Щоб розпочати війну, не потрібні бомби. Все, що вам потрібно, це вдалий фейк

Her second term as President of the European Commission has been marked by growing attempts to challenge her authority. In July, Ursula von der Leyen narrowly survived a vote of no confidence.
During the current plenary session of the European Parliament (October 6–9), the issue of trust in her leadership will once again be put to a vote.
Support from centrists and moderate forces should grant the Commission President a temporary sense of stability — but will that support last?

The Best person for the job‍

Maryna Stepanenko: Since 2014, no President of the European Commission has faced a vote of no confidence, yet Ursula von der Leyen has found herself in this situation for the second time. What is the source of this political crisis?

Roland Freudenstein: Within the European Commission, critical voices toward its President are becoming more frequent — not only from political extremists but also from some centrists. However, everyone understands that, in reality, there is no alternative. That’s why the upcoming vote of no confidence is unlikely to succeed.

Some call Ursula von der Leyen “Europe’s strong voice in the world” and a consistent advocate for Ukraine’s interests across the continent. Others claim she lacks the persistence needed to see major initiatives through to the end. What would you identify as von der Leyen’s main strengths and weaknesses as a politician?

I would say her greatest strength lies in the power of her convictions and her incredible work ethic.

She is often described as a workaholic. She even turned her room on the 13th floor of the Commission’s headquarters in Brussels into a makeshift office.

Naturally, not everyone appreciates that. Some people dislike strong Commission Presidents; others simply dislike strong women. She has also faced criticism for not devoting enough attention to certain projects — though, in most cases, the circumstances worked against her.

The best example is the European Green Deal — an effort to balance Europe’s economic competitiveness with the fight against climate change. For years, the pendulum of public sentiment swung toward saving the planet, but that moment has passed. Now, von der Leyen is unable to deliver on all the “green course” initiatives she once championed at the start of her second term.

Although the summer’s vote of no confidence was unsuccessful, it exposed deep divisions within the European Parliament. How do you assess von der Leyen’s ability to maintain the support of various political groups during her second term?

— The very fact that her most ardent critics come from the far left and the far right is what ensures her survival. The left doesn’t want to vote with the right — and vice versa. Moreover, there truly is a sense, even among her critics, that no one else could do this job better than she does.

If we look at their own criteria — especially in areas such as social legislation, environmental policy, and respect for member states — I simply cannot imagine anyone else capable of fulfilling this role.

Her critics know this too, particularly those in the political center who may be dissatisfied with her style or certain decisions. In the end, even they admit it.

Is Ursula von der Leyen able to adjust her policies to satisfy both centrist and right-wing parties while maintaining the unity of the EU?

No, that’s impossible — you can’t please everyone. It’s the same in national politics: no head of government can satisfy all voters. That’s why von der Leyen must rely on a coalition of centrist forces.

Yet even within that coalition, maintaining consensus is extremely difficult — it requires constant compromise. And this is precisely where her strength and her work discipline play a positive role. To make compromises, you must be strong and guided by strong convictions. At the same time, you have to work relentlessly and cooperate with a vast number of decision-makers.

I am deeply convinced that Ursula von der Leyen is currently the best person for this job.

The Political Show of the Far Right

The influence of right-wing parties in the European Parliament is growing. How do you assess their impact on the EU’s political direction? Could they change the balance of power within the European People’s Party (EPP)?

Under the leadership of Manfred Weber, the European People’s Party has at times adopted positions aligned with the far right, allowing it to build a majority that extends beyond the classic centrist coalition of the EPP, liberals, social democrats, and greens. For instance, on certain provisions of the Green Deal, the EPP diverged from von der Leyen and pushed the Commission toward more right-leaning, pro-agricultural stances.

However, on strategic issues — European defense, support for Ukraine, and global trade agreements — its stance remains fully aligned with the EPP’s. The real problems tend to come from the left, particularly the socialists and the greens. One example was von der Leyen’s strong reaction to the situation in Israel and Gaza, which many EU members — including socialists and greens — saw as hasty and one-sided in favor of Israel.

So while the EPP has influenced von der Leyen’s program to some extent, on key strategic matters it remains close to her views.

