right parties exploit it by portraying Ukrainian refugees as a burden on the social system, regardless of their skills or motivation. These sentiments are especially strong in eastern Germany, where parties like AfD and certain left-wing populist movements have gained support.
What concerns me is the lack of strong counteraction from the federal government in Berlin - clearer messaging and political leadership are needed
If more Ukrainians arrive, I hope the next government will take a positive stance, recognising that many of them can significantly contribute to the German workforce. This would mean reducing bureaucracy, accelerating integration and facilitating their employment. Whether this happens remains to be seen.
Continuing on this topic, in recent weeks, some districts in Germany have publicly declared that they can no longer accommodate Ukrainian refugees due to overburdened social systems. How do you assess these sentiments?
It is true that local communities across Germany still face difficulties in accommodating refugees - an issue that arose after Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the borders, leading to a large influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and other countries. Many municipalities remain overwhelmed by demands for housing, language training and integration support. However, Ukrainian refugees do not pose the same challenges.
Ukrainians generally integrate well, bring strong skills and education and do not contribute to social tensions
In contrast, some refugees from the Middle East struggle to adapt to liberal democratic norms, which fuels far-right narratives, particularly in eastern Germany. Parties like AfD and figures such as Sahra Wagenknecht exploit this, promoting anti-Ukrainian, pro-concession rhetoric that ignores the reality of Russian occupation.
Unfortunately, mainstream democratic parties are not doing enough to push them back. With growing support from American right-wing populists, such as those connected to Trump or Musk, this polarisation may deepen further, posing a serious threat to democratic cohesion in Europe.
Europe on the brink of war
Amid full-scale war in Ukraine, initiatives have emerged in Poland and Germany to prepare schoolchildren for emergencies. Does this indicate a deeper shift in Europe's security culture, where defence is no longer solely the army's responsibility, but that of the entire society?
Although some defence-related courses have begun in Germany, they remain insufficient, and the wider public remains largely unprepared - both mentally and physically - to play a defensive role.
Serious debates are now underway about reinstating military conscription, but surveys show that two-thirds of people aged 20 to 30 would refuse to serve, with many saying they would rather emigrate than defend the country.
This reflects a deeper issue: decades of political messaging have conditioned Germans to believe they live in peace, surrounded by allies, and need not prepare for conflict
As a result, Germany also lacks bunkers for emergencies, civil defence training and basic resilience measures for the population. Changing this mindset will require strong political leadership. Without it, the Bundeswehr will remain under-equipped and unable to contribute significantly to efforts such as a potential coalition in Ukraine.
We see civil defence becoming part of public policy, from educating children to testing alarm systems. Is Europe beginning to think seriously about its own resilience in the face of potential escalation beyond Ukraine?
Undoubtedly. Some countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic States, have prioritised both military capability and societal resilience in recent years. In cities such as Riga and Warsaw, the Russian threat is well understood. However, countries like Germany, Belgium, Portugal, France and others still view Russia’s war against Ukraine as a regional issue.
Fortunately, leaders such as Kaja Kallas are advocating for a long-term strategy against Russia. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, I have argued that we must prepare for a protracted conflict, as long as Putin’s regime remains in power, Russia will continue to pose a threat to Ukraine and the whole of Europe.
Strategic vision
Given your views on NATO's evolution and the need for a new coalition, potentially the so-called «coalition of the willing», how do you envisage its structure? What strategic or institutional frameworks will be important to effectively counter Russian aggression, considering internal challenges within NATO, particularly due to the influence of populist leaders, including Trump?
During my time at NATO, I was proud of my team’s ability to anticipate challenges before they emerged, especially regarding NATO’s enlargement. I was actively involved in the admission of new members, including the Baltic States, Slovenia and Slovakia.
One of the moments I had hoped to witness was seeing Ukraine’s flag at NATO headquarters, but I no longer believe that is a realistic goal
Instead, I believe Ukraine should focus on building a new coalition with like-minded countries, rather than pursuing NATO membership. The Alliance, particularly under the influence of destructive politics, is becoming increasingly divided.
If I were advising President Zelensky, I would recommend not wasting energy on NATO accession but rather focusing on strengthening a broader, more flexible alliance to counter Russian aggression. This would allow us to move beyond the status quo and prepare for the future.
Considering the current dynamics within NATO, how long do you think the Alliance can maintain its current structure before significant changes become inevitable? Do you have a timeframe in mind?
When President Trump was elected, I predicted he would undermine the rules-based order, and we are already seeing significant damage done to NATO, especially concerning the US commitments. European countries have started discussing enhancing the European pillar within NATO, planning to prepare for a potential US withdrawal within five to ten years. However, I believe that timeframe is overly optimistic - we may have only five to ten months before we witness new disruptions.
What lies ahead for NATO? Photo: BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI
Looking back, it is clear NATO missed the opportunity to prepare for these challenges. In 2016, I prepared a document for the Secretary General outlining potential harm Trump could cause, but it was dismissed at the time. The issues I raised remain relevant today, and NATO's bureaucracy is too risk-averse to plan for unforeseen scenarios.
If the Alliance fails to act, it risks becoming a reactive organisation that merely responds to Trump’s tweets instead of proactively working toward the future
I hope that countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Northern European states will cooperate with Ukraine to create a new joint alliance capable of better confronting future challenges.
Cover photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/East News
This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation
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