Given the far-right parties’ support for the vote of no confidence against von der Leyen, could their goal be not just to change the leadership but to influence the overall direction of the EU?

Yes, that’s exactly what they’re trying to do. They aim for tactical victories by gathering as many votes as possible for a no-confidence motion against Ursula von der Leyen. They’re unlikely to win such votes, but their goal is to send a political message.

If you look at Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric, it becomes clear that Brussels is his enemy — and no one personifies Brussels more than Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission.
Of course, there are other influential figures — the Presidents of the Parliament and the Council, and High Representative Kaja Kallas — but von der Leyen is the most powerful of them all.

That’s why she has become a symbol of the EU institutions, which, according to Orbán, have grown too powerful and have led Europe in the wrong direction. Together with the Patriots for Europe (PFE) and other far-right groups, he wants to attack her publicly — and, through her, attack the very idea of the European Union.

They want to turn it into a grand political show.

Hungary, under Orbán’s leadership, has repeatedly blocked EU initiatives — especially those related to sanctions against Russia. How do you assess Orbán’s actions and their impact on von der Leyen’s position?

Viktor Orbán has effectively sided with Putin — he’ll never admit it, but that’s the truth. He believes the future belongs to dictators, wants to maintain close relations with them, and ultimately aspires to become one himself. He might even lose the next election, but that remains his worldview.

He rejects everything the EU stands for: shared sovereignty, strong Brussels institutions, and majority voting in the Council. He has also been a vocal opponent of Ukraine’s EU membership. However, in the coming weeks, the Council may attempt to bypass Hungary’s veto on sanctions against Russia.

At this point, not only Brussels institutions but also most EU member states have had enough of Orbán and are looking for ways to work around Hungary — and, in some cases, Slovakia as well.

That’s a major shift. Previously, member states disliked Orbán but rarely confronted him directly. Now, countries like Poland, the Baltic states, the Nordics, and even Germany sometimes do so openly. Orbán feels cornered. He continues to portray Brussels as the villain and the member states as the “good guys,” but in reality, most governments now openly oppose him. His fallback strategy is to delegitimize them by labeling them “elites” or “globalists” who no longer represent their nations. But since those governments were democratically elected, Orbán’s position is increasingly difficult.

Von der Leyen has publicly supported ending the EU’s unanimity rule in certain policy areas. Can this move be seen as radical or risky for her political career?

No, because she’s not the driving force behind this process. And she’s being very wise not to be — it would only reinforce the stereotype of her as a power-hungry Eurocrat bent on limiting member states’ rights. Let’s not forget that several member states themselves remain hesitant about majority voting in crucial areas.

It would be much better if another influential figure in Brussels — in this case, European Council President António Costa — took the lead, with member states’ backing. That way, the issue would appear political, not personal. Honestly, I don’t think the debate over majority voting will harm her career.

Disinformation and Russia’s Natural Enemy

How do you assess the role of disinformation in EU politics, particularly in campaigns targeting von der Leyen?

Its influence is significant. Russia is doing everything it can to increase tensions in European politics — both within member states and inside the Brussels bubble. The negative image of Ursula von der Leyen is part of that effort to fuel conflict. And of course, Russian disinformation and propaganda target her directly because of her strong and consistent stance on Ukraine. She is, quite simply, their natural enemy.

Russia is always trying to heighten political tensions and internal divisions within the European Union.

At the same time, I notice that people expressing Eurosceptic views or criticizing von der Leyen or Ukraine aren’t always doing so because the Kremlin is paying them. Sometimes, they genuinely believe what they say. That’s why I would be cautious about labeling every form of criticism as Russian disinformation or assuming that someone is on Putin’s payroll.

We need to counter such criticism with political arguments — not just by pointing fingers.

There is a widespread sense of frustration — a belief that things are going in the wrong direction, that wealth is distributed unfairly, that Europe isn’t generating enough economic growth, that too much is spent on defense and too little on social issues, and so on. These feelings are real. Russia seeks to exploit them to intensify political tensions. However, the right way to respond to this criticism is through political action — not merely by accusing people of taking money from Moscow.

Is the European Union responding actively enough to the threat of disinformation from third countries? What more should be done to strengthen the EU’s information security?

Neither national governments nor the EU itself should directly hire people to fight disinformation. Instead, they should fund projects that strengthen and empower civil society — for example, investigative journalists who expose networks of Russian influence.

Of course, governments should use their intelligence services to detect influence operations. But the primary response of a free society to authoritarian threats — whether in the information sphere, social media, or the economy — must come from civil society itself. This means foundations, political parties, think tanks, associations, universities, and the media.

Ukraine itself has achieved remarkable success in countering Russian disinformation since the early years following the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas in 2014. It was Ukrainian civil society that responded — and far more quickly than the government. The same should happen within the European Union. Governments should fund and support civil society, but the real work must be done by the citizens themselves.

Ukraine’s Integration with the EU: Just the Beginning

In her State of the Union address, Ursula von der Leyen emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s integration with the European Union. How do you assess the role of the President of the European Commission in this process?

She sets concrete goals and defines the direction for Ukraine’s path toward EU membership. And this is not merely her personal initiative — it is the initiative of the entire European Commission. She is implementing the will of the member states within the EU Council, yet there are still many aspects she manages independently.

The EU’s assistance to Ukraine — particularly the EU-financed military support — is one of Ursula von der Leyen’s major personal achievements, as she has invested enormous energy into it. The same goes for Ukraine’s accession process. However, the final decisions will be made by the member states, not by the Commission or von der Leyen personally.

Could Ukraine become an EU member by 2030?

That is the plan. I wouldn’t say it’s impossible, but the EU has had surprisingly mixed experiences with setting a fixed date before successfully closing all negotiation chapters and fully implementing the necessary legislation in the candidate country.

Ukraine still has work to do — not so much in adopting legislation, which is largely ready, but in enforcing it, especially in strengthening the rule of law and the fight against corruption. This year has brought certain setbacks, which have certainly not helped accelerate Ukraine’s accession process. But Ukraine has the potential to meet these challenges.

On August 25, the President of Poland announced a veto of the government bill that was meant to regulate protection and support for families fleeing the war. This decision, and the language that accompanied it – promises to make aid for children conditional on their parent’s employment, prolonging the path to citizenship, reigniting historical disputes – is not a matter of mood, but of cold political calculation.

It strikes at Ukrainian refugee women, at their children, at the elderly and the sick; it also strikes at our schools, doctors, and local governments. Instead of certainty, it brings fear; instead of calm, it threatens family separations, secondary migration, and the erosion of trust in the Polish state.

Imagine that you are the ones at war defending your homeland – and a neighboring country treats your wives, mothers, and daughters as hostages of politics.

After the President’s decision, thousands of homes across Poland were filled with shock, bitterness, and a sense of betrayal. Mothers who fled with children and sick parents from cities and villages turned to rubble now ask themselves: where are we supposed to flee next? Women who chose Poland out of love and trust now feel that this love has not been reciprocated.

A child is not a lifeless entry in a statute, and the aid granted to that child cannot be used as leverage against their mother. Solidarity is not seasonal, it is not a trend. If it is true in March, it must also be true in August. Memory is not a cudgel. A state that, instead of healing the wounds of history, reaches for easy symbols does not build community. A state cannot be a street theater. A serious state chooses responsibility, not political spectacle: procedures, clear communication, protection of the most vulnerable.

We, Polish women – mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, and grandmothers – say it plainly: no one has the right to impose conditions, in our name, on women fleeing war. We will not accept the pain and suffering of people in need of our support being turned into fuel for political disputes. We will not allow the destruction of the trust on which community stands. This is a matter of national interest and of our common conscience. It is bridges – not walls – that turn neighbors into allies, and it is predictable and just law, together with the language of respect, that strengthens Poland’s security more than populist shouting from the podium.

Europe – and therefore we as well – has committed to continuity of protection for civilians fleeing aggression. It is our duty to keep that word. This means one thing: to confirm publicly, clearly, and without ambiguity that the families who trusted Poland will not wake up tomorrow in a legal vacuum; that no child will be punished because their parent does not have employment; that the language of power will not divide people into “ours” and “others.” For a child and their single mother, the law must be a shield, not a tool of coercion into loyalty and obedience. Politics must be service, not spectacle.

We call on you, who make the law and represent the Republic, to restore certainty of protection and to reject words that stigmatize instead of protect. Let the law serve people, not political games. Let Poland remain a home where a mother does not have to ask: “Where to now?” – because the answer will always be: “Stay in a country that keeps its word.”

This is not a dispute over legal technicalities. It is a question of the face of the Republic. Will it be a state of the word that is kept – or a state of words thrown to the wind? Will we stand on the side of mothers and children – or on the side of fear?

Signed:
Polish women – mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, grandmothers.

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As of today, the letter has been endorsed by over two thousand women from across Poland — among them three former First Ladies of the Republic of Poland, Nobel Prize laureate Olga Tokarczuk, and internationally acclaimed filmmaker Agnieszka Holland. Their voices stand alongside those of hundreds of other women — mothers, daughters, sisters, grandmothers — who have chosen to sign as a gesture of solidarity and moral responsibility.

The full list of signatories is available at the link below:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/135yP6XadgyRJmECLyIaxQTHcOyjOVy9Y4mgFP9klzIM/edit?tab=t.0

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Joanna Mosiej: I would like to begin our conversation with your family history, because on many levels it serves as a metaphor for our Polish-Ukrainian relations. I am referring to your ancestors, the Szeptycki brothers. Roman (Andrey Sheptytsky - head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan of Galicia, Archbishop of Lviv (1901–1944) - Edit.) converted to the Greek Catholic faith, entered a monastery, and later became Metropolitan. Another brother, Stanisław, first served in the Austrian army, and after the war became a general in the Polish army. Both were patriots, individuals deeply devoted to the countries they served. And they maintained a fraternal bond.

Professor Andrzej Szeptycki: Of the five Szeptycki brothers, two identified themselves as Ukrainians - Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and Blessed Father Klymentiy - and three were Poles. I am referring to General Stanisław Szeptycki and also his brothers, Aleksander and my great-grandfather Leon. Metropolitan Andrey and Father Klymentiy regularly came on holiday to rest at the family home in Prylbichi in the Yavoriv district, where my great-grandfather Leon Szeptycki later lived. Despite their national differences, they maintained good relations with each other until the end of their lives.

They proved to us that different national identities can coexist without excluding one another.

I believe it was also very important that in the case of each of them, national identity was a significant element of life, but not the only one. In the case of Metropolitan Andrey and Father Klymentiy, their vocation and religious choices were primary as clergy. General Stanisław Szeptycki, as a soldier of that time, first served in the Austro-Hungarian and then in the Polish army and sought to serve his country well. They were certainly patriots - of each nation with which they identified. On the other hand, it is very important that they were certainly not nationalists. And this allowed them to respect different views while remaining close to one another.

Was such a legacy, a borderland identity, a value or a curse for your family? How does it define you?

During the communist period, it was somewhat of a challenge, a burden. The communist authorities viewed representatives of the former noble class negatively. In the case of the Szeptycki family, this was further combined with a very strong propaganda narrative directed against Ukrainians in Poland. And, of course, directed personally against Metropolitan Andrey, who was portrayed as a Ukrainian nationalist and spiritual father of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. During the communist period, and even in the 1990s, relatives quite regularly heard that Szeptycki is a Banderite». Nowadays, this has practically disappeared. I experienced this myself in 2023 when I was running an election campaign. The few voter reactions to my name were generally positive. In this sense, it is a significant change.

Apart from comments on social media, of course.

Yes, there I am often called Szeptycki - a Ukrainian, a Banderite. And surely there is a portion of society that will always react in this way. Returning to how it defines me, ever since our student years, my cousins and I have quite often travelled around Ukraine.

Some of us needed only one trip, while others stayed longer, for life. My cousin moved to Lviv a few years ago at the age of 50. Another cousin established the Szeptycki Family Foundation, which became actively involved in supporting Ukraine after February 24th 2022.

How do you explain this outburst of solidarity among us in 2022?

I believe there are three important factors. Firstly, the simple human need to help. Altruism which arises when we witness the suffering of others and react without much consideration.

Secondly, the shared experience of Russian imperialism. This has always resonated with Polish society. It is worth recalling the Polish response to the war in Chechnya - the reception of refugees, the clear sympathies. Or the year 2008 and the war in Georgia. Poland does not have strong cultural or geographical ties with Georgia, yet the reaction was vivid. We remember President Lech Kaczyński’s visit to Tbilisi and his prophetic words: today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after, perhaps the Baltic states, and then Poland. But most importantly - and in my opinion decisively - is the fact that none of this arose in a vacuum. This solidarity did not suddenly sprout in a desert, but on rather fertile ground which Poles and Ukrainians had been cultivating together over the past three decades.

From the 1990s, both sides carried out considerable work to develop interpersonal contacts. In 2022, many Poles were not helping «refugees». We were, for the most part, simply helping friends

Keeping in mind the great importance of the prior presence of Ukrainian refugees who had arrived in Poland since 2014, economic migrants from Ukraine, and the Ukrainian minority, primarily descendants of the victims of Operation Vistula.

Of course. Since the beginning of the war, that is, since 2014, or even since 2004, the Ukrainian minority in Poland has played an important role in supporting Ukraine - collecting funds, purchasing equipment, sending that equipment to the frontline. And receiving Ukrainian military refugees after February 24th 2022. Undoubtedly, the role of this community cannot be overestimated.

Precisely. You have been researching Polish-Ukrainian relations for many years. How have they changed? How has the Poles’ perception of Ukrainians changed?

It has been a long process. From the establishment of mutual contacts in the 1990s, through the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity - up to 2022. And, on the other hand, through the long-term presence in Poland of a significant group of economic migrants from Ukraine. Let us not forget that none of this would have been possible without the consistency of Poland’s Eastern policy and the legacy of the thought of the Paris-based «Kultura» and Jerzy Giedroyc personally. This belief in the importance of Ukraine, the importance of good relations, the necessity of support.

We were the first country to recognise Ukraine’s independence.

And it is worth mentioning a very important, albeit little-known, moment in Polish-Ukrainian relations on the eve of the USSR’s collapse, namely the participation of the Polish delegation of civic committees in the 1st Congress of the People’s Movement in Kyiv in 1989. The presence of representatives of the Polish civic committees, including Adam Michnik and Bogdan Borusewicz, was a symbolic gesture of support for Ukraine from Polish «Solidarity» at a time when Poland was still part of the Warsaw Pact and Ukraine still within the USSR.

And what were the subsequent milestones of our cooperation?

First and foremost, the three key events of the past two decades, which I have already mentioned: the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity, and the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. Each of these was met in Poland with clear public interest and a broad response of solidarity.

A sense of shared destiny, the legacy of Solidarity and the struggle for independence played an important role. At times, analogies were even drawn: it was said that Ukrainians in 2022 found themselves in a situation similar to that faced by Poles during the Second World War. The exhibition «Warsaw - Mariupol: cities of ruins, cities of struggle, cities of hope» was one such attempt to draw this symbolic parallel: cities levelled to the ground, the suffering of civilians, resistance. But it was also accompanied by another, no less important conviction: that Ukrainians today are facing something we, fortunately, are not experiencing - a classic violent conflict with Russian imperialism. And this solidarity manifested itself in Polish assistance.

What can we do to ensure this unprecedented solidarity seen in 2022 is not wasted? Today, in addition to the demons of the past, such as Volyn’ and the issue of exhumations, there are pressing social and economic problems.

Firstly, it is important to realise that no surge of solidarity lasts forever. The enthusiasm for Ukrainians that erupted after the beginning of the Russian invasion has gradually waned, and we are now in a phase where tension and fatigue are beginning to accumulate.

For most of its recent history, Poland has been a country of emigration - people left in search of work, bread, a better life. The issue of immigration was virtually absent from public debate. Today, the situation has changed. Around two million Ukrainians live in Poland - both economic migrants and people who fled the war. This is an entirely new social reality and a challenge to which we must respond consciously. Other challenges, including economic ones, must also be taken into account.

The pandemic, war and inflation - all of these influence the public sentiment. When people start running out of money, their willingness to show solidarity with «new neighbours» may weaken

Especially since they are constantly exposed to populist narratives claiming that immigrants take away our social benefits and our places in the queue for doctors. And that Ukraine does not agree to exhumations.

Yes, this is precisely why Polish-Ukrainian relations are no longer merely a matter of the past, but one of the key challenges for the future of Central and Eastern Europe. It is therefore important to defuse historical disputes, such as those concerning exhumations. It is very good that an agreement has recently been reached on this issue. Even if discussions on exhumations in the short term revive the Volyn’ issue, in the long term they will help resolve it. However, it is important to recognise - and I say this quite often to both Polish and Ukrainian partners - that at present, the key issue is not history. A major challenge lies in the broad economic matters related to Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.

We must recognise that Ukraine is not a failed state from which only unskilled workers or refugees come to Poland.

Despite the war, Ukraine has advantages in many areas that will pose a challenge to Poland when it joins the EU single market

Of course, Ukraine's accession to the EU is in Poland’s strategic interest. However, these are developments that we must be aware of, which we must closely observe and take action to prevent conflicts in these areas.

Therefore, at present, the real challenge is not the issue of the Volyn’ massacre, but rather how to adapt the common agricultural policy to the potential of Ukrainian agriculture. Naturally, it is also essential to prevent the escalation of social antagonism.

How does Polish-Ukrainian academic cooperation appear against this background?

Today, around 9% of students at Polish universities are international, almost half of whom are Ukrainian. The academic world, in line with its longstanding European tradition, is multinational. Universities have always been places of openness and tolerance; today, they develop programmes for support, equality and diversity. These are initiatives and responsibilities undertaken by the universities themselves.

Of course, there are always areas that can be improved. I am thinking, for example, of efforts to achieve better integration within the university. It often happens that we have two or three student communities living separately – students from Poland, English-speaking students and students from the East, mainly Ukrainians and Belarusians. We are working to ensure that these two or three communities come closer together.

You are responsible for international cooperation. In Ukraine, claims are heard that Poland is «draining» its intellectual capital. This is a well-known phenomenon here too - for years, it has been said that the best Polish academics leave for the West. What does this circulation between Poland and Ukraine look like?

Before February 24th 2022, around 500 Ukrainian academics worked in Polish universities. After the outbreak of war, this number doubled. Initially, there were special support measures - help with finding housing, work, a safe place - but quite quickly we realised that a change of perspective was needed.

Our goal is not a brain drain, but a brain circulation - a circulation of knowledge, ideas and experience

This is precisely why today, as a ministry, we support projects involving researchers and institutions from both countries. Those that build a joint research space.

A concrete example of such cooperation is the project of Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University in Ivano-Frankivsk, which, together with the Centre for East European Studies, rebuilt the pre-war university observatory «White Elephant» on Mount Pip Ivan. A functioning research station was created from ruins. Now the two universities are seeking funding for a telescope, the third stage of the project. This is an example of concrete cooperation based on partnership, not asymmetry.

Another example is Mykulychyn, a village in the Ukrainian Carpathians, where a Polish-Ukrainian youth meeting centre is being built. During my recent visit there, the first meeting took place with the participation of students from several Ukrainian universities and the University of Warsaw. It is in such places - in conversations, debates, joint projects - that the next generation of mutual understanding is born.

There is a real chance that this generation will get to know each other not through stereotypes, but through experience and culture.

Yes, but much work still lies ahead. I remember a study conducted, I believe, in 2021. Poles were asked which Ukrainian authors they knew, and Ukrainians were asked which Polish authors they knew. It turned out that 95% of Poles had never read a book by a Ukrainian author - and vice versa. What followed was even more interesting. Ukrainians associated Polish authors with Sienkiewicz and Sapkowski, while Poles named Gogol and Oksana Zabuzhko among Ukrainian authors. In terms of getting to know one another, including through culture, we still have much work to do.

But it is also important not to reduce each other to a kind of ethno-folklore, because we have much more to offer one another. We are united by common aspirations and hopes. And commonality does not always arise from similarity. It also arises from the desire to coexist despite differences and wounds.